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The following thesis examines the more than three-centuries old confrontation of liberalism and 
technological change and sketches an alternative approach based on the political theory of 
republicanism. It offers an intellectual history of liberalism on the subject of technological change 
as well as a theoretical and practical alternative to the liberal modes of thinking the variant pasts, 
presents and futures of technology. 
The concept of technological change is essential to my study of the politics of technology. 
Whether one is viewing technology as a historical phenomenon or as an actually existing set of 
tools, machines, techniques, etc., there is no possibility of studying technology as a static object. 
Additionally, positioning technological change as a matter of open criticism eschews any moral or 
political philosophy that would assume in advance the inherent value of alleged improvements to 
existing technology. On a rhetorical level, technological change is non-neutral, though compared 
to notions of technological “progress” and “innovation” the mere fact of change is undogmatic; it 
leaves room for dissent, deconstruction and reconstruction. If we are to go “to the things 
themselves” as Husserl advocated, then we should also be aware that these things, technological 
things, exhibit a tendency toward flux: they are slippery things that admit of sustained reflection 
if they are to be described and critiqued at all. 
However, the metaphysics of technological change does not bother me here so much as the 
notion of technologies and technological systems as phenomena in the field of politics. The 
alliance, for instance, of technology and political power is sometimes treated as irrelevant because 
 2 
the technologies-themselves do not have moral agency. On this view, humans are the ultimate 
cause of technological change and therefore the only relevant moral actors to consider when new 
technologies begin to upset the existing social order. When millions of rural laborers in the first 
Industrial Revolution found themselves working in squalid conditions in the new factories, when 
European colonial powers utilized compass navigation and modern shipbuilding techniques to 
transport human chattel across the world’s oceans, when a social media platform collects, holds 
and processes data pertaining to their human customers without external oversight, it is the people 
in charge, not the technologies-themselves that are to blame. 
This thesis challenges the assumption that technology consists of neutral objects, tools, 
machines and software that merely perform their intended functions. I argue that technologies have 
a moral and political significance that demands attention from the people of a democratic republic; 
indeed, the same kind of attention that citizens give to their laws should be extended to the 
technologies under which they live. Further, the task of political theory is to imagine institutions 
that will facilitate this public reflection and discussion on technologies. The slowness of 
democratic deliberation is the first counterweight to the frenetic acceleration of technological 
change in our time. 
My notion of democracy, however, differs from others that emphasize popular sovereignty, the 
control of the people [demos] over the national government. Many contemporary calls for the 
“democratization of technology” seem to float in this populist direction, albeit for the purpose of 
garnering the participation of people as users and consumers rather than citizens. Participation is 
in-itself an insufficient marker of democracy when democracy is understood as a means of securing 
the freedom and equality of citizens; one can still participate in a political system that dominates 
people of their religion, race, class, gender, sexual orientation and socioeconomic status. 
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This brings me to the fundamental frames that guide my constructive thinking in the following 
work. The first of these is republicanism, a branch of political thought with historical commitments 
to constitutionalism, mixed government and freedom understood as the absence of domination. 
The political thought of the republican theorist Philip Pettit, in particular, has guided my thinking 
on the subject of technology and freedom, and on the questions that surround the propensity for 
technology to increase or impinge upon the political freedom of the citizen. The concept of non-
domination receives its most thorough treatment in chapter three, “Technology and non-
domination.” 
Second, this thesis includes an attempt to synthesize republican political thought and the 
phenomenology of technics. Phenomenology provides the basis from which a thorough critique of 
technological conditions can arise, both analytically and in terms of existing scholarship on the 
relations between humanity and technology. The phenomenology of technics refers to the 
movement in phenomenological philosophy to engage with the phenomena of technology; my 
usage of the term “technics,” is due in part to an affinity with this movement and with their goal 
of coming to grips with technology as it appears on the level of experience. More generally, 
phenomenology as a philosophy of human experience describes the essential relationship between 
the human subject and technological object through the concept of intentionality, whereby my 
engagement with technologies is a process of creating practical meanings related to technological 
artifacts and systems. Intentionality describes the process by which my engagement with 
technology makes me who I am on an individual level, and, furthermore, how technologies become 
embedded in social relationships via a process of co-constitution. In short, we make technologies, 
though technologies also make us who we are. 
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The synthesis of republicanism and phenomenology happens on the level of awareness of 
relations of domination. Phenomenology offers a method of examining the things that make up the 
technological constitution; republicanism offers a strong normative frame with which to critique 
the conditions the technological society has constructed. 
To arrive at a republican approach to the theory of technics, I have also chosen to do the work 
of analyzing the confrontation of liberalism and technology from the writings of John Locke in the 
late 17th century to the present-day discourse of cyber-libertarianism. I allot the first half of this 
thesis to the examination of liberalism and its dominant tendencies toward the process of 
technological change. An alternative approach such as the one I present in the later chapters must 
be an alternative to something, and in this case, I perceive ideas from the liberal tradition as guiding 
the trajectory of technological change from its foundations to the present day. 
Chapter one, “Liberalism I: Technology at the foundations liberal political thought” is the first 
of this two-part intellectual history. In this chapter, I begin by analyzing the political and economic 
philosophies of three founding figures of modern liberalism: John Locke, Adam Smith and Jeremy 
Bentham. Locke and Bentham supply competing discourses of political rights and individual 
freedom, with Locke drawing his theory of property from the natural law tradition, whereas 
Bentham advocates a new axiom of legislation based on the principle of general utility. 
Additionally, Bentham’s attempt to establish a new science of morals and legislation complements 
the free market position of Adam Smith on the value of innovation to national productivity. Later 
on, however, the rise of social liberalism, with its conception of positive freedom, would unsettle 
the classical liberal tenets of individualism and laissez-faire; the political and social philosophy of 
T.H. Green and Leonard Hobhouse, in particular, qualified the claims of the Industrial Revolution 
and centered instead the experiences of oppressed workers caught in the economic machine. 
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Chapter two, “Liberalism II: 20th century technological change,” picks up where the first 
chapter left off with the continued articulation of social liberalism. In this first section, John 
Dewey’s critique of the old liberalism and desire to free engineers from the interests of business 
is complemented by the progressive ideas of Louis Brandeis on the value of individual rights, 
especially privacy, in the face of technological change. However, social liberalism would be 
supplanted by three other approaches to technology from the other corners of liberal theory: liberal 
technocracy, neoliberalism, and cyber-libertarianism. I analyze the significant theorists from these 
traditions in the section that follows and conclude with the claim that the majority of liberal 
theorists are not equipped to deal with the politics of technology because of the liberal ideal of 
non-interference. For Pettit, liberalism is a “broad church” that includes a wide range of political 
ideals and practices; however, the liberal tradition has also staid fast to the notion of freedom as 
non-interference, a notion that has permitted violent changes in the technological constitution of 
society and justification of these shifts in the rear-view mirror of history (1997 p.10). 
Chapter three, “Non-domination and technology,” transitions to the aforementioned synthesis 
of republicanism and phenomenology for the purpose of sketching an alternative means of thinking 
technological change. Beginning with an exposition of republican non-domination and the existing 
applications of phenomenological thought to technology, especially from the work of Don Ihde 
and Peter-Paul Verbeek, I then move on to defend the synthesis on the grounds that the 
phenomenological framework represents an improvement over existing descriptive methods that 
treat technological change as exogenous, and the republican notion of non-domination captures an 
essential harm of technologies that standard liberal accounts do not have the language or 
conceptual frames to express. 
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Chapter four, “The constitution of technology,” addresses the question of designing institutions 
to investigate and regulate technological change. Through the lens of constitutionalism, in this 
chapter I critique existing approaches in Technology Assessment and present an argument for 
thinking of technological change as a relation of co-constitution between humanity and 
technology. I also critique the political theorist Langdon Winner’s writings on the technical 
constitution of society, arguing that his image of democratic politics is not a substantive base from 
which to secure the means of promoting freedom as non-domination. After explaining my own 
formulation of democracy grounded in the republican tradition, I compare and contrast two 
essential institutions of popular control—the legislative body and the citizens’ committee—and 
their potential to secure citizens against the threat of domination. 
Thus, the normative claims in this thesis rest on the principles of freedom and domination. 
Why should this negative notion of freedom be of any relevance in a discussion of technology, 
whose impact on freedom is always cast in terms of augmentation, expansion and evolution from 
a primitive past into an enlightened future? The demand freedom makes of technological change 
is expressed by the revolutionary thinker Frantz Fanon in the context of the decolonial struggle : 
“I, the man of color, want only one thing: / That the instrument never dominates the man. That the 
servitude of man by man ceases forever. That is to say, of myself by another. That it might be 
permitted for me to discover and to love man, wherever he may be” (187).1 
Whenever technology recedes from awareness, it becomes a potent instrument of domination. 
Whenever technology is acknowledged for what it is, only then can we begin to discover what it 
can be.
 
1 « Moi, l’homme de couleur, je ne veux qu’une chose : / Que jamais l’instrument ne domine l’homme. Que cesse à 
jamais l’asservissement de l’homme par l’homme. C’est-à-dire de moi par un autre. Qu’il me soit permis de 
découvrir et de vouloir l’homme, où qu’il se trouve » (Peau Noir, masques blancs 187). [My translation] 
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Chapter 1.  
Liberalism I: Technology at the foundations of liberal political thought 
 
The traditional commitments of liberalism, including individual rights, free expression and market 
exchange, have undergirded the political and economic systems of states since the enlightenment. 
However, despite the relative staying power of liberalism, it often operates under an apparent 
contradiction: liberty is understood as the absence of interference, yet interference on the part of 
the government is a necessary component of political society. While many liberal thinkers have 
found creative ways to resolve this contradiction, deny it or simply assume it away, it has been and 
always will be a major stumbling block in liberal thought. 
Liberalism produces a twofold danger when it pairs the doctrine of non-interference with an 
unwillingness to engage with challenges to its authority. From the liberal economic point of view, 
for instance, technological change is cast as “innovation,” a process of continuous technical 
improvement that invariably leads to increased efficiency and individual autonomy. Though liberal 
thinkers recognize the replacement of human with machine labor as a social problem of some 
concern, they refuse to acknowledge more pressing threats to political institutions. The digital 
revolution has thrown this uncritical attitude into relief. Even as modern technologies engender 
automated decision-making, electronic surveillance and the dilution of the public sphere, 
neoliberals and cyber-libertarians argue the state should curtail regulation. Paradoxically, the 
liberal state should both render itself impotent against the exercise of economic freedoms and 
remain potent in its defense of these freedoms when they are under attack. 
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In this chapter and the next, I examine and evaluate the ways in which a variety of liberal 
thinkers have approached the tensions between freedom, technology and the law. I cover an 
expansive domain of modern political thought, spanning from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in 
England to the present day and its global crises of politics, economics and public health. Whether 
their responses are explicit or implicit, the thinkers with whom I engage provide answers to three 
basic questions: (1) what is the meaning of liberty, (2) what is the proper domain of the state in 
which it can intervene to secure political, or civil liberty, and (3) to what extent is technology part 
of this domain of intervention? The last question is the most pressing, in my view, because it 
implicates the fundamental issue of whether the state has a legitimate interest in regulating 
technological change. Within this question lies the disquieting notion that certain technologies 
have the potential to impinge on political liberty; more specifically, that certain devices and 
techniques, and, in some cases, entire technological systems, can constrain the capacity of 
individuals to meaningfully participate in the public affairs of their community and enjoy the equal 
exercise of their rights and duties with respect to their peers. 
With regard to the place of technology in the polity, there are three roughly distinct periods for 
the development of liberal thought, the first two of which I address in this opening chapter. First, 
three intersecting revolutions of the enlightenment—political, industrial and scientific—
accompany liberalism in its foundational period. Second, the elaboration of liberalism occurs in 
the wake of these revolutions, with the emergence of the modern nation-state, corporate industry 
and social protections against the perceived detrimental effects of industrialization. Third, the 
dissolution of Keynesian economic policies in post-war democracies catalyzes the rise of two 
interpretations of liberal thought that persist today, that of neoliberalism and cyber-libertarianism. 
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The development of the liberal state has been accompanied by political and economic policies 
that seek to prolong an interminable technological revolution. These policies undermine the 
foundations of the liberal state, excluding the general public from discussions about the future of 
technology and replacing informed deliberation with socially engineered consent. However, I 
conclude that this has been an endogenous process, not necessarily caused, but certainly inclined 
by the contradictions within liberal non-interference. If it is true that certain technologies have 
impinged on liberty while liberals turn a blind eye, in theory and in practice, then we stand on firm 
ground in claiming that liberalism has lost its way. It is my goal in this opening chapter to explicate 
the origins and development of the liberal tradition that have contributed to its modern crisis of 
disorientation. 
INSTRUMENTS AND MACHINES AT THE FOUNDATION OF LIBERALISM 
In 1688, William of Orange’s accession to the British throne and parliament’s subsequent drafting 
of a Bill of rights ushered in the end of the Stuart monarchy. The next year, John Locke returned 
to England from exile and published Two Treatises of Government, though he had composed much 
of the work in the years leading up to his flight from the country in 1683. In fact, convincing 
historiographical evidence suggests Locke wrote the Treatises not in response to the new 
constitutional monarchy, but in criticism of the paternal absolutist writings of the previous decade, 
especially those of Sir Robert Filmer.2 With this background in mind, it seems that Locke was not 
at all concerned with technology, and in a general sense, this is true. However, Locke was deeply 
concerned with the rights of the individual against arbitrary power. It is the depth of Locke’s 
humanism, then, as well as its pitfalls, that bears on our question concerning technology. 
 
2 See Peter Laslett, “Two Treatises of Government and the Revolution of 1688,” Cambridge Historical Journal, vol 
12, no. 1, March 1956, pp. 40-55. 
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In The Second Treatise of Government, Locke employs the theory of natural right to justify the 
perfect freedom and equal status of men in the state of nature.3 In that theoretical state, each man 
has “an uncontroleable Liberty, to dispose of his Person or Possessions,” but lacks the liberty to 
harm others, except in self-defense (ch. II §6). To sustain themselves, men enjoy the right to 
appropriate parts of the common, God-given stock of the world as their own. To do so lawfully, 
without gaining the consent of all other members of mankind, requires that each man “has a 
Property in his own person” (ch. IV §27). From the idea of self-ownership, it follows that each 
man has a natural title to the labor of his body and the works of his hands. In removing an item 
from what is held in common—an apple from a tree, for instance—man mixes his labor with it, 
improves it, and thereby makes it his own. 
Unlike his well-known predecessor,4 Locke differentiates between the state of nature, “Men 
living together according to reason, without a common judge Superior on Earth,” and the state of 
war, in which the absence of a common judge leads men to employ “force, or a declared design of 
force” in settling their disputes (ch. III §19). The state of nature, then, represents a fragile peace, 
and the reason for men to enter into political society is “the mutual preservation of their Lives, 
Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property” (ch. IX §123). Again, in Locke’s 
view, each individual owns himself; there is thus an identity of liberty and property. Similarly, the 
people as one body consent to the law of government, giving up their natural liberty, though in 
return they gain the safety of the commonwealth. Locke writes further that “express consent” is 
necessary to incorporate oneself as a member of the body politic; profiting from the security of a 
 
3 While I tend to alternate between masculine, feminine or gender-neutral pronouns in my own writing, when 
discussing the work of a philosopher I employ the language they use in their original written work. 
4 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan chap. XIII 
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particular country makes the individual subject to that country’s laws, but to enjoy the rights and 
duties of citizenship requires active submission (ch. VIII §119). 
Given the centrality of private property in Locke’s political thought, in what instances does the 
commonwealth have a legitimate reason for interference in the affairs of individuals? First, the 
state can interfere on grounds of inefficiency. Locke, who claims that God gave the world to 
mankind in common, emphasizes that any man who takes more than he is able to enjoy, letting the 
products of nature spoil, has “invaded his Neighbour’s share, for he had no Right, farther than his 
Use” (ch. IV §37). Such a person, in Locke’s view, is liable to be punished by his fellow man in 
the state of nature, and, by extension, the government in political society. And though it would be 
incorrect to call Locke a proto environmentalist, his vilification of waste speaks to a growing 
problem in mass consumer societies.  
The introduction of agriculture and manufacturing technologies, for example, has greatly 
magnified the volume of waste since the publication of the Second Treatise. In the 2018 “What a 
Waste 2.0” report from the World Bank, Kaza et al. note that Food Loss and Waste accounts for 
about 30 percent of all food produced in the world, amounting to 1.3 billion tons of wasted food 
per year (30). Most of the food waste in low-income countries occurs at the production and storage 
and distribution stages, and the authors cite “managerial and technical limitations” as one of the 
key causes of this failure (31). Blockages in supply chains, high market prices and intentional 
retention of food supplies contribute to food waste, and on a Lockean view the commonwealth 
would have an interest in punishing, and thus deterring those who allowed excessive waste in their 
production process. In this case, however, the liberality of the state has resulted in letting both food 
waste and environmental degradation occur within generous limits of acceptability. 
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For the people to tolerate government intervention, Locke expects that the Legislative power 
always uphold the right to life, liberty and property. Express consent is the keystone of the 
legitimate commonwealth, though to some degree Locke admits this consent is only valuable if 
the people have access to the practical means of resisting arbitrary power (ch. XIX §226–229). An 
individual’s consent to live under the laws of a commonwealth is conditioned on the relative 
rightness or corruption of the government; to claim that a person should not resist unlawful 
government because it would disturb the peace is tantamount to the claim that “honest Men may 
not oppose Robbers or Pirates, because this may occasion disorder and bloodshed” (ch. XIX §228).  
It is in this sense, however, that Lockean consent leaves us at a loss to resist the process of 
technological change, which has no obvious locus of power, nor center of authority to whom one 
can express one’s disapproval. Thus, the concept of consent in-itself is incomplete; such consent 
is not meaningful if all parties to the contract do not have the opportunity to express their views 
and influence the outcome of the deliberation. 
Locke’s ideas concerning individuals’ right to pursue life, liberty and property would be further 
developed during the first major turn towards mechanized production during the First Industrial 
Revolution. Especially in the domain of political economy, thinkers were beginning to recognize 
the transformative potential of machines in labor and industry; it was in this context that Adam 
Smith published his economic treatise The Wealth of Nations (1776). In the first two chapters of 
The Wealth of Nations, Smith makes two significant claims that together serve as the wellspring 
of his economic theory. The first is that “the division of labor, however, so far as it can be 
introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labor” 
(Bk. I.i 5). To support this claim, Smith describes the effect of the division of labor on the 
productive capacities of a pin-manufacturer; namely, that splitting the different stages of the 
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production process amongst several workers is more efficient than having an equal number of 
workers each manufacture pins individually. Smith’s second major claim is that all men have a 
“propensity to truck barter and exchange one thing for another” that leads naturally to the creation 
of markets based on self-interested economic behavior (Bk. I.ii 14). 
Smith argues that lone individuals profiting from the division of labor drive technological 
innovation. Such individuals typically fall into one of three categories: workers, makers and 
philosophers. Smith conjectures that workers who specialize can then devote time and energy to 
inventing new methods of production, and indeed their self-interest motivates them to do so. For 
example, Smith relates an incredible anecdote about a boy who, tasked with operating the valve of 
an early “fire [steam] engine”, finds a way to automate his labor by tying a string from the handle 
of a valve to another part of the machine, an ingenious improvement that allows him to go out and 
play with his friends (Bk. I.i. 10).5 
Smith does not have much to say of the makers—whose occupation, after all, is invention. 
However, in the philosophers he finds further proof of the benefits of the division of labor. 
Philosophy, of course, does not connote the professional university departments of today (though 
these might also serve as proof of Smith’s argument); instead, philosophy, or speculation, refers 
to the work of individuals “whose trade it is, not to do any thing, but to observe every thing” (Bk. 
I.i. 11). While workers want to streamline the industrial process, philosophers nurture academic 
interests which are adjacent to technology, thereby contributing unintentionally to the creation of 
new methods and machines of industry.  
 
5 The moral of this story is that individual workers, operating from self-interest, are liable to improve upon existing 
techniques. Smith’s stance on the moral permissibility of child labor, however, is ambiguous. 
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In sum, the benefits Smith associates with technological progress are the virtuous outcome of 
the division of labor and market competition. There is a potential problem with this claim, 
however, because of the inefficiency involved in coordinating innovation on the macro-scale. It is 
plausible that a single worker might figure out a more efficient production process, but to 
contribute substantially to the national economy the process must eventually enjoy widespread 
adoption. The difficulty is to find a method or process by which inventions can spread naturally, 
without the hindrance of government planning or intervention. 
For Smith, the market mechanism achieves in the absence of conscious guidance much more 
than the state can hope to achieve by unified intention. In the pure competitive markets of classical 
economics, firms quickly adopt new methods of production that might give them a slight edge, 
and over time the free market allocates the fruits of invention. In this way, the drives of human 
nature, as Smith understood them, provide fuel for the automated process of market exchange. 
Smith therefore resisted efforts to tamper with this mechanism, allocating to the state a 
comparatively narrow domain in which to regulate economic activity. The state’s only duty is to 
maintain conditions under which market transaction can occur, including the provisions of defense, 
a justice system and public works (Bk. IV.ix 745). In short, the state intervenes in instances where 
the market mechanism fails—though this also includes the need to address moral degradation 
among workers in the “large manufactories” of newly industrialized urban environments, in which 
“the temptation of bad company” is a threat to the moral development of the individual (Bk I.viii 
96). Overall, the Smithian perspective on technology is characteristically laissez-faire, positing 
technological change as a natural process that tends toward the public good. 
Classical economists like Smith recognized the transformative role of machine technology due 
to its effects on economic activity. However, the impact of science and technology on politics 
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proved more abstract and difficult to articulate. Before confronting technology as a political 
phenomenon, modern political thinkers gained fluency in importing a science discourse into 
politics and economics. Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, played a pivotal role in 
bringing a scientific attitude to the legislative process and applying to legislation his principle of 
general utility: the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In 1789, Bentham published his first 
major work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in which he claims the 
pursuit of pleasure and the evasion of pain are the source of all human conduct. Working from this 
premise, he derives a moral and political formula for legislators to apply in their work: “Between 
two opposite modes of action, would you know to which the preference is due? Calculate the 
effects, in good and ill, and decide for that which promises the greatest amount of happiness” 
(310).  
Within the recommendation to legislate on the basis of moral calculation lies a significant 
fracture with preceding liberal theorists. In detaching politics from what he termed the “fictions” 
of natural law and the social contract, Bentham appealed not to an absolute moral authority, but to 
the authority of an axiomatic moral principle, the principle of general utility, from which burst 
forth an extensive body of political thought (303). However, despite his formidable oeuvre of 
moral and political writings, Bentham is most well-known among scholars of science and 
technology as the architect of the panopticon. The panopticon’s structure resembles a cylinder, 
with a high watchtower in the center that affords the inspector a view into the prison cells on the 
circumference. The cells are partitioned such that the prisoners cannot see the inspector, nor each 
other, though the inspector can see them. Its original application was to prisons; however, Bentham 
believed the architectural principles of the panopticon could also be applied to other settings in 
which individuals must be constantly watched to ensure their good behavior. 
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Bentham published the panopticon plans in 1791 under the title Panopticon: or, the Inspection 
House, though this work and the later ‘Postscripts’ came after years of reflection. Bentham, 
however, never saw the construction of a real panopticon. The contemporary obsession with 
panopticon metaphors comes, no doubt, from its treatment in Foucault’s 1975 work Surveiller et 
Punir: Naissance de la prison. Foucault argues that the arrangement of power structures in modern 
society has come to resemble a panopticon, in which individuals discipline themselves under the 
exposure of institutions that induce the perception of total surveillance. The total diffusion of 
panopticism, Foucault writes, is no accident, but a Benthamite dream come true: 
These disciplines, which the classical age had elaborated in specific, relatively enclosed 
places—barracks, schools, workshops—and whose total implementation had been 
imagined only at the limited and temporary scale of a plague-stricken town, Bentham 
dreamt of transforming into a network of mechanisms that would be everywhere and 
always alert, running through society without interruption in space or time. (2008 p.12) 
Foucault intimates that Bentham’s ultimate goal was to subject people in every social context to 
the same disciplinary measures used to manage lepers, prisoners and schoolchildren. Despite the 
Figure 1-1. Architectural drawings of the panopticon prison by Willey Reveley from the 1791 plans 
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undeniable influence of Foucault’s interpretation, however, his characterization is incomplete. 
Bentham indeed wished to introduce the panopticon principle to schools, hospitals and factories, 
though there is scant evidence to support the goal of total implementation. In fact, Bentham 
considered the panopticon an “answer to one of the most puzzling of political questions, quis 
custodiet ipsos custodes [who will watch the watchmen]?” referencing a line from the Satires of 
the Latin poet Juvenal (1791 p.26). Through the verse of the poet, Bentham illustrates a challenge: 
how to verify those in power are wielding power in the right way. However, despite our intuitions 
about the psychological oppressiveness of panopticism, Bentham actually viewed the panopticon 
as a solution to this challenge. How could this be the case? 
One answer lies in the performative role Bentham envisioned for the prison system. The real 
Bentham, argues Sajjad Safaei (2020), believed the prison held instructive quality for the onlooker 
of the tortured prisoners, adding in the ‘Postscripts’ that “in a well-composed Committee of Penal 
Law, I know not a more essential personage than the Manager of a Theatre” (58).6 The prison had 
to be theatrical not for the entertainment of the guards, but for that of the general public. Bentham 
wanted the panopticon and similar institutions to be subjected to the scrutiny of the public eye, 
“thrown wide open to the body of the curious at large: —the great open committee of the tribunal 
of the world” (30). He encouraged officials and ordinary citizens to visit the panopticon, not simply 
to witness the suffering of the prisoners, but to keep tabs on the inspector as well. The above 
considerations contradict Foucault’s thesis that the practice of gruesome medieval torture had 
given way to torturous banality and regimentation. And though Bentham’s obsession with social 
engineering is cause for concern on a classical liberal view, the great mistake of panopticon 
 
6 Safaei acknowledges a debt to Philip Smith (2009) for bringing this quote to their attention. 
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metaphors is that they stop at the prison gate; those in the watchtower, too, expose themselves to 
a transparent, quasi-democratic process of monitoring. 
If there is any strictly Benthamite influence on the contemporary modes of technological 
regulation, it lies not in the panopticon as a metaphor for the surveillance state, but in Bentham’s 
integration of utilitarianism into a new quantitative science of politics. Nothing should be so 
familiar to us, yet so strange given the history of constitutionalism and legislation, that the art of 
politics should base itself on a quantitative understanding of happiness. I say “familiar” because 
of the rapid advances in speed and power of computers within the past half-century, and the 
concomitant deluge of digital data in our technological society. Bentham, on the other hand, wrote 
during the fledgling years of statistical method, when it would have been impossible to process the 
necessary data to implement the felicific calculus he proposed. 
In The Taming of Chance, a history of the emergence of national statistics in Europe, Ian 
Hacking writes of the first attempts to record numerical indications of social welfare. On the advice 
of G.W. Leibniz, the kingdom of Brandenburg-Prussia began recording births, deaths and 
marriages during the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm I (1713-1740), using these numbers as proxies 
for the vigor of the state (Hacking 19). Suffice it to say those Prussian administrators would be 
amazed at the sheer volume of data that contemporary governments collect on their citizens. With 
the United States as a notable exception, many countries today have comprehensive national ID 
systems that connect the personal information of citizens to an array of government services. In 
addition, the phenomenon of “big data,” the collection, storage and distribution of data sets too 
large for standard IT devices, has greatly increased the volume and types of data organizations can 
feasibly process (see Alam et al. 2014; Chen, Chiang and Storey 2012). 
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Modern technology has not achieved the Foucauldian panoptic dream, so much as the 
distinctively Benthamite dream of quantitative morality. Take Bentham from any stage in his 
career—from his early conservatism to his late radical republicanism—and you will find a constant 
adherence to the principle of general utility (Schofield 93). Everywhere the legislator is expected 
to carry out moral calculations to ascertain the amounts of pain and pleasure drawn from a 
particular act, while at the same time he is faced with the impossible task of quantifying the 
subjective mental states of millions of citizens. Bentham, however, seems to sidestep the practical 
difficulty of moral calculation: 
When we are familiar with it [moral calculation], when we have acquired the judgement which 
results from such familiarity with it, we compare the sum-total of good, and the sum-total of 
mischief, with so much promptitude as not to perceive the items of the reasoning. We do the 
sum without knowing it (Morals and Legislation 238). 
According to Bentham, moral calculation has always been followed implicitly; over time it 
becomes ingrained in the mind of the legislator. What this really sounds like, however, is the use 
of heuristics: rules of thumb for making informed, but hardly quantitative judgements about the 
moral acceptability of public policies.7 The Benthamite legislator was, then, a “computer” in the 
literal sense of the word, albeit a groping and inefficient one. But if processing power is the most 
important attribute of the legislator, are there now digital computers that can do a better job? 
It is tempting to claim that information technology has dragged the least practical aspects of 
utilitarian government into the realm of possibility, though the same weaknesses of utilitarian 
thought also plague modern data-centrism. Latent within the utilitarian foundations of the modern 
state is a logic of government that attaches political meaning to quantitative proxies of social 
 
7 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974) for a detailed study of the general use of heuristics in human decision-making. 
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progress. These are often presented in the form of economic ratios and averages, and thus are liable 
to obscure increasing inequality and the decay of basic freedoms. There is, in fact, no fundamental 
agreement between utilitarian aims and institutions that safeguard political liberty. Indeed, there is 
a diminished need for representative government if the state can effectively measure public opinion 
and predict the effects of its actions via technological means. Further, as was demonstrated by the 
Snowden leaks in 2013 of post-9/11 National Security Agency electronic surveillance, an 
apparatus of mass surveillance allegedly designed to protect American citizens supplements the 
traditional bureaucratic machine of government. The startling lack of legislative oversight in that 
case further proves the imperative of technical execution over the messier process of legislative 
deliberation. Democracy becomes superfluous, and a data-driven enlightened despotism 
constitutes an attractive alternative. 
THE ELABORATION OF LIBERALISM IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 
Over the course of the 19th century, interpretations of the impact of machine industry on social 
progress gained greater relevance in liberal spheres of thought. Classical economists working 
within the tradition of Adam Smith lauded the advantages of machine technology for both 
producers and consumers, touting the invention of new methods of production as an undeniable 
social good. This form of economic liberalism constituted a powerful intellectual current, but it 
did not stand unopposed; the advent of social liberalism, beginning with the late political thought 
of John Stuart Mill, turned towards an acknowledgement of the recurring crises of unemployment 
and unequal contractual relationships the factory model had engendered. These social liberals 
emphasized the duty of governments to foster conditions that would allow citizens to develop as 
creative, engaged and moral members of democratic society, though they still hesitated to inquire 
directly into the political content of the machine. 
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Though a disciple of Bentham’s utilitarianism, Mill accorded individual liberty and its 
realization within a system of representative government a central position in his political thought. 
For Mill, locating the proper limits of government coercion over the individual—what he terms 
“the struggle between Liberty and Authority”—represents the single greatest challenge in the 
history of government (On Liberty 5). In this way, Mill articulates a similar flashpoint between the 
commonwealth and its citizens. The problem of government coercion is especially pronounced 
when the authorities impose a tax, a rule or some such other provision that comes into conflict 
with the desires of individuals. In response to this concern, Mill advocates a supreme political 
principle: “That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Ibid 14). The security of the 
individual, however, is not an end-in-itself, but a precondition for his active flourishing as a 
member of society. Indeed, it is Mill’s broad definition of utility, “grounded on the permanent 
interests of man as a progressive being,” that ties the moral progress of the individual to that of the 
community (Ibid). 
One of the instances in which Mill supported government intervention was in the reform of 
factory working conditions, especially as it concerned the treatment of women and children. Mark 
Blaug (1958) documents the economic debates surrounding early factory legislation in Britain, in 
which Mill was a central figure. Mill first argued in an 1832 article for a law that would ban 
children and females of all ages from working in factories, while answering possible objections to 
his position from the adherents of a “non-interference philosophy” (qtd. in Blaug 214). Later, 
however, he argued for women’s right to employment and even expressed a desire to extend 
worker’s protections to men as well. Mill emphasized the “propriety of government intervention” 
in cases where the legislature ought to support the interests of workers, whose bargaining power 
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paled in comparison to that of the industrial capitalist (220).8 It might be assumed that the classical 
economists aligned themselves against the Factory acts in England, though Kenneth Walker (1941) 
actually reported a lack of consensus among the most prominent liberal economists of the time. 
Thinkers such as David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus, for example, stayed relatively silent on the 
matter, and most of the attendees of the star-studded 1821 meeting of the Political Economy 
Club—which included Ricardo, Robert Torrens, J.R. Mcullough and Mill—actually favored 
factory legislation, at least on behalf of children (Walker 171).9 
If Walker is right that the English political economists did not express strong opinions on 
factory legislation, perhaps it will be more fruitful to look elsewhere; namely, among the thinkers 
of the more uncompromising French Liberal school of economic thought. In his Traité d'économie 
politique, for example, the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say argues unreservedly for the 
advantages of industrial machinery.10 Say address two key concerns of his opponents: that 
machines destroy occupations and that they benefit the capitalist producer at the expense of 
laborers. To the first point, Say expounds the idea that all machines, from the simplest tools to the 
most complex instruments, are merely methods for harnessing the powers of nature (65). Though 
Say admits that new inventions risk certain “disadvantages” [inconvéniens] for those who lose 
employment, these disadvantages have always been greatly outweighed by the overall benefits 
(66). He therefore has no sympathy for arguments to the contrary, chalking them up to 
shortsightedness, even madness on the part of the critics of industry: 
 
8 See Mill, Principles of Political Economy (London, 4th ed., 1849), pp. 427-30. 
9 See also Proceedings of the Political Economy Club, 1821-1920 (London 1921), IV, 41. 
10 From the fifth edition of the Traité D'économie Politique : Ou Simple Exposition De La Manière Dont Se 
Forment, Se Distribuent Et Se Consomment Les Richesses, published in Paris in 1826. 
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Et l'on a tiré là des arguments assez graves contre l'emploi des machines ; plusieurs lieux, elles 
ont été repoussées par la fureur populaire, même par des actes de l'administration. Ce serait 
toutefois un acte de folie que de repousser des améliorations a jamais favorables à l'humanité, 
à cause des inconvéniens qu'elle pourraient avoir dans l'origine ; inconvéniens d'ailleurs 
atténués par les circonstances qui les accompagnent ordinairement.11 (66) 
Say further observes that the loss of employment in one sector often causes a demand for labor in 
another; the construction of a hydraulic machine (aqueduct) replaces the labor of water porters, 
with a demand for the labor of architects, masons and steel workers (67). In addition, there will be 
less suffering among members of the working class when machines carry out exhausting jobs, 
because “machines do not die of hunger” [des machines ne meurent pas de faim] (71). Finally, 
such improvements give workers greater purchasing power due to the decreased costs of 
production, allowing firms to reduce their prices to compete on the market. 
On Say’s view the continuous invention of new machines is one of the single greatest 
determinants of economic and social progress, diffusing benefits to all members of the society, 
managers and workers alike. It follows that any attempt to regulate the process of technological 
innovation is likely to be ill-conceived, ultimately tending toward the harm of the very same 
individuals or groups its author sets out to protect. The liberal economic interpretation of 
technological change can always fall back on the assertion that the temporary pain felt by some 
 
11 “And there have been some rather serious arguments against the use of machines; in many places, they have been 
pushed out by popular fury, even by acts of administration. It would be, however, an act of folly to reject those 
improvements ever favorable to humanity because of the disadvantages they may have in the beginning; 
disadvantages, moreover, attenuated by the circumstances that ordinarily accompany them.” [My translation] 
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will surely yield long-term benefits for all. The entrepreneurial inventors of technology need only 
say “leave it to us” [laissez-nous faire], and abundance will follow.12  
It is perhaps ironic, then, that the economic doctrine of laissez-faire would gradually lose its 
standing within the liberal tradition due to a series of innovations that were not technological, but 
ideological in nature. The first of these innovations was the addition of ‘positive liberty’ to the 
working vocabulary of liberal theorists. While the idea of positive liberty was by no means a 
completely new phenomenon, having been a cornerstone of concepts of liberty in the classical 
republics of ancient Greece and Rome, the negative notion of liberty as the absence of constraints 
had dominated liberal thought since the beginning of the enlightenment.13 However, in the mid to 
late 19th century a new generation of social liberals had taken up the concept and began employing 
it as a justification for more vigorous government intervention performed in the interest of the 
community. 
One of the first thinkers to elaborate a positive concept of liberty during this period was the 
English philosopher Thomas Hill Green. Like the social contract theorists, Green argues that man 
in the state of nature, while enjoying perfect freedom in terms of the absence of constraint, lacks 
freedom because he cannot exercise the full faculties of thought and action: “He is not the slave of 
man, but he is the slave of nature” (371). Green, for his part, emphasizes the gains the individual 
makes when he submits to the law and enters into political society. What is also distinctive is the 
extent to which the freedom Green refers depends on the definition of man as a social being: 
“freedom… is valuable only as a means to an end: That end is what I call freedom in the positive 
 
12 This quote is attributed to the French merchant M. Le Gendre, who, speaking on behalf of the merchant class in 
1681, allegedly refused the economic assistance of finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert with the phrase, 
« Laissez-nous faire ». 
13 See Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge UP, 1998. 
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sense: in other words, the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a common 
good” (372).  
On this view, although the individual is still an important point of reference, there is a clear 
rejection of atomistic individualism. Green’s philosophical anthropology thus consists of a 
rejection of homo oeconomicus and an embrace of the Aristotelian zoon politikon [political 
animal], whose existence is inextricably tied to life in the polis. Liberation, the removal of 
obstacles, is instrumental to the enactment of positive liberty in this social context. Extending the 
liberal commitment to individual rights, Green also advances a critique of economic interpretations 
of labor. Unlike Smith or Say, for example, who treat labor as a market commodity, Green claims 
that labor “attaches in a peculiar manner to the person of man,” and therefore requires greater 
restrictions on its sale (373). Labor is much more than a factor of production; one’s occupation is 
also a vital source of purpose and dignity. 
Though Green accords the state a responsibility to maintain a minimum set of conditions under 
which citizens can attain a high degree of self-fulfillment, the nature of this maintenance is 
proactive as it regards the actions of individual agents, but reactive as it regards processes such as 
technological change. Regarding the general population, he is not convinced that “the enlightened 
self-interest or benevolence of individuals, working under a system of unlimited freedom of 
contract,” would have been able to resolve the problems addressed in the Factory Acts (376). The 
intervention of the legislature was necessary, he argues, in order to rearrange the rights and 
regulations involved in contracting one’s labor in the novel industrial context. Still, Green offers 
little guidance in the way of influencing the introduction or design of the machines that helped 
give rise to the working conditions in those factories. Tongue in cheek, he references the official 
accounts of dismal working conditions among the nation’s “great industries” before the 
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introduction of legal regulations, thereby focusing on the conditions produced by the factory 
system, not the factory system itself; Green betrays no pretensions to Luddism, technophobia or 
anything close to a sustained critique of machine technology outside its effects on workers. 
In fact, in the new social liberalism there was an even greater synthesis between the state and 
the machine as a metaphor for social control. As an intellectual successor of Green, the English 
liberal political theorist and sociologist Leonard Hobhouse made further innovations in the 
expression of social liberalism, though also did so through the use of mechanical rhetoric. To be 
sure, Hobhouse wrote convincingly of the common political interests linking the individual to 
society. In direct confrontation with earlier liberal thinkers,14 He claims in his seminal work, 
Liberalism (1911), that there is “no essential antithesis between liberty and law. On the contrary, 
law is essential to liberty” (17). Because the law implicates all members of the community, 
Hobhouse argues, it liberates the individual from the fear of arbitrary subjection. It is also from 
this impartiality in the law that Hobhouse concludes, “Liberty in this respect implies equality,” not 
merely between citizens but also between citizens, governments, and any other corporate entity 
that operates within the society (Ibid). 
Looking back on the legislative disputes surrounding the Factory Acts, Hobhouse traces the 
disorientation of laissez-faire doctrine among members of parliament in the 1830s, a process that 
heralded “the decay and death of the older Liberalism” (48). Concerning contracts, for instance, a 
major tenet of classical liberalism had been the right to freely dispose of one’s labor. At least since 
Locke, liberal theorists had consecrated the absolute right of a person over the labor of their body 
and the works of their hands. Hobhouse, however, associates the “rise of machine industry since 
1760” with a growing admission of the need to protect children and adult laborers from 
 
14 E.g., Bentham, Principles of Legislation: “Every law is an evil, for every law is an infraction of liberty” (259). 
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exploitation in contractual relationships (46). Even as a fully capable adult, the laborer was also 
subject to the bargaining power of industrial managers, requiring the state to interfere with freedom 
of contract to establish a fair and just transaction. Moreover, the lack of industrial regulation 
increased the arbitrary power of industry owners over their dependent employees who, by 
economic necessity, placed themselves under the partial dominion of factory bosses in exchange 
for wages. 
With his rejection of laissez-faire and individualism, Hobhouse represents one thread in a 
radical strand of liberal political thought. Though he advances nothing close to a cohesive theory 
of technology or technological change, Hobhouse and other social liberals introduced the concept 
of organicism to the theory of the liberal state.15 Hobhouse claims society is “organic” in the sense 
that it is “made up of parts which are quite distinct from one another, but which are destroyed or 
vitally altered when they are removed from the whole” (67). In this thoroughly socialized 
conception of humanity, the identity of the individual means nothing in the absence of public life. 
Further, the organic view is conditioned on a vision of the body politic which seems to evoke 
images of the flesh, but which actually belongs within a tradition of mechanical political rhetoric. 
Locke invokes this tradition when he refers to god as a divine craftsman whose “workmanship” 
brought man into existence, though the metaphor extends much further, appearing in many 
different political orientations (Chap. II §6). 
The 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes delivers one of the most poetic expressions of 
mechanical politics in his introduction to Leviathan, in which the motions of man and the state are 
reduced to their material and instrumental functions: 
 
15 See Jeannie Morefield, . “HEGELIAN ORGANICISM, BRITISH NEW LIBERALISM AND THE RETURN OF 
THE FAMILY STATE,” for a detailed account of the way in which Hegelian ideas in the new liberalism served as a 
foil for their classical liberal alternatives. 
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For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but 
so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art 
goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art 
is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine 
CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man…” (7). 
The parallelism of man and state thus rests on their shared status as the outcome of artificial design. 
Whether Hobbes was the first to propound such a mechanical interpretation of the state is doubtful, 
though subsequent theorists certainly owe a debt to his treatment of the subject. Hobhouse is 
included among these inheritors of machine discourse, deploying mechanical metaphors at various 
junctures in his political thought. He does so in the chastisement of individuals who take the state 
for granted, writing, “if everyone were to act as he does, the social machine would come to a stop” 
(79) and in the context of keeping paupers “away from the Poor Law machine” which had allegedly 
sapped individual initiative and lowered the average working wage (82). 
The most revealing instance of machine rhetoric, however, appears in an argument for the right 
to a living wage. Hobhouse claims that, in any society where a capable individual cannot sustain 
himself by means of a decent profession, “[t]here is somewhere a defect in the social system, a 
hitch in the economic machine” (84). Hobhouse pursues the metaphor in his description of the 
worker who has no hope of fixing such a machine on his own; for one person to fix the machine, 
he argues, is an impossible task owing to the complexity of the economic mechanism in question. 
Nevertheless, in his view these considerations of feasibility should not abrogate the rights of the 
citizen. Though Hobhouse does not turn his attention to the process of technological change per 
se, he opens up the domain of government intervention to address the “complex mass of social 
forces” that can potentially endanger the free status of the individual in society, but which no 
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individual can hope to control: “They [social forces] can be controlled, if at all, by the organized 
action of the community, and therefore, by a just apportionment of responsibility, it is for the 
community to deal with them” (86-7). It is not so much of a leap, in my opinion, to posit 
technological changes as one of these social forces, even if this is ultimately not the language I 
embrace in describing the role of technologies in society. 
Finally, it is one thing to designate collective responsibility for regulating social conditions, 
though quite another to probe into how those conditions came about. Among the many possible 
lines of inquiry, Hobhouse is not prepared to scrutinize the design of technology for its political 
content. By design, I mean not only the structure of machines, but within what overall plan for the 
society those machines fit. The same machines that the classical economists lauded for their 
efficiency—such as textile looms, the steam engine, and faster printing presses—had played a role 
in giving rise to social conditions that no one in particular had planned, but that were nevertheless 
the outcome of innumerable decisions that each finely altered the course of technological change. 
Unlike in the design of political constitutions in the liberal tradition, which supposedly involves 
careful planning and deliberation by all of the relevant stakeholders, the technological makeup of 
the society had taken shape without input from the majority of its would-be citizens. The question 
that began to occupy liberal thinkers at the turn of the 20th century was how to harness the social 
forces of technological change so they would serve the public good. In the next chapter, I turn my 
attention to the debates over technological change from the conclusion of the First World War, the 




Chapter 2.  
Liberalism II: 20th century technological change 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, new technologies of communication and production as well as 
advancements in science promised a higher quality of life for an increasing number of people. 
Among other factors, the ascendance of liberalism and the liberal state contributed to these 
developments in science and technology by setting up market institutions and property rights 
regimes that favored innovation and entrepreneurship. Along with their enthusiasm for technology, 
however, liberals also began to consider the various unintended consequences of these innovations. 
From a sociological perspective, many thinkers recognized that technological developments were 
having adverse effects on the material and psychological welfare of the population. Only a 
minority of them, however, acknowledged the gravity of these emerging issues. 
The subject of technology, if approached at all, appeared mostly in the context of economics 
and industry; technology was concerning to the extent that it clearly violated laws, decreased social 
welfare or offended the established mores of a society. All things being equal, however, the steady 
march of industry in the preceding century made it seem all but certain that technological 
innovation would continue unabated. While classical liberals preferred letting the “natural” course 
of technology take hold, there were others who more readily critiqued the state of technology and 
advocated regulatory action from governments and civil society. In this chapter, I outline the major 
liberal attitudes and critical responses to the challenges of the technological society during this 
period of intense technological change. 
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The dominant variants of liberalism negate and build on each other at different junctures in the 
historical debates on politics and technology. Thinking through the contours of human-technology 
relations that appear in these debates reformulates the issues surrounding technological change as 
ones that implicate both the complexities of human affairs and of contemporary technology itself. 
The structure of my analysis happens to be chronological, if only to serve the purpose of illustrating 
a certain rhetorical trajectory contained in these ideas and languages of politics, the proponents of 
which seize upon historical developments as justification for their claims.  
This part of my history begins with early efforts toward a “radical” liberal interpretation of 
economic and social life in the early 20th century. The optimistic belief in science and technology 
to solve social problems was embodied in the policies of liberal technocracy, whereas the attitudes 
of neoliberalism, anarcho-capitalism and cyber-libertarianism leaned on the free market as a tool 
to promote the ends of civilization. Coming to grips with this taxonomy of creatively enmeshed 
terms, however, is not the point of my analysis; in the absence of discourse (written and spoken 
communication) and praxis (the enactment of theory), these terms are emptied of meaning. My 
aim, rather, is to move through the paths of thought apparent in liberal theory to show their 
implications for political life. The net effect of the liberal domination of technics in the past century 
has been an accumulation of intertwined ideological, rhetorical and material justifications of 
accelerating technological change. In the following pages, I examine the premises that belie these 
justifications, as well as the technological conditions that sustain their normalization. 
THE CONFLICT WITHIN LIBERALISM: NATURE AND PROGRESS 
A key feature of most explanatory arguments for the progress of Western civilization is the 
unfettered advance of science and technology. New medical breakthroughs, more efficient 
production processes and bounties of consumer products foster confidence in the power of human 
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ingenuity, offering undeniable evidence of the benefits of these advances. For the most part, 
liberals have supported heavy investment in the fields of science and engineering, especially when 
they promise to make the nation safer, more prosperous, or more admired by international allies, 
and, conversely, feared by foreign enemies. Through a pseudo-utilitarian calculus, the benefits of 
technological change consistently outweigh the “costs”, “risks” or “harms” that befall individual 
citizens and groups. Admittedly, the natural environment suffers, the masses stuff themselves into 
overcrowded cities and the complexities of the modern world multiply considerably, yet these 
downsides are never framed as unacceptable attacks on the supposed jewel of liberalism: liberty. 
The reason for this lies in the liberal conceptions of liberty, the majority of which posit liberty 
as the absence of interference. Early modern social contract theory set the bar of liberty when its 
proponents emphasized what man in his natural state has to give up in order to live with others in 
the commonwealth. The stylized natural man, who lives in total, dangerous freedom, exchanges 
the commodity of his natural liberty for the security of life in political society. The good behavior 
of man qua citizen depends on whether this exchange still makes economic sense: do the costs of 
suffering interference in society still outweigh the benefit of mutual security? To keep the peace, 
governments should therefore err on the side of less intervention rather than more; too much 
intervention threatens to infringe on the sanctity of liberties the individual gains in society, such 
as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of thought, and countless others. 
Social liberalism 
The tradition of liberalism most inclined to deny this narrative of natural rights and the social 
contract is the “radical” tradition. As intellectual inheritors of 19th century social liberalism, the 
radicals deviated from the tenets of classical liberalism, embracing instead the causes of social 
justice and reform. They saw in classical liberalism a faulty conception of human nature that 
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obscured its essential mutability. The American philosopher John Dewey, commenting on the 
future of liberalism in 1935, wrote that classical liberals erred in holding natural laws and human 
nature as “absolute and eternal truths; good for all times and all places” (1935 p. 226). Dewey’s 
charge was that classical liberals used these universalist ideas to consolidate their positions of 
power and influence over oppressed social groups. However, the entrenchment of liberal ideas 
could not sustain itself without the entrenchment of practices, ways of living, and patterns of 
conduct as well. Dewey was keenly aware of this, emphasizing the impact of “conditions, cultural 
and physical.” (228). Included in these “physical” conditions were the rapidly changing landscapes 
of science and technology. With respect to the state of technology in the first third of the 20th 
century, Dewey was at once optimistic about the possibilities, yet pessimistic about the prevailing 
course of technological change.  
When Dewey laments the reality of capitalist domination over the engineer, for example, he 
drifts quite far from Adam Smith’s conjectures on innovation—in which free, self-interested 
entrepreneurs add to the sum of technological knowledge, benefiting all of humanity. 
the simple fact is that technological industry has not operated with any great degree of 
freedom. It has been confused and deflected at every point; it has never taken its own 
course.16 The engineer has worked in subordination to the business manager whose primary 
concern is not with wealth but with the interests of property as worked out in the feudal 
and semi-feudal period. (The Public and its Problems 108) 
According to Dewey, interference in the innovation process is not perpetuated by the unwieldy 
government, but the business manager. Because his propertied interests dominate the course of the 
 
16 If technological industry were to pursue its “own course” it would presumably be led by engineers rather than 
business managers. Dewey betrays a moral preference here for technical proficiency over the interests of property, if 
only because the makers of machines are cast as morally neutral compared to their self-interested managers. 
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industrial revolution, the business manager seeks to manipulate the direction of technological 
change for his own private gain. It is in this gradual, evolutionary way that the so-called industrial 
revolution failed to meaningfully lift up the poor and instead only succeeded in bestowing power 
unto the group of individuals who understood enough about the political and technological 
machines of the time to profit from their ascendance. 
If we accept Dewey’s claim that the material conditions in a given society are an important 
determinant of power relations, and thus political relations, what is the role of mere individuals? 
For proponents of classical liberalism, the individual is the primary agent of change. The individual 
pursues self-interest in economic exchange, deliberates freely with her peers, thinks her own 
thoughts, and casts her vote in the selection of elected officials. The individual is entrepreneurial, 
competent, and rational enough to take care of herself and her community.  
This, however, is exactly the kind of naive individualism Dewey seeks to efface from the new 
liberalism. Still taking the individual as a point of reference, he clarifies the weakness of the 
average individual, weakened further due to his role as a cog in the industrial machine. The image 
of the freethinking individual, a paradigm of classical liberalism, is misleading because, “What he 
believes, hopes for and aims at is the outcome of association and intercourse” (25). The first 
evidence of the importance of association, Dewey informs us, is the elevation and education of 
children, whose pure helplessness, dependence and weakness resembles the most likely condition 
of the individual removed from social ties. It is, rather, in association with other humans that 
individuals have the power to effect change. 
The mere awareness of others, however, is not sufficient to create more long-lasting 
associations, those which might mutate into the village, the city or the state. In each of these cases, 
the members of an association form a “public,” constituted by “recognition of extensive and 
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enduring consequences of acts” (47). For comparison, the private domain is where the 
consequences of actions are limited to the individuals involved. If A mows the lawn of her 
neighbor, B, that is a private affair; A’s generous gesture is of no consequence to the rest of the 
neighborhood. The public domain, on the other hand, arises when the consequences of an action 
extend beyond the immediate participants. If B starts using pesticides in her garden that cause a 
degenerative disease in other members of the community, B’s use of pesticides becomes a public 
matter. “We take then our point of departure from the objective fact that human acts have 
consequences upon others, that some of the consequences are perceived, and that their perception 
leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to secure some consequences and avoid others” 
(12). This is not the place to fully explore Dewey’s arguments concerning the origin of the state, 
though, in brief, he submits that between the intimate unity of the family and the disunity of 
peoples separated by great distances or barriers of communication lies the proper region for the 
state, not as an entity that grows of itself or is a logical consequence of family and village ties, but 
as a human-made institution created for the purpose of addressing itself to the public. 
In the context of this functionalist theory of the state, Dewey describes how modern technology 
obscures the ability of individuals to perceive the consequences of their actions, while at the same 
time expanding and deepening the network of those possibly affected. With the increasing reliance 
on technological systems for the operation of key infrastructure, public health, agriculture, 
education, defense, and other items of government concern, matters of public deliberation are 
ceded to technical experts. Perhaps ironically, as the number of things relevant to public 
deliberation increased, so did the apathy of the individual citizen. Dewey calls this the “eclipse of 
the public,” and elaborates its coming to fruition: 
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the machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the 
scope of the indirect consequences, have [sic] formed such immense and consolidated 
unions in action, on an impersonal rather than a community basis, that the resultant public 
cannot identify and distinguish itself. And this discovery is obviously an antecedent 
condition of any effective organization on its part. (126) 
When viewed through this lens, the end of politics is to allow people to be able to live together 
and address issues of common concern. Social progress, under this conception, is the improvement 
of the means to bring about this kind of change. It is clear, then, that in this case there is always a 
possible disconnect between technological progress and social progress. This begs the question: 
what is technological progress? 
There is a word for technological progress that has become commonplace today, and that is 
innovation. Innovation requires that an existing artifact, process or practice is improved upon; 
made to be more efficient, useful or socially beneficial in some previously unexpected way. While 
innovation is not limited to technological progress, in the fledgling 21st century the discursive 
scope of innovation has related primarily to improvements in technology. To further draw out the 
significance of innovation for the early 20th century radical liberals, however, it is useful to look 
for instances in which the desirability of innovation is ambiguous. This usually occurs when 
innovation is ostensibly opposed to existing institutions that preserve the historical rights and 
privileges people have come to enjoy as a matter of course. 
The law represents one such institution whose clashes with technology expose its fragility in 
the face of technological change. Indeed, new technologies often occasion entire new corpuses of 
law because of their propensity for social disruption. For example, Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis’s 1890 article “The right to privacy” represents the major point of departure for the 
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justification of protecting privacy rights in the face of technological change. At the time, the 
authors were particularly concerned with the introduction of new image and printing technologies 
that threatened to expose the private lives of individuals: “instantaneous photographs” as well as 
“numerous mechanical devices threatened to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in 
the closet shall be proclaimed from the rooftops’” (195). Written in response to the enervation and 
mental distress caused by gossip columns whose writers used these technologies to surveil 
celebrities, the article includes an appeal for legal scholars to accept a general right to privacy 
derived from several sources of common law jurisprudence. 
The common law tradition, Warren and Brandeis claim, has had a long history of protecting 
individual freedom. At first, this only meant protecting the individual from physical violence, then 
from the mere threat of physical violence, and finally against damages to and threats against his 
mental, emotional and spiritual well-being. For the authors, the very “advance of civilization” is 
correlated with this heightened sensitivity towards the well-being of the individual (Ibid). Working 
through principles from the legal regimes of property, tort and copyright, the authors differentiate 
a unique “right to one’s personality,” which differs from the private property rights extended to a 
person’s private papers and effects (207). The invasion of privacy is, rather, a legal injuria to be 
compensated based on “the value of mental suffering” that the common law already acknowledges 
(213). 
Later on, in his career as a Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis further elaborated this philosophy 
of reinforcing legal protections against abuses made possible by technology. In his dissenting 
opinion in Olmstead v. United States (1928), for example, Brandeis affirmed the possibility that 
technology can impinge on individual freedom in unprecedented ways, and that it is the duty of 
the government to respond in turn. The defendants had been charged with liquor trafficking during 
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prohibition. Federal agents discovered their operation after intercepting messages on a wiretap 
inserted into telephone lines off of the defendants’ property. The issue before the court was whether 
the federal agents needed a warrant to tap the phone lines, and thus whether the evidence they 
gathered was admissible in court. Responding to the majority’s conclusion that incriminating 
evidence collected without a warrant through a covert telephone wiretap did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Brandeis argued that the court relied on an overly literal 
construction of the Fourth Amendment, which protects Americans’ rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure.17 The majority interpreted the amendment as strictly protecting Americans’ 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures [italics mine],”: 
because information gleaned from a private telephone conversation did not fall squarely into one 
of these categories, it was not protected. This technicality, in Brandeis’s view, missed the broader 
intention behind the Fourth Amendment, which serves as a protection against arbitrary, 
“unreasonable” government intrusions upon people’s person or possessions. Brandeis recognized 
that the Constitution was not merely a document to be read and interpreted: it was the expression 
of general principles that would inform future generations of their rights and responsibilities, and 
a source of authority that would guide the outcome of political conflicts. The facts of the case 
showed there were already technologies undermining the de jure authority of the Constitution by 
virtue of de facto changes in the material conditions of daily life. In this nuanced understanding of 
technological change, every step made in the name of progress might also represent a possible 
retrogression of liberty: 
 
17 U. S. Const. amend. IV.: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized.” 
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“The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not 
likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the 
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, 
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home.” 
In Brandeis’s view, the default attitude toward technology should be vigilance. Formerly outlined 
in The Right to Privacy, the “right to be let alone” is invoked again in defense of citizens’ security 
in their material possessions as well as their mental, emotional and spiritual well-being. With this 
continued affirmation in mind, Brandeis proceeds to make a radical claim, that “every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, 
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” In specifically addressing the “means 
employed,” Brandeis rejects the a priori legitimacy of technological instruments. It is said that the 
law must adapt to technology, but this is incomplete; technology that conflicts with the law 
occasions a struggle between them, a struggle whose outcome determines what respect people 
should have for the laws under which they live. 
While the Supreme Court later vindicated the general ideas of Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent in 
another case, Katz v. United States (1970), the U.S. government has never fully embraced the 
radicalism of this far-reaching interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Most recently, the 
executive branch has engaged in extensive mass-surveillance programs since the 9/11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center, citing concerns of national security against criticism that its activity 
violates civil liberties. According to the New York Times article from Dec. 16, 2005 that broke the 
story, the executive orders signed by President George W. Bush in the wake of the attacks 
engendered broad-based authority to surveil telecommunications, foreign and domestic, without 
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obtaining a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, whose jurisdiction includes 
oversight of intelligence agencies and assent to specific instances of electronic surveillance for the 
purposes of gathering foreign intelligence (50 U.S. Code § 1803). 
The political philosophy of radical liberalism, both in these early examples and in its 
resurgence during the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, and the global convulsions 
of 1968, is marked by a commitment to fundamental normative ideals. Dewey was a strong 
proponent of political democracy, likening its methods of discussion and deliberation to the 
scientific method; Warren and Brandeis were clear defenders of an expansive concept of individual 
freedom, equality, justice and due process before the law. Among the radical liberals, there is at 
least an acknowledgement of contingent outcomes in the process of technological change. Despite 
the pervasive equating of civilization and technology, and of scientific with ethical and political 
progress, these are couched with a frank recognition of the disadvantages related to changes in 
technological conditions. As I will describe in the next section, the interwar period and post-War 
boom saw a relapse into the choice between blind faith, ignorance and tacit acceptance of 
developments in science and technology. Especially on the subject of freedom, the three dominant 
liberal orientations toward technological change—liberal technocracy, neoliberalism and cyber-
libertarianism—carried the liberal notion of liberty to its most perverse programs of 
implementation. 
THE DOMINANT LIBERALISMS OF 20TH CENTURY TECHNOLOGY 
Liberal technocracy 
The word “technocracy” derives its meaning from the ancient Greek words technē, roughly 
meaning the useful arts, techniques, crafts and methods of making things, and kratos, “power” or 
“strength”. Given these etymological roots, it might seem accurate to compare technocracy to the 
 41 
other forms of government. Democracy, for instance, refers to a form of government in which 
political power resides with the people [demos]; similarly, oligarchy consists of rule by the few, 
aristocracy rule by the best, and monarchy rule by one. Technocracy, then, should be understood 
as rule by the technical experts, whose authority derives from their superior knowledge. In the 
interconnected world we live in today, literally linked across thousands of miles by undersea 
telephone and internet cables, it makes practical sense to entrust the government to experts who 
understand the system’s inner workings better than anyone else. 
However, though technocratic government might take on distinctive forms, technocrats view 
the problems facing society not first and foremost as objects of political debate and discussion, but 
as problems to be solved through their tools of analysis. Politics, if anything, is a source of 
inefficiency, the sworn enemy of any avowed technocrat. In fact, the writings of the early 20th 
century North American technocrats reveal a disdain for the activity of politics and a veneration 
of technical expertise. Especially in the wake of the First World War, the first “modern” war in 
terms of the widespread use of industrial methods of production and destruction, many thinkers 
became aware of the awesome power of industrial organization. The constant lament of the 
technocrats was that this power was in the wrong hands. 
As one of the founders of the technocracy movement, the American economist and sociologist 
Thorstein Veblen elaborated this conviction that the ills of modern society—economic poverty, 
inequality and corruption—could be traced to mismanagement. Shortly after the conclusion of the 
war, Veblen argued in The Engineers and the Price System (1921) that the inefficient distribution 
of goods and services was the most pressing issue facing industrial nations. The key figures in his 
narrative of incompetent administration were the business manager and the statesman, both of 
whom sabotage the distribution of essential goods and services to consumers. The business 
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manager, especially, was guilty of sabotaging the national economy by means of the 
“conscientious withdrawal of efficiency”: restricting production to avoid producing in excess, 
thereby increasing prices and letting essential goods go to waste. While there was a period in the 
middle of the 19th century when this practice made economic sense, Veblen describes an inflection 
point where, due to “[t]he unexampled advance of technology during the past one hundred and 
fifty years,” the rate of industrial production exceeded the quantity that could be sold at a profitable 
price (28). The problem became that there was not enough consumption to meet the accelerating 
rate of production, and thus to preserve profits businesses artificially restricted supply. 
Veblen characterizes the industrial system as a mechanism of complex interconnections, all of 
which depend on the sound functioning of the others. “It is an inclusive system drawn on a plan of 
strict and comprehensive interdependence, such that, in point of material welfare, all the civilized 
peoples have been drawn together by the state of the industrial arts into a single going concern” 
(53). The rhetoric of interconnectedness in this passage exposes an agreement between the 
technocrat and the social liberal concerning their understanding of the organic nature of a social 
mechanism, as well as a state of interdependence among nations that necessitates international 
cooperation. The industrial system, however, on which the whole civilization depends, is also 
extremely vulnerable to manipulation. Through tariffs, production restrictions, speculation and 
wastefulness, the colluding statesmen, captains of industry and financial interests threaten to bring 
the whole system to a state of ruin. 
For Veblen, the defeat of the vested interests of business, capital and government requires the 
ascendance of a class of technical experts, whom he refers to as “the engineers,” and their 
establishment of a new industrial order. Veblen does not merely want to reform the industrial 
system; rather, he envisions a comprehensive regime change from the current class of industrial 
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managers to a Soviet of Technicians. For even if the contemporary managers were virtuous, they 
are, “at the best to be rated as well-intentioned deaf-mute blind men” (147). Therefore, to say 
nothing of Veblen’s view on the capacity of the common man, it is clear that the technocratic 
attitude proceeds from the claim that the engineers ought to have the authority to govern the 
industrial system. The problem of technological change is a problem of mismanagement; the 
harmful consequences of the industrial system are not to be attributed to the structure of the 
mechanism, but to the intellectual failings of a group of hopeless incompetents. 
Thus, if there is any group who should enjoy the liberal ideal of freedom from interference in 
the technocratic polity, it is the technicians, who “must have a free hand, unhampered by 
commercial considerations and reservations; for the production of the goods and services needed 
by the community they neither need nor are they in any degree benefitted by any supervision or 
interference from the side of the owners” (69-70). The hand of the engineer seems to be a 
conceptual stand-in for the “invisible hand” of the free market, though what is remarkable here is 
the exclusive prerogative of the engineer. Veblen does not mention any checks on the power of 
the Soviet of Technicians over the industrial system, likely because this would represent the 
potentially disastrous influence of uninformed outsiders. Notably, there are no proposals to include 
the government or any regulatory bodies in the decision-making process, nor does Veblen care to 
elaborate the necessary changes to the political and legal institutions required to transfer what is 
essentially the executive power of the government to this new group of technical elites. It would 
not be too much to say that Veblen would refuse to talk about the legal and moral arguments his 
argument implicates, only that “the economic moralities wait on the economic necessities” (161). 
It is, however, altogether too convenient that what Veblen clearly believes are the right policy 
prescriptions are also the ones borne out of economic necessity. The statement smacks of the same 
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naturalistic fallacy of which too many classical liberals were equally guilty: namely, that because 
the efficient allocation of goods and services is the natural outcome of the industrial system, and 
because the engineers are the only group capable of ensuring peak efficiency, engineers should 
have control of the industrial system. The argument is so uncannily correct that it distracts from 
the obvious tensions, readily acknowledged by most economists, between efficiency and equity. 
There is also the illiberal premise that one group should hold all the power over economic 
distribution, and while technocrats might defend this premise by clarifying that the group of 
engineers in question are acting in good faith, or that the other decisions not related to the economy 
are reserved for the government proper, it is strikingly clear that the engineers would be capable 
of wielding their power as leverage over other centers of political power if they wanted to. Veblen 
admits as much: “By themselves alone, the technicians can, in a few weeks, effectually incapacitate 
the country’s productive industry sufficiently for the purpose”; the purpose, that is, of seizing 
governmental power in a Locke style rebellion (167).  
Like many technocrats after him, Veblen fails to acknowledge that political power does not 
come free, nor does it come easily in countries used to living under a system of self-government. 
Further, although the technocrats derive their legitimate authority from their expertise, it is 
apparently still necessary to retain the “tolerant consent of the population at large,” a formal vestige 
of liberal democracy within the new industrial order (Ibid). 
The American political theorist Langdon Winner said of the writings of the liberal technocratic 
theorists that they “are interesting not only for what they say about the role of the new men of 
knowledge, but also what they do not say” (1977 p.170). In his critique of Don K. Price and John 
Kenneth Galbraith, both of whom were influenced by Veblen, Winner notes the absence of 
democracy, representative government and other traditional liberal commitments. Price, a political 
 45 
scientist, conceived of a novel “unwritten constitution” composed of four estates: one political, 
one administrative, one professional and one scientific. Within this model of political interaction, 
democracy consists of the frictions between scientific knowledge, political power and private 
enterprise, the culmination of which is a pluralist consensus where each estate makes compromises 
and checks the others’ influence.  
John Kenneth Galbraith, an economist, held that the different members of society are in a quest 
for survival in a world of advanced technology. Rather than merely pursuing profit, businesses 
must adapt to new methods and machines of production, while the state struggles to draw the legal 
boundaries of the system. In the same manner as Veblen, however, Galbraith concludes in The 
New Industrial State that the experts of science and technology hold the key to reversing the 
dominance of market values: “Unlike members of the technostructure, the educational scientific 
estate is not handicapped in political action by being accustomed to function only as part of an 
organization. It gains power in a socially complex society from its capacity for social invention” 
(464). 
Thus, though both of these theorists temper the technocratic obsession with efficiency with 
socially conscious goals, the means of achieving these goals are shaped in the interactions between 
centers of scientific knowledge and administrative control. The primary agents of change are group 
entities rather than individuals, though these entities, such as Price’s estates, are fractured and 
dependent on each other, with technical personnel serving in the bureaucracy in order to add expert 
legitimacy to the decisions of politicians. Rather than the pure technocracy Veblen envisioned, 
where a dominant group of scientific and technical elites manages the national administration, the 
pluralist model assumes a polite give-and-take between the ascendant technocrats and the vestigial 
class of career politicians (Gunnell 394). 
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With few exceptions, the proponents of technocracy, are committed to the marriage of 
knowledge and power for the purpose of ordering the affairs of an industrial state. Only a small 
cadre of technical experts understand the economy and its inner workings, the technocrats argue, 
whereas politicians and, by extension, the voters cannot hope to comprehend its complexity. 
Unlike squabbling parliaments and tyrannical executives, the technocrats can make the economic 
machine work the way it is supposed to. Thus, the technocrats’ legitimacy seems to be based on 
their expertise, but this is only the case when their applied knowledge happens to achieve the 
desired result. It should be no wonder that faith in technocracy can falter when glitches in the 
economic machine mutate into the spiraling decline of the entire system. Though technocracy is 
meant to function as the precursor to an end of ideological politics, what is of great concern to all 
is how technocratic government maintains its legitimacy in the midst of a protracted crisis. 
Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism emerged after the collapse of the post-War economic order that proceeded slowly 
throughout the 1970s.  Key economic shifts in industrial nations stretching back to the late 19th 
century solidified the Keynesian economic policies that had aided nations in their battered post-
War condition. For instance, inspired by the coalescing of economic power in the industrial 
economy, in 1890 the United States passed the Sherman antitrust act outlawing the formation of 
monopolies and cartels; the first legislative attempt to preserve commercial competition in a 
capitalist economy. The experience of Western nations during the Great Depression of the 1930s 
also fueled enthusiasm for deficit spending, and during the Second World War the economic links 
between the government and business strengthened, especially among industries requiring high 
initial investment such as communications, transportation and defense. 
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During the 1970s, however, widespread anxieties about macroeconomic decline and fear of 
radical Left political movements found their articulation in the avowed renewal of the principles 
and practices of classical liberalism. From a historical perspective, this academic reformulation of 
classical liberalism began in the interwar period in Austria and Germany and caught on in the 
United States among economists at the University of Chicago. Along with a positive commitment 
to the principles of economic liberalism, neoliberal thinkers warned of liberal socialism as an 
ideological precursor to totalitarianism, or other equally menacing forms of political domination. 
Because of its dominance in the past half-century, the social construction of neoliberalism, its 
various characterizations among different communities, has taken place in both sympathetic and 
critical camps; the neoliberal attitude towards technology, however, has received less attention 
than its treatment of social and economic policies more broadly. The story of neoliberalism’s rise, 
so its critics suggest, has been coeval with nefarious processes such as the de-politicization of the 
social realm, the financialization of the economy, contributing to a permanent state of economic 
fragility, and the ironic loss of classical liberal commitments to justice, liberty, sovereignty and 
the balancing of interests. What we are concerned with is how neoliberal discourse and praxis 
pursued specific principles and types of technological forms that would complement its particular 
technology of government. What constitutive relation between technology and the polity did 
neoliberalism form, reform or dissolve throughout its ascendance? 
On one view, the imperatives of the neoliberal economy provided a “habitat” for the 
development of the information society and data-intensive approaches to government and 
business.  In her book Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier 
of Power, the Harvard professor Shoshana Zuboff argues that the neoliberal habitat of the mid-
1970s propelled the “radical free-market theory, political ideology, and pragmatic agenda” of the 
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likes of Hayek and Friedman and prepared the ground for surveillance capitalism, a form of the 
capitalist economic system that thrives off the accumulation, processing, sale and transfer of 
human behavioral data as a new form of capital (38). Taking Google, Inc. as the paradigmatic 
example, Zuboff draws a connection between the freedom from regulation that Google and other 
digital media companies enjoyed in their early existence and the antagonism toward government 
interference that neoliberal economists and politicians helped to foster. Armed with the positive 
freedom to engage in new business practices, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin traded 
their “passionate and public opposition to advertising” for a system of matching advertisements 
with individuals through the use of data collected from their activity interacting with Google’s 
search engine: 
The raw materials that had been solely used to improve the quality of search results would 
now also be put to use in the service of targeting advertising to individual users. Some data 
would continue to be applied to service improvement, but the growing stores of collateral 
signals would be repurposed to improve the profitability of ads for both Google and its 
advertisers. These behavioral data available for uses beyond service improvement 
constituted a surplus, and it was on the strength of this behavioral surplus that the young 
company would find its way to the “sustained and exponential profits” that would be 
necessary for survival. (75) 
As a framework for the critique of the contemporary data-driven economy, surveillance capitalism 
offers something much more substantial than merely dwelling on the right to privacy or the impacts 
on economic competition, issues that fail to capture the scope of technologically mediated 
domination. However, the considerable insights of Zuboff’s work are balanced against her 
hyperbolic claims against the strategies of legitimation neoliberalism provided for future forms of 
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technology. For example: “Hayek and his ideological brethren insisted on a capitalism stripped 
down to its raw core, unimpeded by any other force and impervious to any external authority.” 
While there are certainly individuals and groups who actively promoted this genre of anarcho-
capitalism, neoliberal thinkers, especially Hayek, proposed a more subtle role for governments in 
the post-industrial economy. Zuboff finely accents the macroeconomic changes that bring 
surveillance capitalism to the fore, though her analysis of the fate of the individual bears consistent 
reference to the loss of control over a “human future” in the face of surveillance capital’s anti-
democratic vision of society. She rightly criticizes neoliberalism’s philosophy of individualism 
and pathological fear of governmental interference, though her description of the neoliberal habitat 
is more of a caricature than a critique.  
As is the case with many of the theorists I consider, there is a fundamental interplay in Zuboff’s 
analysis between the concepts of power, technology, knowledge and the individual which is again 
worth examining. Zuboff perceives a cruel weakening of the individual that the logic of 
surveillance capitalism effectuates; the digital economy based on the data extraction model 
introduces new asymmetries of knowledge that translate into unforeseen modes of manipulation 
and control on the part of surveillance capitalists over individuals. By extension, there is a “coup 
from above, not an overthrow of the state but rather an overthrow of the people’s sovereignty and 
a prominent force in the perilous drift toward democratic deconsolidation that now threatens 
Western liberal democracies” (21). 
Within this dual concern for the individual and the ideal of political democracy lies a 
fundamental agreement between Zuboff and the neoliberal theorists she criticizes. Their common 
enemy is a group of elites who use technical knowledge to quietly gain the means to direct and 
control the economy and society, usurping the sanctity of the human person. For Hayek, however, 
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it was the new generation of well-intentioned socialist planners who constituted a threat to 
individual liberty. And like Zuboff, he seeks to challenge the claims of technological inevitability 
that seemed to necessitate technocratic forms of governance. Referring to the imperatives of 
surveillance capitalism, Zuboff cites a decision from the European Union Court of Justice that she 
deems “claimed the future for the human way, rejecting the inevitability of Google’s search-engine 
technology… recognizing instead that search results are the contingent products of the specific 
economic interests that drive the action from within the belly of the machine.” Similarly, Hayek 
highlights in The Road to Serfdom the corrosive “myth” of inevitability that helped give rise to 
collusion between private monopolies and the state, a myth in which “we are embarking on the 
new course not our of free will but because competition is spontaneously eliminated by 
technological changes” (91). 
The mutual emphasis on non-inevitability is a significant one, though not quite as significant 
as its corollary of restoring individual autonomy. If the course of technological change is 
inevitable, as some suggest, then all individual resistance is futile; however, if it is indeed the case 
that individual human agency can prevail over the dominant order, then it is worthwhile to insist 
on revolutionary change. Despite these parallels of social liberalism and its more conservative 
counterparts, the concept of autonomy is also where these different traditions of liberal thought 
diverge most dramatically with regard to the influence of technology on the distribution of power. 
It is common practice to critique neoliberalism as a creed that extends the institution of the 
market to all spheres of life, or as one that transforms all persons into human capitals; and indeed, 
there is often substance to these claims. It is a much more delicate task to challenge the neoliberal 
commitment to liberty, a commitment which is no more fanatical than the social liberal’s claim to 
defend democracy, justice or equality. Hayek, for his part, is uncompromising on the subject of 
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liberty in Law, Legislation and Liberty: “A successful defence of freedom must therefore be 
dogmatic and make no concessions to expediency, even where it is not possible to show that, 
besides the known beneficial effects, some particular harmful result would also follow from its 
infringement. Freedom will prevail only if it is accepted as a general principle whose application 
to particular instances requires no justification” (61). But what is the meaning of freedom Hayek 
evokes here that makes it such a prized ideal? Interestingly, it is not the positive, liberal Kantian 
concepts of autonomy, sovereignty and self-rule, that are so dear to Zuboff, Wendy Brown and 
other critics of neoliberalism. In Surveillance Capitalism, for instance, Zuboff treats autonomy and 
democracy as an almost inseparable pair, and in Undoing the Demos, Brown claims that neoliberal 
reason undermines “the fundamental liberal democratic promise since Locke, that popular and 
individual sovereignty secure one another” (Brown 109). 
For Brown, whose critique of neoliberal political rationality is grounded in an extensive 
examination of the major ideas and trends of Western political theory, the “central paradox” of 
neoliberalism is that “the neoliberal revolution takes place in the name of freedom—free markets, 
free countries, free men—but tears up freedom’s grounding in sovereignty for states and subjects 
alike” (108). This claim, however, as well as the entire preoccupation with positive liberty among 
thinkers in the liberal tradition since the time of T.H. Green conceals the radically different 
foundation of liberty which informed Hayek and his intellectual successors.  
In his article “Hayek’s neo-Roman liberalism,” historian Sean Irving argues convincingly that 
Hayek, in the same manner as later neo-Roman republican theorists like Quentin Skinner and 
Philip Pettit, advocated the concept of liberty as the absence of domination, or, as Hayek puts it in 
The Constitution of Liberty, “independence of the arbitrary will of another” (12). Freedom as non-
domination differs from the philosophical “freedom of the will,” psychological freedom of choice, 
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freedom from poverty or biological necessity, and finally the “political freedom” which ensures 
citizens the right to participate in the choice of their government, politics and legislation. It is an 
ultimate ideal, while political democracy, for the neo-Roman republicans as for many neoliberals, 
is a device, albeit an important one, for the maintenance of liberty. This is a crucial anomaly within 
the cartography of liberal of ideas; that the avowedly democratic-minded neo-republican theorists 
share the same root concept of liberty with one of the most influential theorists of free-market 
economic liberalism. Irving reckons with Pettit that the distinction to be made is that Hayek was 
concerned solely with imperium, the public power of the state, whereas the neorepublicans seek to 
examine imperium as well as dominium, the private power relations between individuals and 
groups in their private capacities: for example, as employees and employers, husbands and wives, 
or landlords and tenants (564).  
The essential relationship between power and freedom implicates in no uncertain terms the 
advent of new technologies, though for the various schools of neoliberalism, including the post-
Walrasian school, the Chicago school, the Austrians and the German ordo-liberals, the question of 
freedom passes through a process of “economization” wherein the power dynamics of economic 
transactions between the state and its legal and political institutions, markets and individuals take 
center stage (Madra and Adaman 2011). Economization is associated with a transformation of how 
individuals relate to one another, positing them as rational, self-interested agents, and thus aims at 
restructuring the society along non-political lines; Madra and Adaman explain that the “epistemic 
shift” of neoliberal reason contributes to the parallel processes of economization and de-
politicization of the social realm (693). Homo oeconomicus reemerges as the dominant model of 
individual behavior and serves as a policymaking tool for considering the incentives of private 
actors. However, while economists are comfortable analyzing transactions between economic 
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agents, there is considerably less guidance on how to interpret these transactions as dynamics of 
power, interference or domination. Further, what is the relation between homo oeconomicus and 
machina, “machine”; how can human-technology relations figure into the economic analysis of 
neoliberal reason? As a matter of discourse and practice, neoliberalism does not offer much in the 
way of an immediate answer to these questions. While there is much reading between the lines to 
be done on the subject, I move now to another active strand of liberalism that more expresses 
explicit links between government, technology and individual liberty.  
Cyber-libertarianism 
While elements of technocratic management and neoliberal marketisation have guided the 
legislation and architecture of technology, the most formidable discourse of technological politics 
in the past half-century has been articulated by libertarian thinkers and activists who applied their 
beliefs concerning individual freedom and limited government to the exciting new technology of 
the Internet. The discourse of cyber-libertarianism refers to the recurring patterns of written and 
spoken language employed to legitimate the claims of the much less cohesive “ideology,” or, even 
less, the “theory” of cyber-libertarianism. The strong focus within cyber-libertarian circles on 
Internet exceptionalism, the claim that the Internet is unprecedented and structurally resistant to 
government intervention, reflects the recurring elaboration of an Internet mythology that continues 
to play a prominent role in academic and popular discussions on this relatively recent technological 
development. 
Within the historical development of liberalism, however, cyber-libertarianism is a unique 
current of ideas and rhetoric because of its strict association with a particular technology. Unlike 
liberal technocracy and neoliberalism, the first public articulations of cyber-libertarianism 
occurred among journalists, activists and lawyers who expressed optimism about the Internet’s 
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potential for liberation. Perhaps the most well-known of them was John Perry Barlow, founder of 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), who in 1996 published “A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace.” In the Declaration, Barlow envisions the Internet as a virtual 
community of complete freedom, in which people could shed their physical identities and enter 
“the new home of Mind.”  
There are two central claims of the Declaration: (1) government regulation of the Internet is 
unnatural, and (2) government regulation of the Internet is immoral. The first has to do with the 
structure of the Internet; the second with the moral rectitude of the nation-state. To be clear, Barlow 
was not an engineer, and thus was not tuned into the Internet architecture per se, but he 
nevertheless committed to the claim that there would be intractable problems surrounding 
enforcing existing legal regimes online: “Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, 
movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter 
here.” However, there is also a different set of appeals regarding the ethical and political 
innovations of the new cyber community: “We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, 
and the commonweal, our governance will emerge.” Similar expressions of rational idealism 
among the cyber-libertarians sustained the image of an ascendant technological revolution that 
promised to maintain open, collaborative, apolitical online communities, accelerating the demise 
of outdated systems of nation-state regulation. 
It is tempting to dismiss the Declaration as hyperbolic, and indeed, Barlow was incorrect 
concerning the first set of claims for the impossibility of legal enforcement (Goldsmith and Wu 
2006). However, the Declaration still serves as a popular point of reference for subsequent 
rhetorical developments, and thus as a document on which future Internet imaginaries drew 
inspiration. Barlow advocates a litany of freedoms, a few of which I want to address for their 
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location within liberal schema of liberty. There are first many positive freedoms, such as the 
freedom of Internet users to govern themselves, speak and assemble; these mirror the classical 
liberal impulse for political democracy, coupled with civil liberties already protected in the United 
States. The negative freedoms, however, are somewhat more engaging. We should not be surprised 
by the desire for freedom from government, though let it be noted too that freedom from 
government is a credible threat from Barlow’s perspective, given the alleged exceptional nature of 
the Internet. Additionally, the Internet promises to achieve the universal liberal values that have 
been only true de jure since their production in the 18th century; that is, universal freedom in the 
form of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. On the one hand Barlow outlines a deterministic 
view of the Internet—a space of liberation by virtue of its natural characteristics. On the other, he 
tacitly recognizes the legal authority of the government to alter the structure of this space and 
import existing forms of oppression. After all, why would it be necessary to declare Independence, 
to constitute Internet freedom, if the government were powerless to prevent the natural self-
organization Barlow supports? 
Drawing on an international political sociology framework, Jean-Marie Chenou (2014) argues 
that even though Internet exceptionalism and its counterpart, multi-stakeholderism, featured 
prominently in the debates about Internet governance, the institutionalization of the Internet 
proceeded according to the plans of four main elite groups: the technical/scientific, corporate, U.S. 
political and non-U.S. political elites. Despite their differences, the four elite groups built 
consensus around the cyber-libertarian concept of Internet exceptionalism. Indeed, Internet 
exceptionalism served as a basic assumption in a series of policy documents produced as 
overarching plans for the structure of the Internet, as well as institutions such as the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private corporation without official 
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oversight from national or supranational governments. While the Internet engineers, Clinton 
Administration, private corporations and multinational corporations had sharp disagreements, they 
each wanted to suppress discourses from the Sovereigntist and critical technology camps. These 
and other marginalized groups held positions that were untenable in the neoliberal habitat: 
government control of networks and restrictions on online commercial activity, to name a few 
(215). Internet exceptionalism was one of the most powerful “discursive tools” these elites 
employed to suppress criticism and engender a hegemonic discourse (218).18 
Despite the dominant tenure of cyber-libertarian discourse during the 1990s, key historical 
events at the turn of the century dampened popular enthusiasm for the Internet. Lincoln Dahlberg 
(2010) notes the decline of cyberlibertarian rhetoric due to state regulation, rapid 
commercialization and the “dot.com bust” of the early 2000s occasioned by excessive financial 
speculation over the rising share prices of Internet-based companies (333). However, cyber-
libertarianism made a comeback associated with the rise of “Web 2.0”, a suite of content 
production and social networking sites such as YouTube, Myspace, Facebook, etc., as well as the 
resurgence of digital media companies such as Yahoo and Google (339). “Cyber-libertarianism 
2.0” as Dahlberg terms it, relies on much of the same rhetoric of safeguarding individual liberty 
against repressive governments, and of equating democracy with “the liberty of individuals to 
satisfy private interests through technologically mediated networking with (disembodied, 
abstracted) others.” (333). Because of the increasing use of the Internet, however, this re-
articulated cyber-libertarianism gained a wider following outside of popular science and business, 
changing the language of the Internet in academia and the mass media as well (Ibid). 
 
18 See esp. the “Draft Postel” on the controversial subject of distribution of Internet domain names: Jon Postel, 
“New Registries and the Delegation of International Top Level Domains”,  IETF, June 1996, 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-postel-iana-itld-admin-01. 
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A variety of sources constitute the discourse of cyber-libertarianism; not just self-avowed 
cyber-libertarians, but journalists, scholars and corporate actors who would not necessarily identify 
with the cyber-libertarian moniker. Whether intentional or not, the repetition of certain statements 
and signifiers, including “democratization”, ‘“digital networking”, “DIY,” “citizen-
consumer/prosumer,” “choice,” “freedom/liberty,” “transcendence,” and “post-(antagonistic 
politics”’ links together constituent elements of a new discourse around the politics of Internet 
governance (337). The usage of these terms across marketing campaigns, academic talks and social 
media comment sections serves to legitimize additional corporate capture and colonization of the 
Internet.  
Like its predecessor, cyber-libertarianism 2.0 continued to emphasize a notion of individual 
liberty based on consumption, production, participation and consent. Yochai Benkler in The 
Wealth of Networks (2006), for instance, claims that the emerging networked information 
environment would provide individuals with new opportunities for cultural production, increasing 
their autonomy and reducing their dependence on information produced by media companies or 
governments. In his view, the structure of mass media created a passive, one-way relationship 
between the individual information consumer and the corporate information producer; distributed 
platforms, on the other hand, featured content generated by users, for users. The new possibilities 
for self-organized production on distributed online platforms thus represented an augmentation of 
freedom; the same person sitting on their couch watching television finds in digital technology the 
key to their creativity; they are suddenly inspired to make YouTube videos or edit Wikipedia 
articles, joining communities of like-minded people just like them acting out of enlightened self-
interest. 
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To support the flourishing of cultural production in networked information environments, 
Benkler argues for a substantive interpretation of autonomy to guide Internet policy, one that 
emphasizes “how law and policy actually affect whatever capacity we have to be the authors of 
our own life choices in some meaningful sense” (140). While Benkler does not present himself as 
a libertarian, his vision of the techno-individual ideal and lack of regard for the positive role of the 
state contributes to what is essentially a libertarian view of individuals’ relationship to the 
government. He admits that what he proposes in The Wealth of Networks may “seem more of a 
libertarian or an anarchistic thesis than a liberal one” however he subsequently explains the 
empirical justification for this disregard of traditional government:  
what is special about our moment is the rising efficacy of individuals and loose, nonmarket 
affiliations as agents of political economy. Just like the market, the state will have to adjust 
to this new emerging modality of human action. Liberal political theory must first 
recognize and understand it before it can begin to renegotiate its agenda for the liberal state, 
progressive or otherwise. (16) 
The focus on individual liberty in cyber-libertarian discourse, however, comes into conflict with 
the freedom from government control when the government finds itself in the ideal position to 
secure individuals against infringements on their liberty. Electronic surveillance, for example, is 
an issue that implicates government interference both in the executive capacity to surveil and the 
legislative duty to restrict surveillance. The issue for libertarians is that individuals’ reliance on 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and other private protections against government 
surveillance are likely to catalyze a tit for tat between surveillance techniques and PETs; the 
illegality of electronic surveillance should, on its own, spur libertarians to call for legislative 
intervention. One of Benkler’s preferred examples demonstrating the collaborative prospects of 
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the internet is Wikipedia, the online crowd-generated encyclopedia; however, Penny (2016) 
documents the “chilling effects” on traffic to certain Wikipedia articles after public reporting in 
2013 of NSA/PRISM surveillance on the website. In that case, individuals were substantively free 
to visit any article they liked, fulfilling the substantive notion of libertarian autonomy, though the 
fear of government surveillance impacted their behavior nonetheless. US Congressional legislation 
on data protection would help to address the infringement of individual privacy by the NSA, but 
this might also represent increased control of federal and state governments over the internet. The 
libertarian EFF, too, has made privacy one of its central issues, focusing on the increasing threat 
to individual privacy that has accompanied the accelerating pace of technological change. New 
technologies in their view liberate the individual, but the new opportunities for free association 
have to be weighed against the competing interests of government and private industry.  
Finally, cyber-libertarians also think of the process of technological innovation as a problem 
of economic freedom. The liberal notion that the introduction of new techniques, production 
practices and machines, is always an affair best left to individual entrepreneurs and private industry 
is at least as old as the classical liberal economists; in the last chapter I explained the trenchant 
views of Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say on similar questions concerning the tension between 
technological change and the protection of freedom of contract and property rights for 
entrepreneurs. The cyber-libertarian position holds parallel assumptions to that of classical 
economists concerning the beneficence of new technologies and the association between the 
market economy of minimal regulation and the possibilities for human flourishing. 
Contemporary advocates of pro-innovation policies, however, have a new language with which 
to outline the benefits of accelerating technological change associated with the digital revolution. 
More than in the 18th century debates, there is now a sustained focus on the growing amount of 
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information available to people all around the world with which they can educate and empower 
themselves without the aid of government. Adam Thierer, a pro-innovation scholar and recurring 
figure in a number of American conservative think-tanks, articulates the concept of 
“permissionless innovation” as the guiding regulatory principle for the digital age.19 
Permissionless innovation refers to the idea that companies should not have to ask permission of 
public officials to develop new technologies, except in the case where those officials demonstrate 
with a high degree of probability that the harms from a technology would be “tangible, immediate, 
irreversible, catastrophic” (34). In Thierer’s view, thinking and preparing for the worst-case 
scenario stifles innovation because it inhibits the risk-loving attitude of entrepreneurs. 
“Permissionless innovation is about the creativity of the human mind to run wild in its inherent 
curiosity and inventiveness. In other words, permissionless innovation is about freedom” (9). This 
is a notion of positive liberty par excellence, though the human mind also has to be free from both 
government intervention and cautious thinking more generally. The entrepreneur, Thierer argues, 
should be absolved of ethical reflection on the possible consequences of their product, lest the 
potential harm to others prematurely cancel the potential benefits. 
Thierer also argues for a strict consequentialist approach to evaluating public policies, which 
should “never be judged by intentions but rather by their actual real-world results” (13). The 
opposite of this consequentialist position is the “precautionary principle,” which engineers and 
public officials can employ to think through all of the possible consequences of deploying a new 
technology or legalizing it for consumption. Permissionless innovation, however, is about 
 
19 See Adam Thierer, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Change, 
2nd ed. Mercatus Center, George Mason University (2016). 
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removing restrictions on the freedom of corporations and entrepreneurs to invent new 
technologies, which on balance will always end up empowering the idealized prosumer-citizen.20 
CONCLUSION 
From analyzing key moments of intellectual production for 20th century social liberalism, liberal 
technocracy, neoliberalism and cyber-libertarianism, I have sketched the views of major thinkers 
from these traditions on the intersection of freedom, technology and the law. In truth, there is a 
diversity even within sub-traditions, and my intention has not been to write a definitive account. 
However, even with the simplifications I have made, there are essential disagreements between 
the discursive and practical claims of the different traditions. For example, the social liberals 
generally agree with liberal technocrats that self-interested politicians and businessmen impede 
social progress, whereas the neoliberals and cyber-libertarians espouse the virtues of individual 
entrepreneurship and market-based interaction; each tradition holds varying conceptions of 
negative and positive liberty, with the social liberals holding the most progressive views on 
maintaining safeguards for mental and emotional well-being, whereas neoliberals tend to view 
individual liberty as the capacity to participate freely in consumption and production. There are 
many other points of intersection and conflict between these strains of liberal thought, but for now 
I would like to focus on what I think is the central assumption on the subject of freedom and 
technology shared to a large extent by each of them. 
Whether the idea is framed in terms of autonomy, participation or production, the central 
assumption of liberal interpretations of technological change is that the process of technological 
innovation enlarges the scope of individual freedom. Maintaining the natural course of 
 
20 The futurist writer Alvin Toeffler coined the portmanteau term “prosumer” (producer and consumer) to describe 
the blending of production and consumption roles of the individual thanks to new technologies. (Dahlberg 332) 
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technological progress is a necessary condition for the continued flourishing of humanity; if 
technology ever poses a threat to the health, safety or psychological well-being of individuals, it 
is the responsibility of society as a whole to redesign human behavior, legal institutions and social 
mores to adapt to the exogenous evolution of technology. 
To be clear, while individual technologies might engender new forms of interference, the 
natural attitude of many liberal thinkers is to conceive of these as unfortunate by-products of an 
ultimately virtuous, rectilinear progression of civilization. It is rare indeed for a thinker writing 
within the cadre of liberalism to express methodological neutrality on the question of technological 
change. The rectilinear mode of thought finds its expression in contexts emphasizing the evolution 
of technology, but this is not the only spatiotemporal representation of technology’s movement in 
the heyday of liberalism. The liberal world, in fact, has been in a constant state of industrial 
revolution since the mid-18th century, a revolution whose continued kinetic output represents an 
engine of intellectual achievement, economic growth and, most importantly, individual and social 
liberation; why would one not want to add fuel to the flame? 
In the following chapters, I dislodge the central assumptions of liberalism with a question: can 
technological innovation create, establish and sustain relations of domination? In my view, the 
answer is a resounding yes, and the affirmation of this question then leads to the unsettling 
realization of the moral contingency of technological change. Technological changes fall along a 
spectrum of liberation and domination, and the accumulation of these changes can represent near 
irretrievable impingements on liberty, understood in its most robust sense as the absence of 
domination. Drawing on neorepublicanism and phenomenology, I articulate a non-domination 
approach towards analyzing the effects of new and existing technologies on social relations, as 
well as the relations of domination between humans and technology itself. Finally, the problems 
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of technological domination cannot be mediated only on the scale of the individual; rather, politics 
regains its position as the context in which community discussions and action on power relations 
takes place, and political theory the context in which scholars analyze, synthesize and interpret 
these debates from a critical perspective. 
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Chapter 3.  
Non-domination and technology 
 
In this chapter, I advance an original approach to thinking how technology impinges on liberty, 
both in the sense of individual liberty and the liberty of the polity. The approach derives its 
originality and, in my view, its wide scope of application from the synthesis of two traditions of 
thought that have hardly ever interacted with each other: republican political theory and 
phenomenology. The purpose of integrating the republican notion of freedom as non-domination 
into the phenomenological tradition is to provide a framework for investigating and evaluating 
the technologically mediated relations between people, as well as the relations between humans 
and technologies themselves. A central premise of this synthetic approach is the relationality of 
human beings, technological artifacts, and technological systems of varying size and complexity. 
It is often easier to write as if there is one overarching “problem” of technology or technological 
change, though the approach I sketch here is to be applied rather to “problems of technology,” 
involving context-dependent relations between different beings (Ihde 1993 p.67). Thus, unlike a 
majority of liberal approaches to technology that assume in advance the virtue of technological 
progress, the republican approach begins from an ambivalent attitude toward the moral status of 
technologies, though one that is also ever sensitive to relations of domination. 
To outline the implications of integrating non-domination into a phenomenological 
framework, first I elaborate the principle of non-domination as it appears in republican political 
theory, its basic formulation and the attendant theoretical concerns. Second, I sketch the emerging 
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postphenomenological tradition and the theory of technological mediation. Third, I defend this 
seemingly esoteric pairing and explain the concrete value of such an approach to ground political 
theorizing and analysis of technology at its intersections with the major constructions of human 
affairs. Despite their relative obscurity, especially in American academies, republicanism and 
phenomenology represent two traditions of thought with a strong grounding in experience and, at 
the same time, awareness of the potential for imagining alternatives to the status quo. The approach 
I sketch here thus diverges from degenerative liberal notions of linear progress and the perpetual 
cycle of innovation, opening new directions for conceiving of the relationship between technology, 
freedom and law. 
THE NON-DOMINATION APPROACH 
Freedom as non-domination: foundations 
The notion of freedom as independence from the arbitrary interference of another has its roots in 
ancient Roman law and political philosophy, so the standard account goes. For Roman jurists and 
statesmen, the paradigmatic image of liberty was that of the liber, the free citizen who could 
participate in the public life of the city; on the other hand, the freedom of the liber was held in 
opposition to the slavery of the servus, the person whose condition of servitude rendered them 
private, obedient and conforming to the will of the master (Pettit 2012 p.17). In his historical study 
of notions of liberty from ancient Rome to early modern Europe, Quentin Skinner notes that Seneca 
in De Beneficiis claims the bodies of slaves are “obnoxia, at the mercy of the masters to whom 
they are ascribed” (qtd. in Skinner 1998 p.43). Thus, though slaves may escape corporal 
punishment as a result of their cunning, flattering, or via the goodwill of their masters, what makes 
the slave unfree is the condition of slavery which attaches itself to the body. Even if he is not 
subject to violence at a given time, he is acutely aware of the potential for violent abuse and other 
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affronts to his humanity. Similarly, an entire community of persons may be subject to the arbitrary 
will of a king or a foreign power who is not responsive to their well-being; thus, there is a parallel 
between the slavery of individuals and the slavery of nations which is not based on the harshness 
of treatment, but on the matter-of-fact condition of being subject to the whims of the dominating 
power. 
From a historiographical perspective, we owe this standard account of Roman liberty to recent 
scholarship that has sought to resuscitate this notion and prop it up against the dominant liberal 
notion of freedom as non-interference. Historians affiliated with the Cambridge school of 
intellectual history—including Skinner, J.G.A Pocock, James Tully, Peter Laslett, etc.—
emphasize the importance of understanding the meaning of ideas within their own historical 
context. Rather than viewing concepts such as “liberty” as having roughly the same meaning across 
centuries of debate, the Cambridge historians have engaged in something of an archaeology of 
ideas, pulling socially and historically-contingent ideas from different, albeit mostly European, 
historical contexts; freedom as non-domination, then, can be viewed as the product of interpreting 
the discourse of freedom in ancient Rome, Renaissance Italian city-states, 17th century 
commonwealth Britain and the early American republic in a historicist light; it is the result of 
successive archaeological excursions into an idea that has since fallen into obscurity both in 
academic and popular debates. 
And indeed, there is a rich historical tradition associated with freedom as non-domination that 
continues to inform its modern articulation. For example, Niccolò Machiavelli in The Discourses, 
his commentary on the first ten books of Livy’s history of Rome, argued that the strength of the 
early Roman republic rested on the conflict between the plebeians and the Senate. Machiavelli 
places the value of this conflict not merely in the political institutions of Rome, such as the tribunes 
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of the lower-class plebeians, but in the fundamental desire of the plebeians to not be dominated. 
For him, it was better to make the plebeians the guardians of liberty rather than the upper classes, 
since “it is reasonable to suppose they will take more care of it, and that, since it is impossible for 
them to usurp power, they will not permit others to do so” (I.5 116). Though the vigilance of the 
populace in defending its liberty was often a cause of disorder, short bursts of disorder contributed 
to a dynamic equilibrium that was beneficial, not harmful to political liberty. The liberty of the 
populace, furthermore, depended on the constitution of Rome, its distinctive form of government, 
which included the establishment of institutions mediating the exercise of power between the 
plebeians and the upper-class. 
Freedom as non-domination, then, has always associated itself with the establishment of a 
mixed constitution and effective legal institutions, the kinds of which would later compel the 
English republican James Harrington to write that the commonwealth is “an empire of laws and 
not of men” (20). Whereas on a non-interference account of liberty any law the state imposes on 
its people is an interference, and thus an infringement on liberty, there is no such problem for non-
domination so long as the laws apply equally to each citizen and are not imposed on an arbitrary 
basis. However, historical pedigree is not itself an indicator of the normative worth of a concept, 
and in the rest of this chapter I outline the application of freedom as non-domination to modern 
problems concerning the interaction between humans and technology. 
Modern republican freedom 
The contemporary account of non-domination has been worked out most extensively by Philip 
Pettit in many articles and two major works, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government (1997) and On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy 
(2012). For Pettit, a relation of domination consists of one agent having the power to interfere with 
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another on an arbitrary basis “in certain choices that the other is in a position to make” (1997 p.52). 
Republicans are thus concerned with invasion of the practical range of choices available to a person 
over which they have the power to choose a course of action. Interference represents an alteration 
of the range of choices that present themselves as available to an agent, whether it occurs by way 
of physical coercion, violence, intimidation, punishment, threat, covert manipulation or, finally, 
“agenda-fixing, the deceptive or non-rational shaping of people’s beliefs or desires, or the rigging 
of the consequences of people’s actions” (53). Furthermore, republican freedom as non-
domination in Pettit’s view is separate from philosophical freedom of the will and similar 
psychological notions whose preoccupation is with the authentic formation of desires on the part 
of the subject; republicans are also not chiefly preoccupied in defending positive freedom, 
autonomy, self-legislation, or similar notions of democratic self-rule. “Our concern is solely with 
social free will or, in effect, political freedom: that is, with what is required for it to be the case 
that however imperfectly formed your will may be, you are in a position to make your choice, 
without vitiation or invasion, according to that will” (2012 p.49). 
Pettit is thus concerned with the revealed will of the political subject. Similar to the concept of 
“revealed preference” in economics, the revealed will may not necessarily represent the “true” or 
real will of the subject, however that may be defined. In today’s technological context, for instance, 
there is a growing awareness among consumers of the addictiveness of social media platforms, 
which then raises the question; is it really my will to use this technology, or, alternatively, is it my 
real will? These are pressing psychological and philosophical questions but are not of the first 
order when it comes to the politics of technology. 21 It is misguided, on a republican approach, to 
 
21 There are strong links between freedom and self-realization, for example, in many Marxian political philosophies 
(See Che Guevara’s treatment of “The Institutionalization of the Revolution” in Socialism and Man in Cuba, from 
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enlist the state as a public psychologist that aims to awaken the authentic desires of its citizens; 
with Pettit, I bracket these questions of positive freedom for now, though I return later in the 
chapter to the question of whether securing non-domination is prior to positive freedom in the 
realm of politics. 
The foil of non-domination, however, is not positive freedom but the negative freedom 
attributed to the liberal tradition of political thought. The most cited exponent of liberal liberty is 
Isaiah Berlin, who in Two Concepts of Liberty asserts that interference alone constitutes invasion 
of freedom, and consequently subjection to the will of another. However, on Pettit’s account, 
interference alone does not necessarily mean an infringement of freedom. For him, domination is 
the enemy of freedom, not mere interference. 
Interference without domination occurs when acts of interference track the interests of the 
interfered, or, in the case of the free democratic polity, when the demos (the “people” or 
“populace”) set the terms of interfering activities such as legislation or taxation. The relationship 
between a coercive republican government and the people is similar, Pettit argues, to that of two 
friends, one of whom, A, hands over the keys of his alcohol cupboard to the other, B, in an effort 
to restrict his own alcohol consumption. If A sets the terms of the agreement such that B returns 
the keys only on 24 hours’ notice, then even if B refuses an immediate handover, he is acting on 
A’s prior instructions: “I refuse the key only because your instructions require me to do so… I 
interfere with you, but only on your terms” (2012 p.57). This example involving individuals can 
be applied to the legitimate relationship that must hold between the republican state and the 
populace, where the state interferes only on the people’s terms, as the title of Pettit’s work suggests. 
 
The Che Reader, Ocean Press 2005, retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1965/03/man-
socialism.htm). However, to engage with this vast literature is beyond the scope of this current chapter. 
 70 
In contrast, there are relationships of domination without interference which are unacceptable 
to republican political theorists. In the case of domination without interference, the potential of 
arbitrary interference is a constant, credible threat. The recurring examples Pettit refers to are the 
slave who relies on his own cunning or the goodwill of his master to avoid interference, the wife 
in a patriarchal society whose husband happens to not be abusive, and the worker in an unregulated 
economy who manages to avoid arbitrary abuse from the manager (cf. Anderson 2017). As 
mentioned in the last chapter, these are examples of dominium, the exercise of private power, rather 
than imperium, the power of the state. 
In sum, while most liberal theorists want to maximize liberty as non-interference, republicans 
want to instead promote the ideal of liberty as non-domination. The central difference becomes 
clear when we consider what is required among the two traditions for a relationship to be 










Liberalism Not free Not free Free Free 
Republicanism Not free Free Not free Free 
Table 3-1 Prevailing interpretations of liberty according to standard liberal and republican accounts (cf. Pettit 
1997 p.24). 
 
The trajectory of republican political thought, then—much like postcolonial, feminist, Marxian or 
critical theoretic approaches—is to extend the analysis of power relations into settings that are not 
explicitly “political” in the mainstream, liberal sense of the term. And while the republican focus 
has mainly centered on traditional problems related to the state, citizenship, democracy and 
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authority, there have been some cursory attempts to transpose republican thinking into the domain 
of emerging technologies.  
In the 2004 article “Trust, Reliance, and the Internet,” for example, Pettit provides a 
counterpoint to unfettered optimism of new collaborative democracies forming on digital 
platforms. The crux of his critique is an analysis of trust and how trust is fostered in social 
relationships. Pettit describes two bases on which a person forms a judgment of the trustworthiness 
of another: the “primary” basis derives from rational beliefs about the stable dispositions of 
persons toward loyalty, virtue and prudence, whereas the “secondary” basis forms in the absence 
of this rational belief, but on the assumption that other persons have a meta-disposition toward 
displaying behaviors that earn the trust of others (117). On this second basis, one may make an 
overture, a preliminary act of trust that tests the other’s inclination to at least act in a trustworthy 
manner.  
Pettit does not deny the possibility that a relationship of trust can form online among people 
who already interact at some level offline, though he does claim that “pure Internet contact” alone 
is not sufficient for two people to foster a robust, well-informed relationship of mutual trust (120). 
More than splitting hairs, Pettit’s distinction of the different bases for trust-based relationships 
allows him to accumulate evidence for the importance of bodily presence in forging trust (118). 
The same bodily presence cyber-libertarians abjure as a constraint on free expression is framed 
here as a necessary condition for establishing evidence of at least the rationality of mere reliability 
on someone else, as well as more demanding virtues such as loyalty, honesty and the like. The 
matter of reading facial expressions, interpreting another person’s social interactions and 
maintaining our own conscious record of their behavior, was either difficult or impossible in the 
(now seemingly archaic) contexts of email, chat rooms and online discussion boards of the mid 
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2000s Internet on which Pettit bases his analysis. And just as I am constrained in making informed 
judgments about the trustworthiness of virtual others, (the kind that would make me comfortable, 
say, meeting them alone, in-person) others are equally constrained in making these judgments 
about me.  
Pettit does not employ a non-domination lens in his article on trust, but the attempt to describe 
in some detail the moral qualities of actual relations on the Internet beyond cyber-libertarian 
discourse provides an avenue into how we can apply non-domination to the types of relations 
engendered by technologies. The “eyeball test,” for example, is another one of Pettit’s claims for 
the importance of mutual regard in politics. The eyeball test is a heuristic for determining whether 
or not someone enjoys political freedom, and Pettit describes the eyeball test as follows, saying 
that people enjoy freedom if they “can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or 
deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public 
status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best” (2012 p.84). In the 
language of subject and object, two people passing the eyeball test see each other as subjects—as 
humans, worthy of equal treatment and respect—recognizing each other’s subjectivity despite the 
objective thingness of the other. Relationships on the early commercial Internet were thus impeded 
because sensory deprivation degraded the possibility of mutual regard: the recognition of the other 
and of oneself as free and equal. Free because of their mutual equality; equal because of their 
mutual freedom. 
Initial approach for a republican theory of technics 
With respect to the relation between freedom and technology, a republican critique could start 
from the constitution of freedom by legal structures and institutions, and then move on to describe 
how technologies either impinge or alter these legal protections. Following Pettit, I argue that the 
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laws of a polity do not cause freedom, but that the people are free by virtue of the laws. I am 
questioning whether there are technological constraints on liberty, and if so, how these constraints 
support or conflict with existing legal structures.  
Critical approaches to law that accent the relational character of legal problems, such as that 
of the legal scholar Roger Brownsword in the article, “Law, Liberty, and Technology,” are of great 
assistance in the analysis of the role of technology in politics. Under an “umbrella conception of 
liberty,” Brownsword evaluates new technologies based on their impact on normative legal 
relationships between agents and the practical possibility of carrying out a given action. Writing 
in terms of legal relationships, Brownsword relies on the framework developed by Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld on the qualities of liberty-rights and claim-rights, where liberty-rights derive 
from the absence of a duty to others and claim-rights derive from someone other than the right-
bearer having a duty to perform a given action.  
In the Hohfeldian framework, given a body of positive law, an agent A has the liberty to do 
some action, x, if relative to some other agent, B, the act, x, is neither required nor prohibited by 
law (Brownsword 1997 p.2). An agent, A, might also have a claim-right against another, B, for B 
to do x, if and only if B has a duty to A to do x. Each of these normative relations represents what 
Brownsword calls a “paper option,” the de jure rights of citizens, which conflict in at least some 
instances with their de facto capacity to carry out certain actions (8). 
Brownsword’s essential contribution to the law and technology literature is an illuminating 
description of the impacts of “technological management” on practical liberty. I quote at length 
the definition of technological management Brownsword provides: 
technological management — typically involving the design of products or places, or the 
automation of processes — seeks to exclude (i) the possibility of certain actions which, in 
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the absence of this strategy, might be subject only to rule regulation or (ii) human agents 
who otherwise would be implicated in the regulated activities. (11) 
One of the significant impacts of technological management is its replacement of legal and 
moral constraints on action. In Hohfeld’s terms, technological management can either reinforce 
existing legal prohibitions or practically prohibit the exercise of a liberty-right or claim-right 
in the absence of formal legal constraint. To illustrate this dynamic of technological 
management, I will refer to a real-world example of technological constraints in the domain of 
urban transportation: the turnstile.  
Those familiar with riding underground trains in urban environments might have 
encountered the temptation to not pay the fare, which might consist of jumping over or 
otherwise evading a technical object called a turnstile. 
 
There are some cities whose public transit systems have no turnstiles of any kind to verify if 
riders are paying the fare. The metro system in the city of Helsinki, Finland, for example, does 
not have gates or turnstiles in its stations. Instead, there are card-reader machines at station 
Figure 3-1. (Left) A typical waist-high turnstile [“tourniquet”] in the Paris Metro at the Station Chaussée 
d’Antin with a slot for paper tickets, a place to scan the Navigo pass and a security gate after the turnstile. 
(Right) Full-height Anti-fraud gates [“Portiques anti-fraudes”] installed at Gare Saint-Lazare, Paris, with 
two high glass panes opening in the French-door style (Photo: Floréal Hernandez, 20 Minutes). 
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entrances that scan tickets and metro passes; the penalty for not having a valid ticket is 80 
euros (€) plus the price of the ticket.22 Human ticket enforcement officials are responsible for 
assigning these penalties, though their presence is scattered throughout the system. For a given 
metro trip in Helsinki, it would be unlikely that one would encounter a team of officials, but 
still possible.23 
To figure out whether dodging the fare makes economic sense, rational fare-dodgers in the 
guise of homo oeconomicus can make an impressionistic calculation of the expected 
probability of running into an enforcement official on a given ride, multiply that by the 
expected fine, 80 € plus the cost of a ticket (2,80 € to 5,70 € depending on what zones—A, B, 
C and D— are needed for the ride), and finally compare that value, their expected punishment, 
to the price of a single ticket. Under these rudimentary assumptions, a rider would feel 
comfortable dodging the fare if they held the subjective belief that the probability of running 
into enforcement on a single metro ride is less than five percent.24 
 
22 All information from Helsinki Region Transport Authority, https://www.hsl.fi/en/tickets-and-fares/penalty-
fare. 
23 This is similar to the ancient Roman practice of “decimating” that Machiavelli describes in the Discorsi, where 
every tenth man in an army would be executed for a crime committed collectively. Machiavelli describes the 
psychological effect of this practice, saying “by killing the tenth part, chosen by lot, when all are guilty, he who is 
punished bewails his lot, and he who is not punished is afraid to do wrong lest on some other occasion the lot should 
not spare him” (III. 49 p.527). 
24 Expected probability of enforcement ⋅ Expected fine = Expected punishment, expressed in euros (€). We are 
therefore interested in the inequality: Expected punishment < Cost of single-ride ticket. In this example I make the 
(unrealistic) assumptions that Helsinki residents are rational, utility-maximizing agents who are chiefly concerned 
with minimizing the economic cost of riding the metro, that they buy single-ride tickets and that in the case of 
equality they would be indifferent among dodging and paying the fare. I also assume that the punishment equals the 
monetary penalty, though the introduction of criminal penalties, for repeat offenders, for example, would surely 
introduce discontinuities in the disutility of punishment. 
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For the sake of the example, let us assume that a majority of Helsinki residents begin to 
estimate the probability of enforcement as approximately zero. As a result, revenues from 
metro fares incur a significant decrease. If the Helsinki Region Transport authority wanted to 
reduce the number of riders dodging the fare, they could employ a variety of tactics for doing 
so. A non-technological approach might involve threatening larger fines or criminal penalties 
for fare-dodgers or hiring security officers to enforce the restrictions at more consistent 
intervals. Technological management, however, might involve installing the same kinds of 
three-arm, waist-high turnstiles that exist in many other cities, prominent CCTV surveillance 
cameras to deter jumpers, equipped perhaps with facial recognition software, or, in the most 
extreme case, replacing waist-high turnstiles with full-height turnstiles that would eliminate 
the problem of fare-dodging altogether, though likely at considerable cost. 
The methods of enforcement above are designed to (a) increase the expected probability of 
enforcement, thereby increasing the expected punishment, (b) physically impede fare-dodging, 
or (c) both. They either change the economic calculus or take choices off the table; what I am 
interested in is how technical solutions operate at the level of human experience, especially if 
they significantly alter human behavior. At first glance, the metro turnstile is a mere technical 
object; it is instrumental for pedestrians to use the system of public transport. Its imputed 
functions are to process payments, prevent fraud and manage the flow of riders into the subway 
system. However, if one steps back from these assumptions regarding its supposed functions, 
one can ask how the turnstile effects changes to human interaction. 
The metro rider has a particular form of interaction with the turnstile that reflects “using” 
the machine by passing through it. Upon entering the train station, the turnstile stands between 
the (prospective) rider, and the train platform where she would like to go. From the perspective 
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of enforcement officials overlooking the morning rush-hour, there is a proper way to engage 
with these objects: the rider must approach the turnstile; if there is a payment to be made, she 
pays, either with cash, a ticket bought at a kiosk or a ticket machine, or a pre-loaded subway 
card; finally, the turnstile mechanism determines for how long the stile will unlock itself and 
allow her to pass through. Jumping over the turnstile is an “incorrect” manner of engagement; 
the engineers did not design the turnstile to be jumped over.  
However, it is at this juncture that the moral and political outlines of heretofore benign 
technical objects should become visible. The idea that there are right and wrong ways to engage 
with a technical object presupposes a moral dimension of technology. According to our 
intuitions about the function of the turnstile, the turnstile-jumper has done something wrong, 
an act of “fraud” in the language of transit authorities. Increasing the technical security features 
of turnstiles is one way of preventing fraud, though not by appealing to the moral sentiment of 
the individual or fear of legal repercussions; rather, the removal of the possibility of fraud 
constitutes a moral imposition by way of a technical object. 
Commenting on the moral character of technological management, Brownsword argues 
that a community with “moral aspirations” should not preclude its members from exercising 
their judgement, nor render it impossible for citizens to engage in civil disobedience (57). 
When a technological object removes the possibility of doing the wrong thing, authentic moral 
performance becomes impossible because the agent does not freely do the right thing. 
Technology can remove the possibility of what Pettit calls “contestability,” referring to the 
permanent, institutionally guarded capacity of the populace to contest the power of the state. 
Rather than accepting the liberal claim that a legitimate agreement involves the consent of all 
relevant parties, republicans go further, arguing that preserving the freedom of all requires that 
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each party can effectively challenge the terms and change those terms if the challenge is 
sustained (61-3). Such a requirement implies that the stronger party—the government, in this 
instance—tracks the interests of the public good, or else it can face a legitimate, credible 
challenge to its position of authority. 
If it is correct, as I have attempted to demonstrate, that technological management can 
hinder the capacity of individuals to act according to their will, and thus alter the relationship 
of contestability between the governors and the governed, then the domain of technology and 
the domain of liberty incur substantial overlaps. The problem for republican political thought 
is to what extent these technological power relations (those that risk devolving into relations 
of domination) are intelligible in terms of its existing frames of description and analysis. While 
there have been attempts to reckon with the role of modern technology in contemporary 
politics, to date no republican theorist has taken up an extended description or critique of the 
relationship between non-domination and technology. It is only recently that republicans have 
ventured outside analysis of public imperium and into private dominium: the relatively closed 
world of family, business, religion and other facets of the private sphere. Technological 
domination is a late arrival, and one of the reasons for this has been the lack of a framework 
of description for the indefinite variations of human-technology relations. In the next section, 
I argue that phenomenology offers a suitable descriptive framework from which republicans 
can derive the substance for normative critique of technological artifacts and systems. 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
Phenomenological foundation 
The principal task of phenomenology is to directly engage the phenomena of experience. As a 
philosophical activity, engaging the phenomena of experience first requires describing the 
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range of things that appear on the level of our awareness. The phenomenological description 
is, then, a systematic description of the objects of experience that aims not at definitions or 
explanations so much as detailed accounts of the qualities of things, or phenomena, the 
ensemble of which comprise the world. The phenomenologist does not want to explain the 
essence of things as they exist behind a subjective veil of appearance; their activity, rather, 
denies the metaphysical separation of appearance and reality in favor of close examination of 
reality as it appears. In the words of Don Ihde, whose method of phenomenological description 
I draw on extensively in this chapter, in phenomenological description “Careful looking 
precedes classification and systematization, and systematization and classification are made to 
follow what the phenomenon shows” (Experimental Phenomenology (EP) 17). Unlike 
philosophies that begin from a set of axioms, then, or an indubitable Truth, phenomenology 
begins with no prior commitments other than to occupy oneself with what is present to 
experience as it presents itself. 
Describing the entire field of experience, however, is not a feasible project, given that 
everything from the sensations of perception, to mental representations, to material objects are 
part of the totality of what is experienced. It is much more pragmatic to reduce the field of 
experience before proceeding to the analysis. To that end, Ihde outlines a list of five 
phenomenological reductions which elaborate the sort of approach one must take to engage in 
good description. The first three of these relate to correct attitudes and methodological choices; 
the last two specify how phenomenology is to present the results of its practice: 
(1) Attend to the phenomena of experience as they appear (18-20) 
(2) Describe, don’t explain phenomena (18-20) 
(3) Horizontalize all phenomena (20-22) 
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(4) Seek out structural or invariant features of phenomena (22-24) 
(5) Correlational rule: maintain the intentional and reflexive relation 
between the experiencer and what is experienced (24-34) 
Ihde provides detailed descriptions of each of these steps in the text, though for my purposes it 
will be necessary only to elaborate a number of key points. I have already touched on the first two 
steps, the function of which is to delimit the field of inquiry and guide the subject’s preliminary 
excursions of phenomenological looking. The third step, “Horizontalize all phenomena,” is the last 
of these negative steps. To horizontalize phenomena is to “not assume an initial hierarchy of 
‘realities,’” i.e., to temporarily suspend one’s convictions of what the essence of the phenomenon 
in question actually is (20). If this step seems counterproductive—if it seems silly, for example, to 
resist defining familiar things in familiar terms at the outset—it is precisely because 
horizontalizing phenomena helps in distancing oneself from presuppositions that might skew a 
rich description of the thing experienced. When I move on to a phenomenology of technics, it will 
become clear that this step is key to recognizing the ambiguous quality of technologies that tends 
to escape the natural attitude with which we treat the objects of daily experience. 
Steps four and five serve to assist in reporting the results of systematic description. Another 
term Ihde uses for the reductions is hermeneutic rules, where hermeneutic refers to the 
interpretation of things as they appear.25 The end of phenomenology is to offer such interpretations 
as accounts of experience, and the hermeneutic rules structure these accounts. The invariant 
 
25 “Hermeneutics is derived from the Greek verb hermeneuein, which means to say or interpret; the noun hermeneia, 
which is the utterance or explication of thought; and the name hermeneus, which refers to the playful, mischievous, 
‘trickster’ Hermes.” From Nancy J. Moules, “Hermeneutic Inquiry: Paying Heed to History and Hermes An 
Ancestral, Substantive, and Methodological Tale,” International Journal of Qualitative Methods, Sept. 2002, pp. 1–
21, doi:10.1177/160940690200100301. 
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features of a phenomenon are its aspects that tend to remain stable across the variations of its 
appearance, or across the different interpretations of its essence or function. For example, suppose 
I am observing a pair of wired headphones; while what this object is and does might be 
immediately obvious to me, these immediate assumptions do not exhaust the possibilities of the 
headphone’s essence or function. My knee-jerk reaction might be to say, “these are headphones, 
they are for listening to music,” but there are other things one can listen to like podcasts, the news, 
or someone else’s voice on a phone call. In addition, headphones might also be a mere accessory 
to wear around one’s neck, like a scarf, or even a means of achieving the absence of noise, silence, 
as is the case with noise-cancelling headphones. “Variations ‘possibilize’ phenomena,” and even 
with the few variations of this familiar object we have moved from the simple definition of 
“something with which one listens to music” to the acceptance of a wide variety of uses, the 
invariant character of which is not immediately clear (23). 
Finally, the correlational rule is a reminder of what Edmund Husserl, father of modern 
phenomenology, thought to be the invariant structure of experience (25). Experience is always 
experience of something; experience only defines itself in relation to the objects of experience. 
Ihde notes the significance of this fundamental relationality of experience from the subject-object 
divide of Cartesian metaphysics. “Husserl transformed this distinction into a correlation of what 
is experienced with its mode of being experienced. He termed the correlation itself intentionality” 
(Ibid). Thus, while experiencing is directed towards things, the correlation implies what can be 
termed a two-way relation between the subject, “I,” and the world. Self-constitution, the capacity 
to identify myself as a self, only happens reflexively; only in relation to a world I interpret as 




I ⟶ world 
( I )—experiencing  ⇄  world 
Figure 3-2. The essential phenomenological relation of the subject ( I ) and the world, (the totality of phenomena as 
they appear). The mode of experiencing varies according to context. 
 
There is nothing intelligible outside experience because nothing outside of experience is 
intelligible. If it were, we would be capable of taking a bird’s eye, or better, an omniscient God’s 
eye view of experience, a possibility that phenomenologists cannot entertain. To illustrate the 
impossibility of viewing experience from an external position, one can turn to the suggestive 
metaphor of the Archimedean point. The Archimedean point was first posited by the Greek natural 
philosopher Archimedes, who, so the story goes, claimed he could move the Earth with a large 
lever if only he were able to outside of it. If only one could stand outside of experience, she would 
be capable of seeing the ensemble of phenomena in its totality. And yet it is one thing to strive for 
the Archimedean point in one’s quest for knowledge, quite another to affirm that one has already 
arrived. To avoid this methodological pitfall altogether, phenomenological description begins with 
the admission that positioning oneself outside of experience is futile. Even the transcendental “I” 
that is able to reflect on experience, and therefore seemingly exists above it, is ultimately 
compelled to regard its reflections too as percepts (EP 27-28). Rather than an admission of defeat, 
however, acknowledging the limitations of philosophical inquiry is the point of departure for a 
serious study of the phenomena of experience. The republican theory of technics must begin from 
this place of methodological humility, lest we discard the structure of co-constitution that has 
always accompanied humanity and its technologies. 
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The phenomenology of technics 
If it is correct that the invariant structure of experience is referential, (I–experience–world), then 
we have a firm base from which to question the role technology plays in our experience of reality. 
In Existential Technics, Ihde makes the case that technological instruments mediate the subjective 
experience of reality as well as the intersubjective communications between humans. The 
mediation of experience in Ihde’s phenomenological framework finds its parallel in the mediation 
of praxis: how humans act upon and in relation to the world. In the context of communications 
technologies, for example, the telephone serves as a medium of communication between two 
people; however, the most direct manner of communication between them would be “face-to-
face,” talking with each other without any immediate obstacles of space or time (47). In terms of 
sense perception, face-to-face communication provides the richest possible sensual experience, 
combining mixtures of at least sight, and sound, but potentially much more, including sense of 
smell, touch, space and the intangible “mood” of the situation. The medium of human 
communication influences mutual comprehension; it is more difficult to detect irony or sarcasm, 
for instance, in an e-mail than in an embodied conversation, where a sense of irony can be 
heightened by changes in the pitch of voice, facial expression, hand gestures, etc. 
The sign of a good technology in this instance is not felt in the presence of the technological 
medium but in its partial withdrawal from awareness, or “transparency” (50). Telephonic 
communication from its inception has strived for sensory identity with the paradigmatic “face to 
face” situation; major improvements in audio quality from the first generation of telephones to the 
modern smartphone, and the introduction of video calling, have brought calls closer to what Ihde 
calls the perfectly transparent situation where the technological instrument itself recedes, at least 
temporarily, from the awareness of its user (51). Paradoxically, then, the hypothetical perfect 
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technology aims to mirror the absence of technological mediation; in order to better approximate 
unmediated communication, future improvements to video call services might come in the form 
of 3-D holograms such as those in Star Wars, or virtual reality headsets that allow interlocutors to 
see not only each other’s faces but virtual representations of their full bodies. 
Essential to a preliminary understanding of technics, too, is the non-neutrality of technology. 
The telephone’s impact on communication is ambiguous because telephonic conversations contain 
characteristics of both amplification and reduction: the telephone extends the range of 
communication across the entire span of the globe, and even into outer space; however, a 
conversation over the phone also lacks the perceptual richness of a similar conversation if it had 
occurred in real-life, in a non-mediated context (Existential Technics 54). For Ihde and the 
postphenomenologists, the notion that technologies themselves are neutral objects, and the parallel 
idea that autonomous human agents should assume all responsibility for their potential 
consequences, is misguided because of how technologies transform human interactions. 
Instead of thinking about technologies in terms of neutrality, we should rather place them in a 
state of essential ambiguity. The ambiguous character of technology is derived in part from Ihde’s 
concept of multistability, which refers to the idea that a singular object holds an indefinite number 
of perceptual variations. Some of Ihde’s favorite examples of multistable objects are the kinds of 
gestalt illustrations used in psychoanalysis, or geometric figures that conform to a variety of spatial 
orientations (see Fig 3.). 
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Figure 3-3. The Necker Cube, an example of a multistable geometric figure that reveals different perceptual 
orientations. One method for bringing forth the bistability of the figure is to focus on its “near” and “far” corners. 
See Ihde’s Experimental Phenomenology for a detailed account of the Necker Cube and its perceptual variations. 
 
Ihde’s material hermeneutics is an extension of an interpretive approach to technological artifacts 
and systems. Technologies, just like objects of perception, are subject to an indefinite number of 
interpretations concerning their status and function. The function of a technology, for instance, is 
not limited to the specifications of its designers; once the technology becomes public, its use-cases 
may multiply indefinitely according to a wide variety of personal and cultural factors. Here the 
phenomenological approach links up with empirical approaches in the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) that draw many of their assumptions and methodologies from the diverse 
literatures of the sociology of knowledge, sociology of science and Science and Technology 
Studies. For example, in their article on the early development of the bicycle in the late 19th 
century, Pinch and Bijker (1984) examine the “interpretive flexibility” of technological artifacts 
(33). Their study highlights the variation in interpretations of technological artifacts as well as the 
contingent character of the design process connected to the process of social construction. For 
example, the interplay between social discussion about the design aspects of bicycles and the 
proliferation of different models of the bicycle resulted in events of closure and stabilization of 
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both discourse and artifact; the pneumatic tire, was initially ridiculed by both racers and the general 
public alike, but soon became a stable component of the bicycle after numerous demonstrations of 
how rubber tires increased the average speed of riders (39).  
Acknowledging the ambiguity of technological artifacts is the starting point for an ethics of 
technology outside of uncritical liberal interpretations of technics. While liberalism is a broad 
political and economic affiliation, the majority of liberal thinkers believe technology always 
augments freedom in the long run; technology in general enjoys a privileged position in liberal 
discourse that biases the evaluation of individual technologies. There certainly have been liberals 
who critiqued the unintended consequences of technological change on certain members of 
society, notable examples being the social liberals such as Dewey and Brandeis. However, the 
dominant liberal attitude is a tacit acceptance of technological innovation and, importantly, 
promotion of the process of technological change as reflecting a natural evolutionary order. 
On the other hand, there has also been a long line of pessimists who see in technology the root 
of many debilitating social ills. One of the first of these techno-pessimists was Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who defended a controversial thesis in the The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences that 
the renewed interest in the arts and sciences had a corrupting effect on the public morals in 
European civilization. It is common in contemporary discussions on technology to praise the virtue 
of human ingenuity out of which we regard the products of innovation; Rousseau inverts this belief, 
arguing that the arts and sciences, which includes the manufacture of technological instruments, 
were actually borne of the vices of pride, greed, avarice, idleness and misanthropic scorn of 
humankind. Rousseau inspired future generations of romantic and humanist critics of the 
technological society whose impact on both philosophical and popular discourse cannot be 
understated. 
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The moral significance of technology 
My aim here, however, is not to delve into an extended discussion of the techno-optimist and 
pessimist positions. Rather, I would like to trace a promising middle path between these two 
extremes, already partly established in the ethical theory of technological mediation that Verbeek 
elaborates in his writings on technology and morality. Eschewing moral presumption as well as 
the traditional subject-object divide in Western metaphysics, in his book Moralizing Technology: 
Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things, Verbeek advances the thesis that “ethics 
should be approached as a matter of human-technological associations,” in which technologies 
play an active role in the shaping of moral decisions by human agents (13). Verbeek launches a 
critique against humanist ethical theories that take the autonomous individual as the locus of moral 
decision-making and reflection. The technological society has, in his view, made clear the limits 
of this humanist view because of its ignorance of the moral significance of technological 
mediation. Technological artifacts have never been merely passive and instrumental. Instead, they 
exert an active influence over the initial framing and range of options available to the individual 
qua moral agent. The recurring example to which Verbeek turns throughout his book is obstetric 
imaging technologies which allow expecting parents to view a technologically mediated image of 
a fetus, their soon-to-be newborn child. An ultrasound, however, is “never a neutral peek into the 
womb” (38). Rather, the ultrasound reveals the fetus both as an individual person lacking 
representational unity with its mother, floating in undefined image-space, and as a patient (24-25). 
Since the ultrasound is capable of revealing the risk of certain congenital diseases before birth, 
expecting parents are thus placed into the (potentially unwanted) role of choosing whether, given 
the results of the scan, they want to deliver this child into the world or not. Even if they do not 
want to consider this choice at all, however, deciding not to not undergo an ultrasound, or deciding 
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to have specific information from the ultrasound withheld, still constitutes a choice of moral 
significance. With this example, Verbeek wants to convey the salience of technologically mediated 
morality, as well as the impossibility of escaping the moral questions technological mediations 
force upon us. 
Technological mediation and freedom 
For Verbeek, technological mediation is also not necessarily a threat to freedom despite the 
apparent interference of technological artifacts and systems into situations of moral significance. 
The concept of freedom Verbeek adopts in order to resolve the conflict between technology and 
human agency borrow from the reflections of Foucault on the nature of power and the ethics of 
self-interpretation. The liberal ideal of liberty is the absence of interference, and on this account 
of liberty technological mediation of human actions presents a violation of non-interference 
because of how technologies alter the choices available to the human subject.  
Foucault, however, conceived of liberty in his ethical writings and lectures as an expression of 
self-realization, as having the capacity to configure one’s relations with different focal points of 
power in society such as the state, the church, the educational system, the family, etc. (85). Power 
relations within this schema of freedom are not necessarily dominating, Verbeek explains, but 
constitutive of the subject, and therefore ethics becomes not a series of moral decisions but a 
practice of engaging with power in a positive manner.  
While the Foucauldian concept of positive freedom is itself liberating, Verbeek’s 
reinterpretation underestimates the role of domination and its negation of the power relations that 
constitute freedom. In an interview, Foucault clarified his position on the relationship between 
freedom and power: “I am sometimes asked: ‘But if power is everywhere, there is no freedom.’ I 
answer that if there are relations of power in every social field, this is because there is freedom 
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everywhere” (1997 p.292). This is an illiberal notion of freedom because it assumes that freedom 
is borne of the interference people experience in their social relationships. Power is present in all 
social relations; Foucault even says that he prefers not to talk of “power” on its own, but rather 
“relations of power” (Ibid 291). On Verbeek’s account of freedom, the individual enters into a 
relationship with technologies and engages in a playful shaping of that relationship which is a sign 
of their freedom. There is, however, a dark side to power: that of domination, or what American 
psychologist Timothy O’Leary refers to as the “perversion of power” (2002 p.158). And indeed, 
Foucault stipulates that if one were “completely at the other’s disposal and became his thing, an 
object on which he could wreak boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn’t be any relations 
of power,” and therefore no possibility of freedom (1997b p.292). The project of identifying these 
“states of domination” and examining what means of resistance are available to the dominated 
should be of prior concern to the political philosopher (Ibid). And although the project of 
reconstituting relations of power presupposes the return of a confident, capable subject in the guise 
of positive freedom, we can draw a distinction between self-liberation, the act of freeing oneself, 
and freedom, the lasting condition of living in the absence of domination. It is this conditional 
sense of freedom that risks being lost in the positive notion. 
Conversely, Verbeek argues in his writings on Foucault that the appropriate conception of 
freedom for an analysis of human-technology is freedom as self-constitution: “In terms of Isaiah 
Berlin: we should move away from the idea of negative freedom (freedom-from, the absence of 
constraints on individual acts) toward an idea of positive freedom (freedom-to, the ability to pursue 
one’s aims), freedom that is positively directed at its environment” (2020 p.146). However, apart 
from giving the definitions of the two concepts of liberty, there is no subsequent effort to address 
Berlin’s critique of positive freedom. Verbeek appropriates Berlin’s language of freedom without 
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acknowledging the profound disagreement they would have on the political consequences of 
embracing either negative or positive freedom. Namely, Berlin expresses his practical preference 
for political freedom understood as “the ‘negative’ goal of warding off interference,” of protecting 
the individual against hindrances of his will, no matter how “noble” or “benevolent the motives” 
of those in power may be (1967 p.158). According to Berlin, this conception of liberty has played 
a role in protecting the most precious rights of the individual. 
Positive liberty, on the other hand—the notion of liberty Verbeek promotes—risks justifying 
forms of coercion on the basis of realizing the “true” self. Verbeek and his readers (Selinger et al. 
2012; Bas de Boer et al. 2018) acknowledge the definition of positive liberty as freedom to rather 
than freedom from and interpret the sense of activity latent in this definition as appropriate for a 
relationship with technology. However, to engage further with Berlin’s critique of positive liberty 
is to consider the “monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if 
he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, [which] 
is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization” (162). If the self is not autonomous, as 
Verbeek suggests, but heteronomous with regard to ethical behavior, there is the danger of wanting 
to raise others to a higher degree of freedom against their will and feeling justified in doing so 
because of the supreme value of reaching the true self. 
It is possible to dismiss this challenge to positive liberty on libertarian grounds; one could 
argue that every individual should have the right to craft their own free relations with technological 
power with the caveat that they do not interfere with others. But here we have regressed to the 
libertarian reductionism that posits technologies as instruments of individual liberation. These 
discursive links with cyber-libertarianism are, in my view, another weakness of the prevailing 
trajectory of postphenomenology. 
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The cryptocurrency movement, for example, has co-opted a libertarian worldview to justify 
digital payment systems that fall outside the domain of government regulation. In 2009, the 
pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto published a paper that outlined a digital platform for currency 
exchange that would bypass the third-party mediation of financial institutions. “What is needed is 
an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two 
willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party” 
(Nakamoto 2009 1). Because of its radical break with state institutions and trust-based social 
cooperation, cryptocurrency advocates have found moral justification in the political philosophy 
of libertarianism (Sotirakopoulos 2018). Nikos Sotirakopoulos draws parallels between 
cryptomarkets’ efforts to escape government oversight and the “counter-conducts” Foucault 
advocated against the repressive regimes of pastoral power and neoliberal governmentality (199). 
The spirit of individual rights encoded in these virtual communities indeed comes into conflict 
with the neoliberal state that Foucault addresses in his ethics.26 The free relation Verbeek 
constitutes between humans and technology is contingent on the operant notion of freedom, and 
this is where a non-domination approach must break from the trajectory of postphenomenological 
politics. 
THE REPUBLICAN THEORY OF TECHNICS 
The normative aims of a republican theory of technics are to secure free relations between 
technology and the polity and free and equal relations between citizens. These normative aims 
 
26 Cryptocurrencies represent an interesting problem for a non-domination approach. Depending on the imperium of 
financial regulation, they might actually represent an improvement in freedom. However, as it currently stands, 
cryptocurrency exchanges still suffer from high barriers to entry and are unavailable to groups without equal access 
to technological resources and literacy. 
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would be acceptable to similar frameworks for the interpretation of human-technology relations, 
such as the postphenomenological approach, however there are clear differences between how 
these and other approaches interpret the central concept of freedom. What further complicates the 
field is the promiscuous oscillations of liberal theorists between promoting freedom as non-
interference, substantive autonomy and self-realization, especially in the context of extolling the 
liberatory potential of new technologies. Modern republican political thought, on the other hand, 
has directed its efforts towards combating a particularly egregious political state of affairs: the 
relation of domination. Recalling Pettit’s notion of domination, where I am dominated to the extent 
that someone else can impose their will on me on an arbitrary basis, a next step would be to ask 
how technologies mediate the power dynamics that have the propensity to constitute relations of 
domination; either in the case technological mediation between humans, or in relations between 
humans and technologies themselves.  
This project should not provoke major objections from either republicans or phenomenologists. 
The trend of republicanism, as I have explained, has been to look for political interaction in an 
increasingly wide variety of contexts. Verbeek and the postphenomenologists, too, have already 
recognized the absence of domination as an essential condition of freedom, even if freedom itself 
is defined in the terms of ethical “practices of freedom” (Verbeek “Subject to technology” 41). 
The question is whether the two approaches can coalesce around a common goal of engaging 
technological phenomena as political phenomena, which in the end is a question of colliding 
frames of analysis and critique. 
S.D. Reese provides a working definition of frames as “organizing principles that are socially 
shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” 
(Reese 11). Whether the field of inquiry contains the individual subject “I”–experiencing–world, 
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or the intersubjective sedimentation of beliefs within a culture, the idea of a pure perception or 
interpretation of phenomena must give way to the recognition of how previous experiences and 
beliefs structure perception and interpretation. Ihde, questioning whether there are dominant orders 
of perception for the variations of multistable objects, notes the function of narratives and 
perceptual rules in bringing out different variations of objects (EP 61). For example, the famous 
duck-rabbit illustration from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, originally from the 
psychologist Joseph Jastrow, is an example of a bi-stable image. Considering hermeneutic frames, 
we might not be surprised if a rabbit-hunter interprets the picture as depicting a rabbit before a 
duck, and vice versa for the duck-hunter. 
 
 
Figure 3-4. Wittgenstein’s simplified “duck-rabbit” image (PI 194). 
 
Despite the apparent limited application of perceptual multistability to political theory, I have yet 
to examine the implication that technologies, and therefore technological mediations of political 
power, are subject to hermeneutic frames. In an earlier section I proposed a primitive 
phenomenological outline of the metro turnstile, one technological artifact of many populating 
contemporary cities. Especially with the growing discourse and implementation of “smart city” 
projects around the world, the urban environment is rife with multistable objects that frame the 
possibilities of action and the overall schema of interpretation for the citizens who live there. 
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In Callous Objects: Designs Against the Homeless, Robert Rosenberger provides a critique of 
urban technologies designed to police and punish homeless populations.27 These include benches 
in parks and in public transportation stations with dividers, ledges with spikes and tilted seats that 
prevent people from sleeping on their surfaces. In the language of Brownsword, these are examples 
of technological management; technical “solutions” to problems that might be unsavory or even 
unconstitutional to implement as a matter of law.28 Anti-sleeping benches are everywhere in urban 
environments; and though it might make no difference to a housed person whether they can lie 
down while waiting for the bus (for them, the bench presents itself as a temporary seat), to a 
homeless person the bench appears as a place above ground to spend the night. If it is not pointed 
out to the housed bus rider, the bench-as-bed stability may never appear. Rosenberger writes: 
“there is a political dimension to what gets noticed and what goes unseen. There is a politics to 
perception itself.” 
Republicans are sensitive to domination in the sense that domination provides an initial 
hermeneutic frame for the analysis of power dynamics and other aspects of human affairs, 
including human-technology relations. The republican approach is therefore biased only to the 
extent that all viewing occurs within perceptual or hermeneutic frames. Framing affects the order 
of appearance of multistable phenomena, but it does not necessarily preclude a rich description of 
the field of inquiry or the possibilization of phenomena that is required to bring out their essential 
structures. In addition, my synthetic approach combines the phenomenological concern for 
 
27 Robert Rosenberger, “Callous Objects: Designs Against the Homeless,” University of Minnesota Press, 2017, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.5749/9781452958538. [no page numbers were available for the online format]. 
 
28 Rosenberger points out that the U.S. Department of Justice ruled anti-camping and outdoor sleeping ordinances 
violations of the 8th amendment of the Constitution’s provision against “cruel and unusual punishment,” because 
homeless people are often punished for doing so when no alternatives are available. 
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intersubjectivity with the republican concern for mutual regard. It is here that the republican notion 
of non-domination must be laid bare in its relationship with communication, for it is partly in 
human communication or lack thereof that structures of domination are sedimented. Pettit 
describes how a mutual awareness of domination serves to reinforce the relation of domination: 
Domination is generally going to involve the awareness of control on the part of the powerful, 
the awareness of vulnerability on the part of the powerless, and the mutual awareness—indeed, 
the common awareness among all the parties to the relationship—of this consciousness on each 
side. (61) 
The final consequence of this common awareness is the materialization of the master-slave 
scenario; Pettit, however, does not probe more deeply into the existential consequences of 
domination. I had written earlier that the passing of a mutual regard is an essential moment of 
recognition between persons. But what is being recognized? What is the object of recognition? In 
the perversion of the dominating regard, it is the objective reality of domination occurring in an 
intersubjective manner. The dominating regard belongs to what Husserl referred to as “the 
intersubjective world,” where the perceptual manifolds of individuals are shared in a higher-order 
objective reality encompassing “an indefinite plurality of subjects that stand in a relation of 
‘mutual understanding’” (420). Included among these higher-order realities are the various socially 
constructed institutions, of which Husserl takes care to name the State, the Church, the laws, to 
which I would add that technological systems, too, constitute higher-order realities that are 
nevertheless grounded in present-to-experience material reality (422). And if the state can 
dominate its citizens, why would technological systems not be able to dominate the humans 
situated within them? To be sure, the government of a state is populated by human actors who 
represent the loci of dominating power, but until technological systems of security, surveillance, 
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policing, etc. are fully autonomous, there is no reason why technologies would pose a less salient 
threat to freedom than the state, the church, the prison or any such other abstraction of political 
power on the grounds that human agents are not ostensibly making the day-to-day decisions that 
govern people’s lives. If anything, submitting oneself to a digital process risks even greater 
exposure to arbitrariness on the direct part of algorithms rather than humans. 
Regardless, the dehumanization that characterizes most relations of domination threatens to 
engulf a technological society in which human communication is everywhere reduced to mere 
interaction with technologies. Can we begin to understand the solipsism of a society in which most 
peoples’ engagement with one another happens by means of telephone, screen or hologram? Such 
a society preserves better than any other the separation between pure subject and pure object. The 
discovery of the other remains impossible without the body; it is the shared experience of 
embodiment, of consciousness that has a body, that allows me to recognize something of myself 
in the other. Consciousness, the awareness of the self, is an opening toward intersubjectivity, as 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty explains in Phenomenology and Perception: 
With regard to consciousness, we must no longer conceive of it as a constituting consciousness 
and as a pure being-for-itself, but rather as a perceptual consciousness, as the subject of a 
behavior, as being in the world or existence, for only in this way will another person appear in 
control of his phenomenal body and receive a sort of ‘place’.” (367) 
Frantz Fanon expressed a similar sentiment when he argued for the eventual dislocation of racial 
categories in the reconstruction of a world for all humanity: “Supériorité? Infériorité ? / Pourquoi 
tout simplement ne pas essayer de toucher l’autre, de sentir l’autre, de me révéler l’autre ? / Ma 
liberté ne m’est-elle donc pas donnée pour édifier le monde de Toi ?” (188).29 Indeed, what this 
 
29 “Superiority? Inferiority? / Why not the simple attempt to touch the other, to feel the other, to reveal the other to 
myself? / Was my liberty not given to me in order to build the world of You?” [My translation]. 
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general approach to intersubjectivity suggests is the importance of empathy in bridging the alterity 
relation. For Fanon, however, the contexts of the decolonial struggle against white imperial 
domination held evidence for how the inhumanity of colonialism had immediate and severe 
material consequences for the Black laborers working in the cane fields of Martinique or living 
under the thumb of French police violence in Algeria. Especially in the optics of racism and racial 
oppression, history is flooded with examples of how technological management picked up the 
slack when explicitly racist statutes become untenable. Deborah Archer, writing on the 
construction of the inter-state highway system in the mid-century United States, details how “[i]n 
states around the country, highways disproportionately displaced Black households and cut the 
heart and soul out of thriving Black communities as homes, churches, schools, and businesses were 
destroyed… In some cases, entire Black communities were leveled” (1265). In the absence of bald-
faced de jure segregation, the highways accomplished what legal means could not: the destruction 
of Black lives and livelihoods, and the effective ostracization of Black people from downtown 
areas filled with law-abiding whites. The “perceived genius” of constructing highways to reinforce 
racial inequality was that they were likely to materially support existing legislation that supported 
segregation and resist future efforts at integration (1275). The consequences of technological 
management are indefinite and tend towards sedimentation, with little leeway for deconstruction 
and reconstruction once the structures are finally in place. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have presented a synthetic approach to technological politics. Republicanism 
provides a language, a set of discursive tools, for articulating the challenges facing a polity as well 
as the normative aims that guide its government and politics. The associated historical tradition of 
republican theory, similarly, contains extensive accounts of how different social and political 
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groups valorized and engaged in struggles for freedom, the central concept of republicanism. 
However, until recently, considerations of how technological artifacts and systems impact power 
relations has remained scant. The phenomenology of technics in turn provides inroads for 
republican theorists to consider at length the mediating role of technology in human affairs. 
The next chapter features a more focused treatment of how to constitute a free relation between 
technology and the polity in the republican state. Remaining moored to the subject of regulating 
technological change, I will investigate the possible legal constraints on technological power 
within the tradition of republican constitutional thought. Therefore, in the following chapter there 
will be more of what would count as traditional political theory, but I want to emphasize that the 
brief phenomenological excursions I have made in this chapter continue to structure the approach. 
What I affirm with both the phenomenological and the republican traditions is the fundamental 
desire to acknowledge and be acknowledge by others; to confirm with others the freedom and 




Chapter 4.  
The constitution of technology 
 
In this chapter, I turn toward the possibility of a republican model for political engagement with 
technology. The republican aspects of the model benefit from the fundamental insight that humans 
are technologically mediated rather than purely autonomous moral subjects. Consequently, the 
goal of an ethics of technology is to examine the relationship of co-constitution between humans 
and technology and to shape that relationship according to the conclusions of ethical reflection. 
What the theory of technological mediation is still negotiating, however, is an application to 
politics; one that stresses the relationships of co-constitution between political institutions, 
technologies and the public. On the one hand, Verbeek has demonstrated some of the promising 
features of what he terms “the political hermeneutics of technology,” including the ways in which 
hermeneutic description can reveal the political significance of individual technologies and the 
non-neutral, technologically mediated character of political interaction (2020 p.152). On the other 
hand, there have been fewer forays into the establishment of political institutions and practices that 
aim to promote a free relationship between technologies and the political community. These 
considerations recall a conception of politics as the design of institutions, and of political theory 
as a space for reflection on the public provisions for supporting an ethics of the good life. For its 
political application, then, I argue postphenomenology should begin to integrate greater reflection 
and experimentation with the themes of legislation and constitution. 
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Drawing on the constitutional thought of Philip Pettit and other republican theorists, in this 
chapter I argue for the virtue of constitutional thinking in the philosophy of technology and propose 
an alternate conception of democratic influence over the process of technological change. To that 
end, the argument proceeds in three parts. First, I show on the basis of a postphenomenological 
account of technics that democratic republics should transition from Technology Assessment (TA) 
to a co-constitution model of technology regulation. Second, I describe and critique Langdon 
Winner’s notion of “regimes of instrumentality” in the context of technologies qua legislation and 
constitution. Third and last, I outline the republican constitutional commitments to dispersion of 
power, representation and deliberation and a contestation approach to democratic control. 
FROM TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT TO CO-CONSTITUTION 
The employment of scientific research and deliberative methods to assess the social, economic, 
environmental and political impacts of new technologies first gained prominence in the United 
States during the 1960s. Along with a general awareness of the increasing influence of science and 
technology in society, several prominent critics—such as Rachel Carson, writing on the impact of 
pesticides on the environment in her popular book Silent Spring—rallied public support around 
limiting the development of certain technologies that threatened peoples’ health and safety (van 
Est and Brom 306). The growing critical discourse around science and technology became law 
with the establishment of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972; this was an 
important event for democracy in the United States, too, because it promised to address the 
imbalance of knowledge and control of technological change between the legislative and 
comparatively stronger executive branches of the government (Ibid 310). 
TA in its initial stages relied on the testimony of scientific experts to inform legislators and 
regulators on the contingent outcomes of technological change. Although this form of “Classical 
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TA” excluded stakeholders outside of government and academia, it still constituted a challenge to 
paradigms of technological regulation that left the process of technological change untouched 
(Ibid). Practitioners of Classical TA conducted research on technologies in order to anticipate their 
possible impacts; as a practice, the OTA presented research on technologies to members of 
Congress and proposed alternatives to the dominant plan. While the regulatory doctrine at the time 
had been to engage only in ex post management of accidents and large-scale failures of 
implementation, TA encouraged legislators to become better informed about technologies during 
their initial stages of development.  
In addition to Classical TA, van Est and Brom (2012) address three other paradigms of 
technology assessment: Participatory TA, Argumentative TA and Constructive TA (308). Each of 
these paradigms politicizes the practice of examining the social impacts of technologies in a 
slightly different way. Participatory TA goes beyond informing politicians to involving business, 
civil society and citizens in the debate on emerging technologies; Argumentative TA also broadens 
the debate but places a greater emphasis on interrogating the presuppositions and overarching 
belief systems of its entrants; and finally, Constructive TA (CTA) aims to open the design process 
itself to public scrutiny and debate. More than Participatory and Argumentative TA approaches, 
“CTA redefines technology assessment as an active contribution to the process of design as 
opposed to an independent analysis of the impacts of technology” (317). Finally, one could also 
add the nascent efforts at ethical TA and ethical CTA (eCTA), which aim to overcome a 
“normative deficit” of TA approaches to this growing list of assessment paradigms (Bas de Boer 
et al. 302). 
As a result of its turn toward the co-construction of technology and society, CTA seems to 
subvert the notion that technology can be assessed from a neutral perspective. This implicit 
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abandonment of assessment in favor of intentional engagement with the process of technological 
change corresponds to the hermeneutic position that humans and technology co-constitute each 
other. Indeed, Verbeek proposes that technological mediation can “augment” CTA by introducing 
its practitioners to the mediating role of technologies in moral decision-making (2011 p. 102). In 
his view, CTA succeeds as a methodology for democratizing technological change in the design-
context but does not pay sufficient attention to how technologies mediate interactions in the use-
context (Ibid). To bring out the possible mediating variations of a technological artifact, Verbeek 
proposes the systematic production of scenarios and simulations, along with a kind of stakeholder 
analysis that seeks to take into account a sufficient quantity of perspectives regarding the 
technologies’ possible real-world relationships with human actors. 
Although Verbeek presents technological mediation as an augmentation of existing TA 
approaches, the existential implications of human-technology relations make the mere application 
of mediation a stunted enterprise. Bas de Boer et al. argue that on a weak reading of technological 
mediation, phenomenological description of the different ways technologies shape moral decision-
making is taken as an invitation to question those meditations on the basis of existing ethical 
frameworks; however, on a strong reading of technological mediation, the subject who begins by 
assessing whether a particular technology is “good” or “bad” ends up asking ethical questions 
about their notions of an ideal present and future self (310) The strong reading explicitly links the 
results of phenomenological description to existential questions that implicate the human subject 
and their moral judgments of present and future selves. “Rather than anticipating the future 
workings of technologies, the strong view suggests that through making potential mediations 
explicit, we face our own possible future” (Ibid). Technological mediation, then, disrupts the 
central TA assumptions of an external and anticipatory position with respect to the process of 
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technological change. Human relatedness to technology implies a relatedness to the self, and 
moreover, a relatedness to established technological artifacts and systems, not simply to those of 
the near to distant future.30 
This hermeneutic transformation of TA undermines many of the core assumptions of 
assessment methodology, but what is less clear is how it could change the practice of supranational, 
national and municipal TA institutions, as well as the discourse in civil society and citizens’ 
groups. It is not immediately clear, in other words, how the ethical theory of technological 
mediation can be applied to political institutions. 
The movement from ethics to politics therefore admits of some reflection if it is to be achieved 
with any degree of success. Verbeek and the postphenomenologists have embraced Aristotelian 
virtue ethics, the ethics of the good life, as the ethical framework to steer technological mediation 
into normative discussions about the morality of technologies. Resuscitating virtue ethics, 
however, also calls to mind the question of an appropriate political philosophy of technology, and 
whether this, too, can be found among the Greeks. Though I am skeptical of this possibility, I think 
further engagement with Aristotle’s theory of constitution could lead the way to a more refined 
understanding of the relation between morals and politics. 
Aristotle in the concluding chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics transitions from ethical to 
political reflection, citing the necessity of teaching good habits to the populace by means of 
legislation. In Aristotle’s view, the virtuous life is a difficult one to cultivate, and while a select 
 
30 Verbeek uses the term “technological accompaniment” to emphasize the relatedness, even companionship of 
humans and technology (2011 p.164). Bas de Boer et al. address the etymological root of “accompany,” which is the 
Old French accompaigner, “to take as companion,” in contrast to the Medieval Italian assessare, “the fixing of the 
amount of taxes and fines (2018 p. 311). I continue to employ the term “co-constitution” because of its more active 
connotations, as well as its resonance within political theory. 
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few are able to live virtuously of their own accord, this cannot be expected of those who make up 
the majority of society. To promote the good life at higher levels of organization, then, the state 
must have good laws, “for most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments 
rather than the sense of what is noble” (1180a 11-12). The legislator is a figure whose primary 
interest is in helping people learn how to be good, and legislation is the means of incarnating this 
vision of the good life into law. Legislation continues to play an important role in The Politics; 
however, the focus in that work shifts to a discussion of the best forms of government, both in 
general and with respect to particular contingent circumstances. The discussion therefore amounts 
to a comparative study of political constitutions, which Aristotle defines as follows: 
A constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the 
governing body, and what is the end of each community. But laws are not to be confounded 
with the principles of the constitution; they are the rules according to which the magistrates 
should administer the state and proceed against offenders.31 (1289a 15-22) 
From the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes, the constitution is the formal cause [causa 
formalis] of the state. The constitution of a state—which need not be materially inscribed, but 
embodied in certain institutions, norms and practices—is its form, on account of which the state 
can be subject to normative judgment. The form of government in a democracy, for instance, 
differs from that of an oligarchy or a monarchy, and each of these contains advantages and 
disadvantages that must conform to the local conditions. These local conditions are the material 
cause [causa materialis] “out of which” the state comes into being and include the people as well 
as the endowments of the natural environment. However, the above definition of a constitution 
also indicates the state’s primary agent of change, the governing body, as an efficient cause [causa 
 
31 Aristotle defines the constitution [politeia] at multiple points in The Politics. (Cf. III.1. 1274b 32-41). 
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efficiens], and the end of the community as a final cause [causa finalis], “for the sake of which,” 
which can be interpreted as the highest good to which the political community can aspire. The 
normative evaluation of a constitution, then, reflects a hermeneutics of the state that aims at a rich 
description of its governmental form as it is present to the observer. The co-constitution at hand is 
that of the virtue of the citizens and of the laws, the ethical and existential implications being the 
type of people we want to be expressed through the legal provisions under the constitution. 
If the theory of technological mediation holds, one implication is that technologies exert a 
similar influence on the citizens as legislation. However, it does not follow from the state’s 
legitimate right to create and enforce its own laws that the state must have a similar control over 
technologies, nor is such a level of control feasible. However, if there are institutional implications 
emanating from the claim that technologies play an active, rather than a neutral role in moral 
decision-making, then political theorists have a challenge in determining the context-dependent 
appropriateness of state control over technologies. This challenge should also be a potential cause 
for concern among postphenomenologists, for it exposes the possibility that the praxis implied in 
technological mediation could be politically impractical. The moral status of technological 
artifacts, for example, might not matter in the assignment of legal liability. In his response to 
Verbeek’s Moralizing Technology, Martin Peterson critiques the moral relevance of technological 
mediation by noting that, even if a gun shapes moral-decision making, in the event of a shooting 
the human is held legally responsible, not the gun. While Verbeek aims to attach moral agency to 
the “the-assembly-of-the-gun-and-the-person-shooting,” Peterson argues that the attempt fails 
because of the conflation of the gun-person assembly and the person-shooting in the act of 
shooting, which is, in the end, the only morally relevant actor.  
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The crux of Peterson’s critique is the denial of the moral relevance of technological artifacts 
due to their lack of agency. Technologies lack moral agency, in his view, because they lack 
“intentionality” in the normal sense of “the ability to form intentions” (Verbeek p. 55 qtd. in 
Selinger 620). However, while it is manifest that contemporary technologies cannot form 
intentions of their own, they retain moral relevance because of the relationship of co-constitution 
between humans and technology. The relevant sense of “intentionality” here is not moral, but 
phenomenological, related to the directedness of human experience towards the world.32 Bas de 
Boer et al. affirm that, in the case of the gun, we indeed hold the shooter responsible, though the 
action of shooting arises out of a relation that posits the human as a killer and the gun as a murder 
weapon (311). The existential difference between the human shooter and the gun is that the “human 
self is always relating to its technological relatedness, i.e., it takes heed of its being in the world 
through technologies,” whereas the gun has no such capacity for self-reflection (Ibid). 
Nevertheless, part of relating to one’s technological relatedness is the awareness that engagement 
with technologies is also an engagement with the self. The question of whether it is morally 
permissible to buy a gun is different from the broader question of how gun ownership transforms 
the horizon of morally relevant decisions and provokes ethical reflection on the moral status of the 
newly constituted gun-person. For political thought, this matter of existentialist self-constitution 
is enlarged to include the normative deliberations of the community. 
 
32 Peterson’s objection to the casual comparison of moral and phenomenological intentionality is warranted, and in 
individual passages Verbeek seems to be guilty of making this comparison (See Verbeek 2011 p.16). What is not 
warranted, however, is the claim that Verbeek locates moral agency in artifacts in-themselves; their moral relevance, 
rather, reveals itself only in relation with human actors who can be held responsible for their actions. 
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THE CRITIQUE OF TECHNĒ AND POLITEIA 
In the political theory of technology, the ethical implications of technological mediation 
correspond to an existing approach developed by Langdon Winner that emphasizes the political 
relevance of technological artifacts as well as the political forms embedded in technological 
systems. For a constitutional interpretation of technological change, the latter is of primary 
importance, but dwelling on Winner’s initial writings on “technology as legislation” will preserve 
the logical movement from legislation to constitution established by Aristotle in The Nicomachean 
Ethics. 
Winner sets the groundwork for technology as legislation in Autonomous Technology: 
Technics out of Control as a Theme in Political Thought, in which he offers a history of modern 
technological change and its interpretation among critics from science, sociology, philosophy and 
political thought. Earlier, I commented on Winner’s discussion of Technocracy from the fifth 
chapter of that work in the context of early 20th century liberal technocratic thought. However, the 
central rhetorical movement of the book occurs at the beginning of chapter six, where Winner 
shifts focus from describing how technocratic elites and hegemonic groups control technological 
development for their benefit, to questioning if there are “conditions, constraints, necessities, 
requirements, or imperatives effectively governing how an advanced technological society 
operates?” (173). The nature of such a question, Winner claims, is to ask after what governs? and 
not who governs? (Ibid). Such a question immediately challenges the intuitive notion that human 
beings can gain control of technological systems, the fundamental premise of Veblen’s Soviet of 
Engineers and the early TA movement.  
Rather than merely designing technological means to suit our ends, humans in modern societies 
exhibit a tendency for reverse adaptation — “the adjustment of human ends to match the character 
 108 
of available means” — with respect to technology (229). Effectively, humankind is adapting to the 
specifications of technology, reversing the causal relationship we typically associate with the use 
of tools. From a regulatory perspective, the increasing complexity of technical systems has 
diffused technical knowledge such that ordinary people understand “less and less about the 
fundamental structures and processes sustaining them” (295). 
With this groundwork underfoot, Winner introduces the fundamental notion of technology as 
legislation, resting on the awareness that “modern technics, much more than politics as 
conventionally understood, now legislates the conditions of human existence” (324). Here, 
technology acts alongside the legislator as a lawgiver, harkening back to the role of the Latin legis-
lator [“law-giver/bearer”]. Winner compares this nascent notion of technological politics to the 
usual social reaction of legislating against technological change, which consists of constructing a 
structure of legal regulation to maximize the utility and minimize the damages of emerging 
technologies.  
Legislating against technology, Winner argues, is characteristic of both the expert risk and 
cost-benefit calculations of the economic field and the equally well-intentioned programs of “the 
ecology movement, Naderism, technology assessment, and public interest science” (319). In his 
view, all of these groups share the externalist position with regard to technological change. They 
look to effect changes in developing future technologies, without considering how politics is 
embedded in technological systems. Thus, the matters of interest in considering the right 
implementation of technological systems are not limited to health and safety, but also fundamental 
political ends. 
Recalling from Aristotle the claim that laws conform to a constitution, not vice versa, we can 
then ask how individual technologies conform to a technological constitution of society. Winner 
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takes up the theme of legislation again in his collection of essays The Whale and the Reactor (WR) 
and applies the ideas of constitutionalism to technology in the chapter entitled “Technē and 
Politeia.” The central claim he makes here is essentially identical to the one made in Autonomous 
Technology, that technologies themselves should be treated as a matter of political inquiry and 
debate. The history of constitutional thinking, exemplified in Winner’s account by the 
contributions of the architects of the U.S. Constitution, leads him to draw a parallel between 
political constitutions and the regimes of instrumentality contained in technological systems: “Just 
as Plato and Aristotle posed the question, what is the best form of political society? an age of high 
technology ought to ask, what forms of technology are compatible with the kind of society we 
want to build?” (52). To illustrate this question, Winner explores the example of energy production 
technologies, comparing the political regimes contained in nuclear energy production, requiring 
centralization, high security and expert management, to the “soft energy paths” of photovoltaic 
solar power managed at the level of neighborhood governance (53).33 Thinking of technological 
forms also threatens to upset the economic commitment to efficiency, and the liberal commitments 
to maximize social utility based on these economic considerations. The premise of efficiency, 
Winner argues, is an important one, though it has become the object of a reductive approach to 
government regulation: “putting Btus or kilowatt-hours in the numerator and dollars in the 
denominator and worshipping the resulting ratio as gospel” (53). 
The upshot offered in this chapter resembles a variation on the common refrain of 
democratizing the process of technological change. Because this general refrain is so common, 
having entered the territory of an empty signifier, the utmost care is required to understand 
 
33 Winner uses the description of different modes of energy production from Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths, 
Harper Collins, 1979. 
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Winner’s position on democracy and technology. To that end, I quote two passages from “Technē 
and Politeia” at length. The first concerns the mostly descriptive issue of how to locate 
technologies of interest in the democratic polity: 
If we were to identify and characterize all of the sociotechnical systems in our society, all of 
our regimes of instrumentality and their complex interconnections, we would have a clear 
picture of the second constitution I mentioned earlier, [See p. 47] one that stands parallel to 
and occasionally overlaps the constitution of political society as such. (55) 
The second passage concerns the subjection of technological change to democratic control: 
Faced with any proposal for a new technological system, citizens or their representatives would 
examine the social contract implied by building that system in a particular form. They would 
ask, How well do the proposed conditions match our best sense of who we are and what we 
want this society to be? Who gains and who loses power in the proposed change? Are the 
conditions produced by the change compatible with equality, social justice, and the common 
good? To nurture this process would require building institutions in which the claims of 
technical expertise and those of a democratic citizenry would regularly meet face to face. Here 
the crucial deliberations would take place, revealing the substance of each person's arguments 
and interests. The heretofore concealed importance of technological choices would become a 
matter for explicit study and debate. (Ibid) 
At first blush, the descriptive claims made in the first passage are consonant with the classical ideal 
of constitutional thinking that seeks to compare different regimes on the basis of their revealed 
form. However, it would be an incredible undertaking to describe in detail all of the relevant 
artifacts and systems. This project is made even more difficult by the fact that the forms of 
technologies are also subject to the dynamic process of technological change. From a hermeneutic 
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perspective, there are also concerns about positioning oneself outside of technologies in order to 
get the “clear picture” of the whole that Winner describes (Ibid). It is important to recognize, then, 
that this passage is a conditional statement of the form “If p then q”. However, Winner does not 
express any doubt here about the likelihood of p, our capacity to “identify and characterize all of 
the sociotechnical systems in our society,” even though previously he had emphasized how 
technological systems were becoming increasingly unintelligible even to the engineers who took 
part in constructing them (Ibid).34 
These two passages confirm that Winner has in mind a model of democracy that combines 
elements of interest-group pluralism and consensus decision-making. The pluralist elements 
appear in the emphasis on “building institutions in which the claims of technical expertise and 
those of a democratic citizenry would regularly meet face to face,” an attempt to include two major 
pillars of legitimacy in decision-making: the technical community and the non-technical populace 
(Ibid). Engineers, programmers and other possible members of the technical community thus do 
not count first as citizens, but as technicians. Citizens, then, are the newcomers on the decision-
making scene. Winner evidently thinks citizen participation represents an important source of 
legitimacy; however, on this matter contradicts he himself. In the first sentence of the second 
passage, he states that citizens or their representatives should debate the constitutional merits of a 
given technical proposal. The statement is disjunctive, implying an awkward symmetry between 
citizens and representatives that Winner does not acknowledge. From a practical perspective, 
legislators spend their time in politics debating proposals, whereas the image of the engaged 
 
34 Cf. Autonomous Technology, Ch. 7 “Complexity and the Loss of Agency” (pp. 279–305).  
E.g., “The gap between the realities of the world and the pictures individuals have of that world grows ever greater. 
For this reason, the possibility of directing technological systems toward clearly perceived, consciously chosen, 
widely-shared aims becomes an increasingly dubious matter” (295). 
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citizen, especially in the United States, is mostly a fiction. Winner does not deconstruct the political 
ontology of the citizen in this chapter, leaving the pool of participants in municipal, regional, 
national and international deliberations over technology open to interpretation and, thus, to biases 
that could compromise the statistical representativeness of the citizenry as an interest-group.  
Furthermore, Winner relies on a vague notion of consensus decision-making to support his 
conjectures about the kinds of questions that would arise in deliberations over technology. He 
claims that the form of “things” should reflect “deliberately articulated, widely shared” social 
notions; such a procedure that aims at cultivating “widely shared” notions must therefore exceed 
the requirements of strict majoritarianism, while still retaining a neutral position about which 
social ends are valuable (Ibid). The consensus that Winner aims to build, then, is characteristically 
relativistic with regard to final ends within the boundaries of acceptability for social liberalism. 
Among the “key political ends” Winner explicitly lists in the vicinity of these passages, for 
example, are “freedom” and “social justice,” as well as “equality, social justice, and the common 
good” (55; 56). There seems to be an issue of commitment here, and I think there are two main 
ways of reading this enumeration of ends and the peculiar repetition of “social justice” across the 
two lists: either Winner chose these ends carefully, and therefore thought that “freedom” and 
“social justice” are appropriate ends for technical regimes (55), and the other three ends, “equality, 
social justice, and the common good” (56) for technological change, or he did not choose them 
carefully, and merely chose words that signaled a sufficient smattering of normative values. I am 
partial to the latter interpretation, given that there is no justification for examining the role of 
freedom in the context of technical regimes, but strictly not in the context of technological change. 
Perhaps Winner merely wants to avoid constraining himself in order to provide rhetorical support 
for democratic decision-making, though the normative charge of this and other examples of his 
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work remains ambiguous. The only normative end that is articulated in any substance is 
communitarianism tempered with a strong dose of procedural democracy. The major problem with 
the process of technological change, then, is that it is not democratic enough, with democracy 
conforming to an astroturf conception of community-based political participation. Winner 
reinforces this unqualified community sentiment in the chapter with the liberal use of “we” and 
“our” rhetoric addressed to his readers, a pathological appeal on the basis of a common struggle 
against technological domination.  
Thus, I conclude that Winner’s project to examine the technical constitution of society lacks 
sufficient prescriptive substance to guide a future for constitutional thinking on the subject of 
technology. While his proposals are generally acceptable to the average left-leaning person living 
in a modern liberal democracy, this is because they combine the enlightenment optimism of the 
founding fathers with the generic ends of freedom, social justice and equality. These ends, while 
often mutually supportive, can also come into conflict with each other. The establishment of 
property rights, for example, often involves considerations of economic freedoms against the 
social inequalities that might result from the creation of a market; this was the case in the debates 
surrounding the establishment of the Domain Name System on the commercial Internet in the 
1990s.35 The deliberative institutions Winner envisions obscure the conflicts of technological 
change and present deliberation as a benign process where “we” cultivate a “widely shared” notion 
of what is good, just, free, and equal. 
 
35 E.g., the conflict between preserving copyrights and trademarks vs. permitting freedom of speech. See Bradshaw 
and Denardis, “The Politicization of the Internet’s Domain Name System: Implications for Internet Security, 
Universality, and Freedom.” New Media and Society, for a detailed study on the political debates surrounding 
domain names. 
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There is, however, a more robust notion of democracy that has not yet figured prominently in 
the discourse surrounding the regulation of technological change. This is the notion of democracy 
supported by contemporary republican political theorists, and its fundamental difference lies in an 
emphasis on the instrumental role of democratic institutions in promoting freedom as non-
domination. It is democracy not as mere consensus-building, but as the people’s effective capacity 
to contest the actions of governing bodies. 
THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
While I do not think it necessary to define and defend democracy as a political idea every time it 
is mentioned for the simple reason that most people in democratic societies share some basic 
assumptions about the importance of elections, representation and accountability, and so on, I 
briefly do so here as a reminder that democracy can indeed hold contingent meanings, and that 
each of these will hold a different set of implications for the kind of culture and institutions fostered 
in a democratic society. Democracy, then, is restated here as an ideal in which the people [demos] 
have control or power [kratos] over the government of their community. The notion that the people 
control the government, however, does not presuppose that it is the people who govern. Perhaps 
that is the ideal of direct democracy, where an assembly including all the people in a community 
makes the laws. But the people’s assembly in a direct democracy is an overly demanding and often 
disastrous institutional requirement when taken as the only seat of decision-making power in a 
community. In any case, it is my contention that direct democracy is not actually the best or most 
perfect form of democratic government; or, better, direct democracy is not sufficient from the 
perspective of non-domination because it is without balance. In the event that at least one person 
does not have a fair shot of influencing the assembly, of having their voice heard, that person is 
subject to the combined will of the rest of the assembly’s members. What the democratic assembly 
 115 
lacks is something to keep it accountable, a counterforce, which is not something to be worried 
about when everyone has an equal chance to participate but becomes a matter of salient concern 
for the political community which vests political power in an elected group of representatives, as 
is the case in most modern democratic societies.  
Alexander D. Lindsay, Scottish democratic theorist of the early 20th century, argues in The 
Essentials of Democracy that the essence of democracy implies a constitutional arrangement that 
endows each person with an equal opportunity to set the agenda for public decision-making; the 
ideal of democracy, argues Lindsay, is not the massive public meeting (analogous to a Yes or No 
referendum), but the dispersion of democratic deliberation across all levels of society. The 
representative assembly in this arrangement serves as “chairman for the multifarious informal 
discussion of the nation as a whole, and the measure of the successful working of democracy is 
the extent to which the voting of the ordinary man and woman has been informed by this widely 
diffused public discussion” (qtd. in Cohen 546). Thus, voting continues to play an essential role in 
democratic government, though for Lindsay it is not sufficient to gain the consent of the governed 
in any old way. The strength of democracy lies not in the rubber-stamping of an uninformed 
electorate, a nameless mass of so-called citizens, but in the “free give and take of discussion” that 
occurs among equals, where each can seize the opportunity to contribute what they can to the 
discussion (544). Voting is an efficient way to field public opinion, but it does not embody the 
democratic ideal of discussion. Lindsay’s view also echoes that of other political theorists, such as 
Hannah Arendt, who argue that discussion among equals is a source of dialogical thinking, a 
particular way of finding things out: “The root of the matter is that if the discussion is at all 
successful, we discover something which could not have been discovered in any other way” (545). 
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Contemporary calls to “democratize” technology have in mind a particular vision of 
democracy and assign to democracy a particular normative weight. I have attempted here to present 
a notion of democracy as a means to an end, albeit a means that is compelling enough—regrettably, 
in my view—to rise to the status of an end-in-itself. Democracy, in the sense of popular control of 
government, is a means in two relevant ways in the present application of popular control of 
technological change. First, democracy is a means of political decision-making that reflects the 
practice of dialectical reasoning. Second, however, democracy is a means to attaining the end of 
non-domination. This is the role of democracy in republican forms of government, where 
democratic processes serve as an opposition to the actions of other centers of power. Republican 
government, in the way Pettit describes, is government “on the people’s terms,” such that the 
actions of the government are subject to public scrutiny and the members of the public play their 
role in resisting policies that tend toward domination. Posturing democracy as a means to secure 
non-domination implies that the constitution of the state arranges for a democratic system “that 
follows deliberative patterns of decision-making, that includes all the major voices difference 
within the community, and that responds appropriately to the contestations raised against it” (Pettit 
1997 p.200). 
Even if popular control over technologies is not feasible, it is an ideal to work towards that 
exerts a demand on the effective capacity of citizens to resist the dominating technologies of their 
everyday lives. Therefore, from a constitutional perspective, the link between democracy and 
technological change requires more than establishing spaces for deliberation; it also requires 
structuring the technological agenda such that the development of certain technologies is “off the 
table” in the absence of broad public discussion about what the introduction of these technologies 
means for the body politic, and further, it requires structuring political interaction such that a 
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person qua citizen is able to have a fair hearing of their complaint related to technology, especially 
if their complaint seems at first blush to have grave implications for the non-dominated status of 
themselves or others. Any political system that respects the average person’s capacity to make 
basic normative judgments—that is, any democratic republic worth its salt—ought to open the 
substantive debate on issues related to technology to this person and persons like them. On the 
basis of the foregoing description in Chapter three of how technologies structure the movement of 
citizens through an underground metro system, technology shows itself to be a matter of public 
concern of similar weight to legislation, even though the legislation of technology often occurs 
outside of the legislative powers of government. 
What is an example of a republican institution that can come into contact with technology? In 
the last part of this chapter, I will briefly present on two such institutions that represent the core of 
popular control of technology: the legislative body and the citizens’ committee. Recalling the 
postphenomenological claim that technology assessment must not stand outside the process of 
technological change, each of these institutions is ideally engaged in an eclectic interaction with 
the centers of imagining, designing, building, testing, evaluating and living with the relevant 
technological forms. Although it is rare to think this way in political theory, the people within 
these institutions are thus subject to existential provocations in their interactions with certain 
technologies, provocations that lead to reflection and discussion on the ramifications of 
technological change both in the future and in the present moment.  
Rather than design technologies themselves, which political institutions are not likely to do, 
these “types” of institutions facilitate reflection on technological mediations. The structure of this 
regulatory regime is thus directed towards technologies, but equally concerned with how the 
technologies embedded in society frame social relationships.  
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Note that here I do not pretend to a complete “ecosystem” of actors related to the dynamic 
process of technological change. I am aware that it is important to include all of the relevant 
stakeholders in a discussion about the implementation of a technology, or the drafting of a 
regulatory (legal) regime around it. The list of such stakeholders inevitably contains government, 
industry, financial interests, academia, the technical and scientific community, consumers, the 
media etc. For example, there can be no fair discussion on what to do about the rising levels of 
CO2 in the atmosphere, so argue the proponents of multi stakeholderism, without including the 
polluters along with those affected most directly by pollution. The conceit of multi-stakeholderism, 
however, is to downplay the imbalances in power that these different parties bring to the table. 
Especially when the table plays host to a negotiation, rather than a democratic discussion or debate, 
the hegemony of groups with greater bargaining power is assured. What perverts the economic 
logic of bargaining as a mechanism of social ordering is not transaction costs, but the belief that 
private self-interest should prevail over communal deliberation. 
To promote non-domination as a political ideal requires robust political institutions. It is 
possible, of course, that most traditional stakeholders have no intention to dominate the others. 
However, in a republic, the people are the ultimate stakeholders. The republican state is res 
publica, a “public thing,” and the republican government thus serves as a trustee of the people. It 
is the people who wish not to be dominated. To an even greater extent, minorities and marginalized 
groups within the populace risk not having their voices heard in an environment where dominant 
stakeholders can operate with impunity.  
The following discussion is therefore focused on the institutions that are positioned to represent 
the public interest in the most direct manner, at the cost of bracketing the stakeholders who 
represent their own private interests. It is aimed at bringing out the contours of a community whose 
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adoption of technologies is based on a practice of dialectical deliberation both within and between 
these institutions. That the instigators of technological change do not engender relations of 
domination is its immediate project; that these instigators also to treat people as humans first—
and only then as customers, consumers, users, employees, or even citizens—is its silent object and 
perhaps the most difficult to achieve in an instrumental culture such as my own. 
The legislative body 
First, I consider the role of the legislative body in a state with respect to promoting technological 
non-domination. In a mixed constitution, the political body that holds the power of making 
legislation derives its legitimacy from the people. Locke articulates a still-persistent attitude 
toward the legislative power when he writes in the Second Treatise that the “Legislative is not only 
the supream power of the Common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the 
Community have once placed it” (§ 134 9-11 p.356). That the legislative power did not act via 
arbitrary decree or hand its power to a third-party was a validation of consent, “the consent of the 
Society,” which for Locke was the principal requirement of legitimate government. With respect 
to other governmental bodies—traditionally the executive, judicial, etc.—the legislative is thus 
responsible for the generation of public law and, in Locke’s common-wealth model, derives its 
legitimate right from the consent of the governed. 
Republican government, by contrast, treats contestability rather than consent as the validation 
of political legitimacy, requiring that individuals enjoy a degree of influence and direction over 
government. Pettit’s discussion of the ideal form of assembly in On the People’s Terms reveals 
that a requirement on such national representative assemblies is that they are responsive to the 
people’s dispositions. The method of electing these representatives, however, does not form the 
bulk of his considerations, so much as their dependence on the good will of constituents. The 
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periodic election of representatives reinforces basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, 
assembly and movement in the short term, and in the long term the floor of the assembly allows a 
space to continually refresh the political agenda (201). Pettit contrasts the elected assembly with 
an indicative assembly, usually chosen by lot or sampled to be statistically representative 
according to the proportion of different social groups; the elected assembly, he argues, performs 
better on a non-domination account because it requires the reinforcement of the above liberties 
during election season and attaches itself to the people’s will. Popular influence over the 
composition of the legislature and the legislative agenda is a basic constitutional feature, but it 
must be complemented by a mechanism that allows statistical minorities and marginalized groups 
to challenge legislation on grounds of discrimination. Pettit argues that religious and cultural 
minorities ought to have such opportunities to contest public policy and to have access to an 
impartial hearing of their case (214). It is essential, on this view, that three institutional 
requirements regarding the legislative process are met: (1) transparency with regard to what 
legislation is on the agenda, (2) contestability with regard to the ability to challenge legislation and 
(3) impartiality with regard to the opportunity to have one’s case heard by an impartial judge (215). 
The legislative power of a social majority is therefore tempered in this system by the presence of 
strong institutional checks against political domination. Having this standard view of the 
representative legislative branch of government in mind, I now turn to the question of how this 
body should approach the process of technological change in a constitutional and regulatory 
capacity. 
The co-constitution of technology and society presents legislative bodies with an imperative 
for action, especially when it becomes clear that technologies—including, but not limited to new 
instruments, machines and software—are mediating existing relations of domination or fashioning 
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entirely new ones. There is a bounty of historical examples to illustrate this point; in chapter one, 
I pointed to the shift in social policy from laissez-faire to stronger regulatory regimes as legislators 
responded to the increasing consciousness of the general public of the dominance of capitalist 
industrial owners over workers. More recently, the advent of algorithmic decision-making has 
sparked a growing public debate about the discrimination from software that reproduces existing 
biases of socially constructed categories such as race, class and gender. For example, the African 
American Studies scholar Ruha Benjamin provides compelling evidence of encoded racial 
discrimination in a recidivism prediction algorithm, discrimination that had its origin in the survey 
data on which the algorithm was built: 
[T]he survey given to prospective parolees to forecast the likelihood that they will recidivate 
includes questions about their criminal history, education and employment history, financial 
history, and neighborhood characteristics (among many other factors). As all these variables 
are structured by racial domination – from job market discrimination to ghettoization – the 
survey measures the extent to which an individual’s life chances have been impacted by racism 
without ever asking an individual’s race.36 (55) 
The above variables are disproportionately associated with the depressed social and economic 
condition of Black people in the United States because of systemic racism of the kind that has 
existed since the founding of the country. If one accepts the premise that racial discrimination still 
persists on a systemic level—that is, that discriminatory practices are embedded in legal structures 
and social mores—then it is not such a huge leap to accept the premise that racial domination can 
also persist within the technical constitution of a society. Winner on this point is rather obtuse 
 
36 See Ruha Benjamin. Race after Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code, Polity Press, 2019. 
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about the history of the American political constitution, praising the “wise political craftsmanship” 
of the founders, the proof being that “[t]he results of their work include two centuries of relatively 
stable government in the United States, a sign that they practiced their craft well” (WR 49). That 
“relatively” hopefully refers to the rupture in American history that was the Civil War (1860 – 
1865), a conflict that saw the secession of eleven Southern states who sought to preserve the 
institution of plantation slavery against Northern legislators and the new President of the Republic, 
Abraham Lincoln. There were, in fact, constitutional provisions that buttressed the institution of 
slavery written in the original constitution of 1789: 
• Article I Section 2 counts enslaved people [“all other Persons”] as three fifths of free men 
in the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes. 
• Article I Section 9 forbids Congress from imposing a limit on the “Importation of such 
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit” until the year 1808, 
though allows for a tax of up to ten dollars per person.  
• Article V forbids Congress from amending the first and fourth clauses of Art. 1 Sec. 9 
before the year 1808. 
• Article IV Section 2, “the fugitive slave clause,” I quote in its entirety [italics mine]:  
No Person held to Service or Labour [no slave] in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to 
whom such Service or Labour may be due. 
Despite the Civil War Amendments—13, 14 and 15—that effectively annulled the institution of 
slavery in the United States, it is important to note that the above provisions constitute a still-
existing layer of the legal and technical sediment of the nation’s history. The protection of slavery 
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embedded in the U.S. Constitution exposes at the same time a massive design failure and a long-
term necessity of constitutional government. The design failure, of course, was the inclusion of 
rules that arranged for domination on a national scale, sending the nation down a path that both 
exterminated millions of African slaves and their descendants and plunged the country into civil 
war due to a fundamental, irreconcilable contradiction. Systemic defects of an arrangement, such 
as the encoding of plantation slavery, are liable to arise over the long-term. Constitutions, then, 
which are arrangements of government, must therefore remain open to rearrangement. Even 
though we call these rearrangements “amendments,” connoting a change of gradual weight, the 
content of a given rearrangement might be more revolutionary, a violent upheaval of the system, 
than merely gradual and reformist.  
Because the constitution forms the backbone of the polity, however there must be compelling 
reasons to bend it out of shape. During the period of American Reconstruction, directly after the 
Civil War, the establishment of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection under 
the law, as well as against slave labor and disenfranchisement, represented compelling reasons for 
the legislature to do violence, to violate and therefore to alter the Constitution from its original 
form. The 14th Amendment, for example, associated with due process and equal protection under 
the law, provides for “privileges and immunities” whose exercise contradicts the original 
proslavery provisions; out of this contradiction, there is an implied deconstruction of practices tied 
to the institution of slavery, and of the ways of life this institution engendered. It was indeed in 
Article V, the same article that forbade Congress from limiting the import of slaves, that provided 
for the undoing of legal slavery, if not for the material forms of racial domination that have 
persisted since the formal end of slave labor. 
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The legislature is also responsible for regulatory decisions in the short term, though I have 
purposefully not touched on these short-term considerations to highlight the long-term, historical 
role the legislature plays in sometimes affirming, sometimes modifying, and sometimes 
completely altering the basic structure of things. A constitutional interpretation of technological 
change has to take this possibility into account; that the technological structure of society is liable 
to be reinforce relations of domination, and that therefore it must always be effectively open to the 
deconstructive and reconstructive acts of government. 
The technologies that open themselves most readily to systematic restructuring of this sort are 
the kinds that span the entire domain of regulation. These technologies are most likely to be large-
scale, ubiquitous, interconnected and integrated; they are likely to resemble systems rather than 
individual instances and are thus open to systematic thinking of their political consequences. While 
a single interface of predictive policing like the one Benjamin writes does not fulfill the criteria, a 
network of algorithmic policing practices probably would. In the event that the public identifies 
such a network as a possible site of domination, the technology itself, its form, as well as its 
material effect on communities should be open to public scrutiny. Representatives of the public 
will, who have the interests of all people at heart, can then render a judgment on the 
constitutionality of this technology. If the technology engenders or exacerbates a relation of 
domination, then authorities order an injunction of that technology in its dominating form.37 For 
 
37 There is a school of economic analysis that draws on the framework of Coasean bargaining (See R. H. Coase “The 
Problem of Social Cost.” The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 3, no. Oct. 1960, pp. 1–44.) to argue that the 
assignment of damages represents a more efficient resolution of property and liability disputes than injunctions. For 
example, suppose that a predictive policing algorithm that calculates where drug deals are likely to occur in Los 
Angeles leads an officer, Peter, to wrongfully arrest an innocent bystander, Melissa, on suspicion of drug possession. 
If the city were to place an injunction on the use of the algorithmic software because it was a proximate cause of the 
wrongful arrest, the economic cost of the injunction would likely be high for the Police Department, and Melissa 
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such a technology to return to market, or otherwise resume implementation, it must take on an 
improved mediating role. The details of these matters are to be applied on a case-by-case basis, 
but the point of the preceding discussion has been to suggest that, when individual cases of 
domination multiply and constitute a veritable social pattern, it is for the legislature to respond as 
a trustee of the public interest. 
The citizens’ committee 
I objected to the facile way Winner referred to citizen participation in shaping the technical 
constitution, though there are some paradigmatic cases of local citizen-led government that he cites 
as instructive examples. Referring to the political ideology of decentralism, he cites “The New 
England Town meeting, Spanish anarchist communities, and political practices of the sans-culottes 
in the French Revolution,” which, in his view, “express a desire to involve citizens in public 
deliberations through direct democratic roles” (89). Winner is also committed to the thesis that, 
contrary to the hopes of liberal theorists like Yochai Benkler, Internet forums for public 
deliberation contribute to the dissolution of political discourse. Taking his rhetorical cues from 
public sphere theorists such as Arendt and Jurgen Habermas, Winner valorizes face-to-face 
deliberation as an essential component of democracy, dismissing the so-called democratizing 
effects of networked technologies: 
 
would not receive any relief for being wronged by Peter. Assuming transaction costs are low, the assignment of 
monetary damages is a more efficient solution because the Police Department can bargain with Melissa to cover the 
subjective costs of a wrongful arrest (physical, social, psychological, etc.) while its officers are still able to use the 
software. Furthermore, if predictive software positions police officers to engage in a pattern of wrongful arrests over 
time, the efficiency of Coasean bargaining multiplies in like proportion. To what extent, however, should  we 
consider the tradeoff of  economic efficiency and police domination over the communities these algorithms happen 
to target? 
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The vitality of democratic politics depends upon people's willingness to act together in pursuit 
of their common ends. It requires that on occasion members of a community appear before 
each other in person, speak their minds, deliberate on paths of action, and decide what they 
will do. This is considerably different from the model now upheld as a breakthrough for 
democracy: logging onto one's computer, receiving the latest information, and sending back 
an instantaneous digitized response. (WR 111) 
The Second Edition of The Whale and the Reactor features a similar lament of the death of the 
town meeting, initiated by the founding fathers with the centralization of the American state in 
1789 and later accelerated by the invention of the personal computer: 
Thus, the ultimate treasure of the revolution—the immediate, lived experience of public life—
was lost… The general lack of town meetings and similar citizen councils as a feature of 
national government is evident each day as people go on the Internet and tune in to what they 
believe to be forums for public deliberation and debate. They may not notice what is missing 
from this pseudopublic realm and how that yawning absence helps generate wave after wave 
of toxic discourse along with distressing patterns of oligarchical rule, incipient 
authoritarianism, and governance by phonies and confidence men. (WR 192) 
The above passages disclose an ideal image of discursive citizens who are periodically called upon 
to engage in a spirited public debate with their peers. There are a number of theoretical assumptions 
that allow such model citizens to participate in a model citizen council: The council to which these 
citizens belong is presumed to have some degree of decision-making power that motivates their 
desire to work things out on a community level; there is no political bête noire, no immediate 
threat of domination imposing its will on this idealized group of community members; at the proper 
time, the citizens devote their full attention to the discussion; perhaps they are compensated for 
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the time spent deliberating, perhaps not; and finally, deliberation alone is the primary method of 
working out issues of shared concern, assuming that each citizen is sufficiently educated on the 
topic of discussion to have an equal chance of making their contribution. 
Not working out the details is a fine choice to make as a political theorist, but the above 
assumptions are strong, and not exhaustive of the requirements on citizens who would have the 
chance of participating in the public affairs of their communities. Furthermore, though “citizens” 
are all taken to be of the same political status, there are often cleavages in identity that play a role 
in deliberation among citizens and exclude those who do not qualify as such. For much of its 
history, the New England town meeting disenfranchised “‘paupers’, ‘minors, idiots, women, 
lunatics, and aliens” and created significant hierarchies within the group of participants itself, with 
property-owning men enjoying privileges and offices unavailable to non-propertied men (DeWolf 
1890 qtd. in Cossart and Felicetti 2018 p. 250). Institutions of deliberation, then, add an ambiguous 
dimension to a non-domination account of political relations. It is not enough that citizens 
deliberate over certain proposals affecting their communities; to preserve their liberty against other 
human and technological actors, groups of citizens must seize for themselves, the kind of control 
over decision-making that tends toward self-government and away from dependence on the 
arbitrary will of another person, or the mediated domination of technologies. 
Republican constitutional government, with its checks and balances and dispersion of power, 
effects structural change over the long-term. As the seat of legislative power, representative 
assemblies hold a particularly important role in structuring legal regimes around technologies that 
continue to protect the rights of citizens against unprecedented situations of domination. What, 
however, is the role of individual citizens in regulating technological change? 
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In the following discussion of citizens’ interventions in the process of technological change, I 
work from a notion of citizenship that situates citizens as actors in their local communities. There 
are other notions of citizenship, to be sure, but for my purpose of highlighting the self-government 
of technological change, I am chiefly concerned with how the majority of people experience 
citizenship: as active participation in the management of local civic institutions. Rather than 
identification with a nation-state, then, I focus on citizens’ interactions with each other in common 
places and, more importantly, their common control of the construction and mediations of 
technologies in these places. 
This place-centered notion of citizenship leads me to consider a stronger notion of participation 
than that of Winner and his predecessors; one grounded in the experience and political struggles 
of the urban poor and marginalized communities. The motivation for citizen control of local 
institutions, rather than mere participation, comes from the desires of marginalized communities 
to free themselves from the domination of private corporations and technocratic elites. Non-
domination is a well-suited theoretical lens for the purpose of studying how urban communities 
can govern the process of technological change, given that private and public actors often make 
decisions of urban investment and technological development without the meaningful input of 
dominated groups. Although these actors might be well-meaning—trying to elevate the health, 
well-being and socioeconomic outcomes of the urban poor—if they lack an experiential 
knowledge of the communities’ problems and the ability to listen carefully to the communities’ 
concerns, not to mention the will to implement more expensive aspects that will increase access to 
shared resources, then these actors risk perpetuating existing problems rather than alleviating them. 
The sociologist Sherry Arnstein (1969) analyzed the degrees of citizen participation in her 
paper, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” developing a heuristic device to describe the 
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genuineness of citizen input on a given project that would affect their local communities. Unlike 
treatments of citizen participation in much of Western philosophy which tend to cast citizens as 
homogenous actors living in a homogenous community, Arnstein claims that the very notion of 
“participation” is diluted so as to remove agency from communities, especially communities of 
color: 
Participation of the governed in their government is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy—
a revered idea that is vigorously applauded by virtually everyone. The applause is reduced to 
polite handclaps, however, when this principle is advocated by the have-not blacks, Mexican 
Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Eskimos, and whites. And when the have-nots define 
participation as redistribution of power, the American consensus on the fundamental principle 
explodes into many shades of outright racial, ethnic, ideological, and political opposition. (216) 
Arnstein probes deeply here, reminding us that the redistribution of political power from the 
“haves” to the “have-nots” is a rare occurrence. The procedural ritual of participation gives 
powerful actors an air of legitimacy without requiring them to cede any significant power. 
Therefore, despite our democratic intuitions that participation and the deliberations that might 
feature in participation are good, the deconstructed notion of participation also shows itself to be 
a possible technique of domination. 
For Arnstein, genuine citizen participation is the redistribution of power from the haves to the 
have-nots; the consequence of redistribution is community control of local projects and policies. 
The ladder of citizen participation is a typology that measures the degrees of so-called efforts at 
citizen participation (See Fig. 1). It has eight “rungs,” and as one ascends the ladder the level of 
citizen control becomes more pronounced and reflective of self-government of the citizens, by the 
citizens and for the citizens. The bottom rungs of the ladder describe efforts of powerholders to 
 130 
stage mock committees, distort information and deflect from the important issues of concern; 
conversely, the top rungs of the ladder feature delegated decision-making authority where citizens 
hold a majority of seats on planning committees, or even the complete managerial control over 
schools, food cooperatives, economic development committees and other similar community-
based organizations. There are a number of models associated with the highest rung of “citizen 
control,” and Arnstein remarks that the model of the “neighborhood corporation” funded on grants 
from U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, defunct since 1981 but quite active at the time Arnstein 
wrote her article, had already showed positive results; although one such model of community 
control of a school in New York City caused a particular stir, “less publicized experiments are 
demonstrating that the have-nots can indeed improve their lot by handling the entire job of 
planning, policy-making, and managing a program” (223). 
 
Figure 4-1. Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (217) 
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The impulse for self-government in the republican tradition has its origins in the defense of 
liberty; on a non-domination account, this impulse has its parallel in citizens’ demands for greater 
political autonomy. Transferring decision-making authority to a foreign power—or, in modern 
business terms, a third party—was not regrettable as long as the power remained with the people; 
this third-party was authorized to make decisions on the part of the original actor, like a trustee, 
but their performance was subject to contract. For a contemporary citizens’ committee, engaging 
in a similar relationship of trustor and trustee would be fundamentally different from the forms of 
rubber-stamping and placation that prevail in situations where private companies are tasked with 
fielding public opinion. 
The corporate leadership of “smart cities” projects in recent decades has incorporated much of 
the bottom-rung practices of citizen participation. The notion of a “smart city” refers to efforts at 
introducing digital technologies into urban environments that collect massive amounts of data and 
thereby automate the city’s public services. As part of the broader revolution in Information and 
Communication Technologies, the smart city has emerged as a dominant paradigm for this kind of 
technological development, one that combines the increasing capacity of software with the 
capacity of integrating software into the hardware of urban environments. 
Drawing on Arnstein’s article, Paolo Cardullo and Rob Kitchin (2018) create a “scaffold” of 
citizen participation based on their research of the smart city projects in Dublin, Ireland. Their 
scaffold is much more comprehensive than the ladder, positing consumerism as its own (very low) 
degree of participation and providing graphical representation of what roles the citizens play in 
these forms of participation, how their participation is framed and whether a level represents more 
elements of top-down technocratic planning or experimental, autonomous citizen-controlled 
planning (5). However, even though the analysis is expanded, the basic approach is much the same: 
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citizen participation is far from a unified concept and can be used in either mostly empowering or 
mostly degrading ways with respect to citizens’ involvements in smart city management. What 
sets Cardullo and Kitchin’s analysis apart from Arnstein’s is, unfortunately, the rise of 
neoliberalism and the tendency of its practitioners to reduce humans to the status of consumers 
and rational agents while deploying a pro-consumer discourse of legitimation. Additionally, the 
technology-first attitude of smart city development prioritizes the technocratic elements of 
planning by-design; this is what might make it unattractive for citizens to contribute to smart city 
projects or lead their own projects, given that community organizations tend “to organize their 
activities and activism around addressing social and environmental issues through political and 
policy solutions rather than technological ones” (9-10). Cardullo and Kitchin conclude from this 
observation that there is a misalignment between the means and ends of community organizations 
and those of private corporations pushing the smart city agenda. Furthermore, the neoliberal 
ideology behind smart cities tends to frame citizen participation “in a post-political way that 
provides feedback, negotiation, participation and creation, but within an instrumental rather than 
normative or political frame” (10). Neoliberal smart citizens are therefore no more than unpaid 
consultants whose demonstration of participation serves the purpose of legitimating the enterprise 
of dominant groups. Of the alternatives to this corporate-driven model, community control of 
technological implementation will be key to establishing relationships of non-domination in an 
increasingly technologically mediated urban environment. 
Cities, the ancestral home of the citizen, will serve as a focal point in the ideological struggle 
between notions of citizenship based on community control and those based on the dominant role 
of the citizen pro-sumer. The struggle will also play out on a material level, where the group that 
decides what is built and how will dictate the technical constitution of urban environments over 
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the long term. However, even if marginalized communities within cities manage to seize control 
of a significant share of power, the threat of technological domination does not pass. Even if the 
structure of technological implementation is intentional, that does not preclude the possibility that 
communities will be duped by the prospects of an exciting new technological advancement or fail 
to consider in-depth the potential mediations of technologies they aim to integrate into their 
experience. 
This, I think, is where the dialectical method of community deliberation reenters the politics 
of technology. Community control and deliberation are complements in the process of deciding 
which technologies to adopt, how to adopt them and how to otherwise live with them as citizens 
must live with each other. Self-government, of course, places a higher level of responsibility on 
the citizens’ committee; and it might be necessary to provide funding for a citizens’ sabbatical to 
serve on the local Municipal Technology Commission so that its members can take the necessary 
time to reflect; in many cases, citizens’ committees would do well to hire technical, legal or 
industry experts to work on their citizen-led projects, or to hire a full-time staff. What must not be 
lost in the process of this institutionalization, however, is the means of communicating with one 
another. To provide places for citizens to stand with each other on an equal footing and hash things 
out is a requirement of republican government. This might take place in a structured way, drawing 
on the imaginative variations of technological mediation Verbeek describes in Moralizing 
Technology, but ultimately these analytic modes of conversation give way to the more natural 
conversations of a frankness that comes with speaking one’s own language, rather than the 
language of phenomenology, republicanism, liberalism or any other such theory of philosophical 
or political thought that does not necessarily align with the local conditions of first importance. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have worked through a number of attempts to reframe the analysis and design of 
technologies, especially from the perspective of political institutions. The dominant method and 
institutional expression of technology regulation is Technology Assessment (TA), which is 
characterized by a diverse range of approaches to anticipating the possible consequences of such 
and such technology on society. Most of the TA approaches, I argued, were unsatisfactory on a 
phenomenological approach because of their treatment of technological change as an exogenous 
process, rather than one which implicates every member of society in an existential relationship 
with the technologies of the present as well as the technologies to come. 
Of the alternative approaches to TA, I offered a critique of Verbeek’s project of “augmenting” 
TA with postphenomenological mediation analysis, as well as an extended critique of Langdon 
Winner’s dueling concepts of regimes of instrumentality and the technical constitution of society. 
While Winner does well to highlight the political significance of the forms of technologies, his 
solution of employing deliberative democracy to uncover widely shared views about technology 
lacks a basis in the empirical struggle over power, either because of a simplification or an oversight 
on the part of the philosopher. 
Centering the non-domination approach, I discuss two complementary arms of popular control 
of technological change in democratic republics: the legislative body and the citizens’ committee. 
Far from an attempt at a complete typology, my goal in highlighting these two types of institutions 
was to show how they complement each other in global and local thinking about technological 
futures, as well as among different levels of institutional control. Over the long-term, the 
legislature in constitutional government takes on the important role of acting in a universal manner 
to protect the liberty of citizens against domination by means of technology. The citizens’ 
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committee, for its part, is grounded in the everyday experiences of its members, including their 
experiences with technology. In a democratic society, we would like to be reasonable in placing 
our trust in the average person to judge the normative significance of certain decisions and patterns 
thereof; among these is the technological constitution of the city, the place where people come 
together and experience mutual regard.  
Beyond this Arendtian ideal of the city, however, lies the experiences of the dominated within 
its environs. And if there is but one dominated person in the community, then, on a republican 
view, that community cannot be called free. The broad condition of liberty requires that the laws 
have a general application and that they preserve, to the greatest extent possible, the non-dominated 
status of the citizenry. It is not much of a leap to then affirm that technology, too, should serve this 
role, even if the society’s determination of its technological constitution is quite unrefined 
compared to its direction of the political constitution. 
Ultimately, the constitution does not impose a particular form on the community, nor the 
community on the constitution. There is, rather, a constant interactive flux between them. This 
relationship of co-constitution between technology and humanity defies causality, though not 
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